David Glantz – författare

The full story of the most terrible siege in history when over a million people perished, illustrated by pictures recently released from Russian archives.Leningrad (now reverted to its pre-1914 name of St Petersburg) was surrounded by German forces in 1941 and cut off from the rest of Russia. It was besieged for nearly three years, the great city's population suffering terribly in the bitter cold of the Russian winter. Over a million men, women and children died of starvation and hypothermia, but the city fought on and never surrendered.In 1943 the Russian army broke through to link up with the garrison and end the longest, bloodiest siege of the Second World War.

A new edited translation of the Soviet Staff study of the Red Army's Belorussian operation in the summer of 1944, which was unprecedented in terms of its scale, scope and strategic consequences. The Soviet Stavka had planned a campaign consisting of a series of massive operations spanning the entire Soviet-German front. Four powerful fronts (army groups) operated under close Stavka (high command) control. Over 1.8 million troops acomplished a feat unique in the history of the Red Army: the defeat and dismemberment of an entire German army group. This book is a translation of the Soviet General Staff Study No 18, a work originally classified as 'secret' and intended to educate Soviet commanders and staff officers. The operation is presented from the Soviet perspective, in the words of the individuals who planned and orchestrated the plans. A map supplement, including terrain maps, is provided to illustrate the flow of the operation in greater detail.

At the request of the other Allies, on 9th August 1945, a force of over 1.5 million Red Army soldiers unleashed a massive attack against the Japanese in Manchuria. Volume 2 covers the detailed course of operational and tactical fighting in virtually every combat sector.

The Red Army's summer offensive of 1944 against Hitler's Wehrmacht was unprecedented in terms of its scale, scope, and strategic intent and impact. This study details how the Red Army accomplished this feat in the words of those individuals who planned and orchestrated the offensive.

First Published in 1991. This book addresses a critical aspect of Soviet maneuver theory that has been almost totally neglected in Western analysis, specifically, Soviet concern for tactical maneuver. Since the 1930s, the Soviets have consistently argued that operational maneuver can be successful only if conducted in conjunction with equally successful tactical maneuver, carried out primarily by forward detach­ments. Forward detachments, the primary tactical maneuver forces tasked with performing critical combat functions, emerged in theory in the 1930s and flourished on the basis of virtually untested concepts until the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet mobile force structure was destroyed in a matter of weeks. Forward detachments again emerged after the Stalin­ grad Operation in 1943, when the Soviet General Staff required their use to spearhead all operations by mobile forces. After mid-1943, forward detach­ments led the operations of all tank armies and tank and mechanized corps, particularly during exploitation operations. By war's end all forces, mobile and rifle alike, employed forward detachments to lead their operations during the exploitation stage of operations. Forward detachments preempted enemy defenses and collectively formed a coordinated network of forward mobile units which provided coherence to the vast array of advancing Soviet mobile and rifle forces. In the late 1960s, the forward detachment received renewed attention as a critical element which could assist in the conduct of operational maneuver. Today, the Soviets believe that forward detachment operations are the key to conducting successful operations on a battlefield increasingly threatened by deadly high-precision weaponry. Tailored, flexible, battalion-size forward detachments, along with their operational counterparts (corps and brigades), may, in fact, be the model upon which the future Soviet force structure will be based. This volume surveys in detail the conceptual and organizational evolution of the forward detachment as the premier Soviet tactical maneuver force. It vividly demonstrates why forward detachments are suited by their versatile nature to be a precursor of future restructured Soviet units in general.

First Published in 1991. This book addresses a critical aspect of Soviet maneuver theory that has been almost totally neglected in Western analysis, specifically, Soviet concern for tactical maneuver. Since the 1930s, the Soviets have consistently argued that operational maneuver can be successful only if conducted in conjunction with equally successful tactical maneuver, carried out primarily by forward detach­ments. Forward detachments, the primary tactical maneuver forces tasked with performing critical combat functions, emerged in theory in the 1930s and flourished on the basis of virtually untested concepts until the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet mobile force structure was destroyed in a matter of weeks. Forward detachments again emerged after the Stalin­ grad Operation in 1943, when the Soviet General Staff required their use to spearhead all operations by mobile forces. After mid-1943, forward detach­ments led the operations of all tank armies and tank and mechanized corps, particularly during exploitation operations. By war's end all forces, mobile and rifle alike, employed forward detachments to lead their operations during the exploitation stage of operations. Forward detachments preempted enemy defenses and collectively formed a coordinated network of forward mobile units which provided coherence to the vast array of advancing Soviet mobile and rifle forces. In the late 1960s, the forward detachment received renewed attention as a critical element which could assist in the conduct of operational maneuver. Today, the Soviets believe that forward detachment operations are the key to conducting successful operations on a battlefield increasingly threatened by deadly high-precision weaponry. Tailored, flexible, battalion-size forward detachments, along with their operational counterparts (corps and brigades), may, in fact, be the model upon which the future Soviet force structure will be based. This volume surveys in detail the conceptual and organizational evolution of the forward detachment as the premier Soviet tactical maneuver force. It vividly demonstrates why forward detachments are suited by their versatile nature to be a precursor of future restructured Soviet units in general.

A new edited translation of the Soviet Staff study of the Red Army's Belorussian operation in the summer of 1944, which was unprecedented in terms of its scale, scope and strategic consequences. The Soviet Stavka had planned a campaign consisting of a series of massive operations spanning the entire Soviet-German front. Four powerful fronts (army groups) operated under close Stavka (high command) control. Over 1.8 million troops acomplished a feat unique in the history of the Red Army: the defeat and dismemberment of an entire German army group. This book is a translation of the Soviet General Staff Study No 18, a work originally classified as 'secret' and intended to educate Soviet commanders and staff officers. The operation is presented from the Soviet perspective, in the words of the individuals who planned and orchestrated the plans. A map supplement, including terrain maps, is provided to illustrate the flow of the operation in greater detail.

The Red Army's summer offensive of 1944 against Hitler's Wehrmacht was unprecedented in terms of its scale, scope, and strategic intent and impact. This study details how the Red Army accomplished this feat in the words of those individuals who planned and orchestrated the offensive.