David M. Toczek – författare
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4 produkter
4 produkter
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20011 169 kr
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Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963.The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2001
1 080 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963.The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.
Häftad, Engelska, 2012
633 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Häftad, Engelska, 2007
194 kr
Tillfälligt slut
On 2 January 1963 the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and itsAmerican advisers were soundly defeated by Viet Cong guerrilla forces at Ap Bac.The loss should have caused US policy makers to question the value of their efforts to train and equip the ARVN troops, but they failed to perceive the battle’s significance. Toczek notes that while a few tactical changes resulted from the battle, no policy changes were made, not even to the structure of the advisory system. This careful examination of a battle seen as a metaphor of the entire Vietnam War will prove useful to readers eager to avoid the pitfalls of the past as they consider how best to fight insurgents of the twenty-first century.David M. Toczek is a former assistant professor at the US Military Academy at West Point and a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.