David Thorstad – författare

This is an open access title. It is available to read and download as a free PDF version on Oxford Academic and is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International licence.Longtermism, broadly speaking, is the view that positively influencing the long-term future is one of the key moral priorities of our time. Calls for taking a long-term view towards global problems such as climate change and poverty are familiar, typically urging us to plan on a scale of decades or perhaps a century. By contrast, longtermism asks us to take seriously the idea that what we should do right now may depend on the effects of our actions thousands, even millions, of years into the future. Essays on Longtermism brings together leading scholars to discuss four sets of overlapping questions raised by the longtermist approach. First, should we accept some version of longtermism? Second, to what extent can we predict and control the far future? Third, which ethical priorities are recommended by longtermism, and how revisionary are they? Finally, what implications would longtermism have for the design or reform of social, political, and legal institutions? Contributors, who include both supporters and critics of longtermism, are drawn from a range of disciplines including philosophy, economics, psychology, law, political science, and mathematics, and from private industry.

This is an open access title. It is available to read and download as a free PDF version on Oxford Academic and is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International licence.Longtermism, broadly speaking, is the view that positively influencing the long-term future is one of the key moral priorities of our time. Calls for taking a long-term view towards global problems such as climate change and poverty are familiar, typically urging us to plan on a scale of decades or perhaps a century. By contrast, longtermism asks us to take seriously the idea that what we should do right now may depend on the effects of our actions thousands, even millions, of years into the future. Essays on Longtermism brings together leading scholars to discuss four sets of overlapping questions raised by the longtermist approach. First, should we accept some version of longtermism? Second, to what extent can we predict and control the far future? Third, which ethical priorities are recommended by longtermism, and how revisionary are they? Finally, what implications would longtermism have for the design or reform of social, political, and legal institutions? Contributors, who include both supporters and critics of longtermism, are drawn from a range of disciplines including philosophy, economics, psychology, law, political science, and mathematics, and from private industry.

This is an open access title. It is available to read and download as a free PDF version on Oxford Academic and is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International licence.Longtermism, broadly speaking, is the view that positively influencing the long-term future is one of the key moral priorities of our time. Calls for taking a long-term view towards global problems such as climate change and poverty are familiar, typically urging us to plan on a scale of decades or perhaps a century. By contrast, longtermism asks us to take seriously the idea that what we should do right now may depend on the effects of our actions thousands, even millions, of years into the future. Essays on Longtermism brings together leading scholars to discuss four sets of overlapping questions raised by the longtermist approach. First, should we accept some version of longtermism? Second, to what extent can we predict and control the far future? Third, which ethical priorities are recommended by longtermism, and how revisionary are they? Finally, what implications would longtermism have for the design or reform of social, political, and legal institutions? Contributors, who include both supporters and critics of longtermism, are drawn from a range of disciplines including philosophy, economics, psychology, law, political science, and mathematics, and from private industry.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International] licence. It is free to read on the Oxford Academic platform and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Herbert Simon held that the fundamental turn in the study of bounded rationality is the turn from substantive to procedural rationality. Theories of substantive rationality begin with normative questions about attitudes: what should we prefer, intend, or believe? By contrast, theories of procedural rationality begin with normative questions about processes of inquiry: how should we determine what to prefer, intend, or believe? If Simon was right, then the central task for theories of bounded rationality is to develop an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents. We need, that is, a theory of inquiry under bounds.Inquiry Under Bounds takes as its starting point a five-point bounded rationality program inspired by recent work in cognitive science. To elaborate on and defend that program, Thorstad argues we need an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents. Inquiry under bounds develops an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents: the reason-responsiveness consequentialist view. I use this account to clarify and defend key insights from the bounded tradition as well as to shed light on recent controversies in the epistemology of inquiry.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International] licence. It is free to read on the Oxford Academic platform and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Herbert Simon held that the fundamental turn in the study of bounded rationality is the turn from substantive to procedural rationality. Theories of substantive rationality begin with normative questions about attitudes: what should we prefer, intend, or believe? By contrast, theories of procedural rationality begin with normative questions about processes of inquiry: how should we determine what to prefer, intend, or believe? If Simon was right, then the central task for theories of bounded rationality is to develop an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents. We need, that is, a theory of inquiry under bounds.Inquiry Under Bounds takes as its starting point a five-point bounded rationality program inspired by recent work in cognitive science. To elaborate on and defend that program, Thorstad argues we need an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents. Inquiry under bounds develops an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents: the reason-responsiveness consequentialist view. I use this account to clarify and defend key insights from the bounded tradition as well as to shed light on recent controversies in the epistemology of inquiry.