After World War II, the United States assumed responsibilities for the Northern Mariana Islands, the Caroline Islands, and the Marshall Islands under a 1947 trusteeship agreement with the United Nations. The United States had the obligation to prepare these Micronesians for self-government or independence after termination of the trusteeship, but the Interior, State, and Defense Departments paid little attention to this question until 1961.Willens and Siemer examine the Kennedy administration's formation of a new Micronesian policy aimed at bringing these islanders under U.S. sovereignty by 1968, the inability of the federal agencies to achieve this objective, and their refusal to acknowledge that the Northern Marianas people had very different economic and political aspirations than the other Micronesians. By 1969, the Micronesian leaders—except for those of the Northern Marianas—were increasingly attracted to a future political status that rejected United States citizenship and had most of the attributes of a sovereign nation-state. Willens and Siemer analyze the initial negotiations between United States and Micronesian representatives, the inability of the United States to respond positively to the demands of the Micronesian negotiators, and the national defense and strategic objectives at issue. By April 1972, the United States recognized that its non-fragmentation policy conflicted with the right of self-determination of the Northern Marianas people and agreed to separate status negotiations with them. A detailed review of recent Micronesian history that will be of considerable value to U.S. government officials involved with insular affairs and foreign policy and scholars and researchers of Micronesian, Pacific islands, and Marianas affairs.

After World War II, the United States assumed responsibilities for the Northern Mariana Islands, the Caroline Islands, and the Marshall Islands under a 1947 trusteeship agreement with the United Nations. The United States had the obligation to prepare these Micronesians for self-government or independence after termination of the trusteeship, but the Interior, State, and Defense Departments paid little attention to this question until 1961.Willens and Siemer examine the Kennedy administration's formation of a new Micronesian policy aimed at bringing these islanders under U.S. sovereignty by 1968, the inability of the federal agencies to achieve this objective, and their refusal to acknowledge that the Northern Marianas people had very different economic and political aspirations than the other Micronesians. By 1969, the Micronesian leaders—except for those of the Northern Marianas—were increasingly attracted to a future political status that rejected United States citizenship and had most of the attributes of a sovereign nation-state. Willens and Siemer analyze the initial negotiations between United States and Micronesian representatives, the inability of the United States to respond positively to the demands of the Micronesian negotiators, and the national defense and strategic objectives at issue. By April 1972, the United States recognized that its non-fragmentation policy conflicted with the right of self-determination of the Northern Marianas people and agreed to separate status negotiations with them. A detailed review of recent Micronesian history that will be of considerable value to U.S. government officials involved with insular affairs and foreign policy and scholars and researchers of Micronesian, Pacific islands, and Marianas affairs.