Dimitrios Kyritsis – författare

In this book Dimitrios Kyritsis advances an original account of constitutional review of primary legislation for its compatibility with human rights. Key to it is the value of separation of powers. When the relationship between courts and the legislature realizes this value, it makes a stronger claim to moral legitimacy. Kyritsis steers a path between the two extremes of the sceptics and the enthusiasts.Against sceptics who claim that constitutional review is an affront to democracy he argues that it is a morally legitimate institutional option for democratic societies because it can provide an effective check on the legislature. Although the latter represents the people and should thus be given the initiative in designing government policy, it carries serious risks, which institutional design must seek to avert. Against enthusiasts he maintains that fundamental rights protection is not theexclusive province of courts but the responsibility of both the judiciary and the legislature. Although courts may sometimes be given the power to scrutinize legislation and even strike it down, if it violates human rights, they must also respect the legislature''s important contribution to their jointproject. Occasionally, they may even have a duty to defer to morally sub-optimal decisions, as far as rights protection is concerned. This is as it should be. Legitimacy demands less than the ideal. In turn, citizens ought to accept discounts on perfect justice for the sake of achieving a reasonably just and effective political order overall.

In this book Dimitrios Kyritsis advances an original account of constitutional review of primary legislation for its compatibility with human rights. Key to it is the value of separation of powers. When the relationship between courts and the legislature realizes this value, it makes a stronger claim to moral legitimacy. Kyritsis steers a path between the two extremes of the sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against sceptics who claim that constitutional review is an affront to democracy he argues that it is a morally legitimate institutional option for democratic societies because it can provide an effective check on the legislature. Although the latter represents the people and should thus be given the initiative in designing government policy, it carries serious risks, which institutional design must seek to avert. Against enthusiasts he maintains that fundamental rights protection is not the exclusive province of courts but the responsibility of both the judiciary and the legislature. Although courts may sometimes be given the power to scrutinize legislation and even strike it down, if it violates human rights, they must also respect the legislature''s important contribution to their joint project. Occasionally, they may even have a duty to defer to morally sub-optimal decisions, as far as rights protection is concerned. This is as it should be. Legitimacy demands less than the ideal. In turn, citizens ought to accept discounts on perfect justice for the sake of achieving a reasonably just and effective political order overall.

In this book Dimitrios Kyritsis advances an original account of constitutional review of primary legislation for its compatibility with human rights. Key to it is the value of separation of powers. When the relationship between courts and the legislature realizes this value, it makes a stronger claim to moral legitimacy. Kyritsis steers a path between the two extremes of the sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against sceptics who claim that constitutional review is an affront to democracy he argues that it is a morally legitimate institutional option for democratic societies because it can provide an effective check on the legislature. Although the latter represents the people and should thus be given the initiative in designing government policy, it carries serious risks, which institutional design must seek to avert. Against enthusiasts he maintains that fundamental rights protection is not the exclusive province of courts but the responsibility of both the judiciary and the legislature. Although courts may sometimes be given the power to scrutinize legislation and even strike it down, if it violates human rights, they must also respect the legislature's important contribution to their joint project. Occasionally, they may even have a duty to defer to morally sub-optimal decisions, as far as rights protection is concerned. This is as it should be. Legitimacy demands less than the ideal. In turn, citizens ought to accept discounts on perfect justice for the sake of achieving a reasonably just and effective political order overall.

This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other’s contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.

What sort of methods are best suited to understanding constitutional doctrines and practices? Should we look to lawyers and legal methods alone, or should we draw upon other disciplines such as history, sociology, political theory, and moral philosophy? Should we study constitutions in isolation or in a comparative context? To what extent must constitutional methods be sensitive to empirical data about the functioning of legal practice? Can ideal theory aid our understanding of real constitutions?This volume brings together constitutional experts from around the world to address these types of questions through topical events and challenges such as Brexit, administrative law reforms, and the increasing polarisations in law, politics, and constitutional scholarship. Importantly, it investigates the ways in which we can ensure that constitutional scholars do not talk past each other despite their persistent - and often fierce - disagreements. In so doing, it aims systematically to re-examine the methodology of constitutional theory.

What sort of methods are best suited to understanding constitutional doctrines and practices? Should we look to lawyers and legal methods alone, or should we draw upon other disciplines such as history, sociology, political theory, and moral philosophy? Should we study constitutions in isolation or in a comparative context? To what extent must constitutional methods be sensitive to empirical data about the functioning of legal practice? Can ideal theory aid our understanding of real constitutions? This volume brings together constitutional experts from around the world to address these types of questions through topical events and challenges such as Brexit, administrative law reforms, and the increasing polarisations in law, politics, and constitutional scholarship. Importantly, it investigates the ways in which we can ensure that constitutional scholars do not talk past each other despite their persistent - and often fierce - disagreements. In so doing, it aims systematically to re-examine the methodology of constitutional theory.

What sort of methods are best suited to understanding constitutional doctrines and practices? Should we look to lawyers and legal methods alone, or should we draw upon other disciplines such as history, sociology, political theory, and moral philosophy? Should we study constitutions in isolation or in a comparative context? To what extent must constitutional methods be sensitive to empirical data about the functioning of legal practice? Can ideal theory aid our understanding of real constitutions? This volume brings together constitutional experts from around the world to address these types of questions through topical events and challenges such as Brexit, administrative law reforms, and the increasing polarisations in law, politics, and constitutional scholarship. Importantly, it investigates the ways in which we can ensure that constitutional scholars do not talk past each other despite their persistent - and often fierce - disagreements. In so doing, it aims systematically to re-examine the methodology of constitutional theory.

What sort of methods are best suited to understanding constitutional doctrines and practices? Should we look to lawyers and legal methods alone, or should we draw upon other disciplines such as history, sociology, political theory, and moral philosophy? Should we study constitutions in isolation or in a comparative context? To what extent must constitutional methods be sensitive to empirical data about the functioning of legal practice? Can ideal theory aid our understanding of real constitutions?This volume brings together constitutional experts from around the world to address these types of questions through topical events and challenges such as Brexit, administrative law reforms, and the increasing polarisations in law, politics, and constitutional scholarship. Importantly, it investigates the ways in which we can ensure that constitutional scholars do not talk past each other despite their persistent - and often fierce - disagreements. In so doing, it aims systematically to re-examine the methodology of constitutional theory.

This open access book explores the connection between proportionality and the moral concept of freedom from a variety of philosophical perspectives. It views proportionality as more than a technical, legalistic formula but as infused with moral meaning. It asks: Is the proportionality test committed to a particular philosophical conception of freedom? Some contributors argue that proportionality subscribes to a morally defensible ‘right to everything’. Others see in this a serious shortcoming of contemporary proportionality discourse. They claim instead that fundamental rights doctrine should abandon proportionality and adopt a less individualistic notion of freedom that is inherently limited by the reasonable interests of others. The volume showcases novel attempts to combine proportionality and freedom that are inspired by Kant, John Rawls and Bernard Williams. It also situates its central question within debates about the legitimacy of judicial power and considers the use of proportionality analysis by the courts to resolve pivotal issues about the meaning of human rights. Individual chapters are in dialogue with each other, offering readers a holistic examination of this important issue of human rights theory and practice.The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin''s interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other''s contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.

This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin''s interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other''s contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.