Dieter Bos – författare

Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 23: Public Enterprise Economics: Theory and Application focuses on economics, mathematical economics, and econometrics, including microeconomics, marginal-cost pricing, taxes, and income effects. The manuscript takes a look at the essential parts of public sector pricing models, normative optimum theory, and normative piecemeal theory. Discussions focus on welfare improvements with non-tight constraints, welfare -improving increases of public inefficiency, conditions for optimal prices and quantities, compensating for income effects, and conditions for optimal quality. The book then ponders on marginal-cost pricing, Ramsey pricing, rate of return regulation, and pricing with distributional aims. Topics include comparing distributional and allocative pricing, prices versus taxes, optimum Ramsey policy, influence of Ramsey prices on allocation, distribution, and stabilization, and consequences for allocation, distribution, and stabilization. The publication examines bus and underground services in London, economic theory and empirical analysis, and different approaches towards optimal quality, including empirical studies on bus and underground demand, organizational and political history, and microeconomics of the representative consumer. The book is a valuable source of data for researchers interested in public enterprise economics.

Hans-Werner Sinn, Munich, West Germany This book contains 15 papers presented at a conference in Neresheim, West Ger­ many, in June 1986. The articles were selected by anonymous referees and most of them have undergone substantial revisions since their presentation. The common topic is measurement of welfare, both from efficiency and from equity perspectives. For many economists, welfare is a diffuse, arbitrary and am­ biguous concept. The papers collected in this book show that this view is not justified. Though not beyond all doubt, welfare theory today is crisp and clear, offering fairly straightforward measuring concepts. It even comes up with numbers that measure society''s advantage or disadvantage from specific policy options in monetary units. Politicians get something they can intuitively understand and argue with, and they do not have to be afraid that all this is metaphysics or the result of the scientist''s personal value judgements. Some economists, whom I would classify as belonging to the "everything is optimal" school, would claim that providing politicians with numerical welfare measures is superfluous or even dangerous. The world is as it is, and any attempt to give policy advice can only make things worse. I do not share this view. There are good policies and there are bad ones, but it may not be easy to distinguish between them. There is a role for consulting politicians, Dr.

This volume presents papers which were given at a conference of the Liberty Fund, Washington, co-sponsored by the Carl-Menger Institute, Vienna. The conference took place in Vienna in January 1988. All papers were subject to a refereeing process; some of them had to be revised very extensively. The economics of progressive taxation have been a research topic ever since economists have dealt with the economic role of the state. Old puzzles are the best: the theoretical underpinning of progressivity still is not fully convincing, even after 200 years of economic research. In the present volume we succeeded in publishing some contributions of outstanding economists which present their visions of the topic. Niskanen distinguishes two types of contributions of public choice analysis to understanding and evaluating the tax and transfer system in modern economics: the positive analysis, which examines the issue of how a tax and transfer system would look if it were established by a government subject to majority rule; . and the normative analysis, which tries to discern an optimal system of taxes and transfers. In the normative case the author distinguishes between the "libertarian perspective", in which each person has full rights to any property that he has acquired legally and in which transfers are determined entirely by the preferences of the donors, and the so-called "constitutional perspective" , in which each person elects the rules affecting taxes without knowledge of his position in the post­ constitutional distribution.