Douglas Kinnard – författare

Since its creation by the National Security Act of 1947 the office of secretary of defense has grown rapidly in power and influence, surpassing at times that of the secretary of state to become second only to the presidency in the government of the United States. The pivotal secretaries, according to Kinnard, are James Forrestal, Charles Wilson, Robert McNamara, Melvin Laird, and James Schlesinger.Kinnard analyzes the administration of each of these secretaries not only within the domestic and international contexts of his time but also within the bureaucratic world in which the secretary functions along with the president and secretary of state.

Since its creation by the National Security Act of 1947 the office of secretary of defense has grown rapidly in power and influence, surpassing at times that of the secretary of state to become second only to the presidency in the government of the United States. The pivotal secretaries, according to Kinnard, are James Forrestal, Charles Wilson, Robert McNamara, Melvin Laird, and James Schlesinger.Kinnard analyzes the administration of each of these secretaries not only within the domestic and international contexts of his time but also within the bureaucratic world in which the secretary functions along with the president and secretary of state.

In Part I the author discusses his experiences as Chief of Operations Analysis for Westmoreland during the 1966-67 phase of the Vietnam War. In 1969 he returns to Vietnam as Commanding General Force Artillery and Chief of Staff of Second Field Force, where his final action involves planning the 1970 Cambodian incursion. Turning down further promotions, in Part II he pursues a Ph.D. at Princeton on a campus alive with antiwar protest. We follow him to a tenured professorship at the University of Vermont, where his polling of U.S. generals who had served in Vietnam results in The War Managers, considered a classic book that sets forth their conflicting views on the conduct of that war.

Dwight David Eisenhower proudly claimed that he "came from the very heart of America." Yet it could be argued that, despite those provincial beginnings, no other American exerted more influence on world history during the twentieth century. From his humble birth in Abilene, Kansas, Eisenhower rose to the supreme command of the Allied armies that helped destroy Adolf Hitler's Nazi war machine and to the presidency of the United States. Douglas Kinnard's profile of this great soldier-statesman describes his rise through the ranks of the peacetime army of the 1920s and 1930s the recognition of his abilities by such leaders as Douglas MacArthur and George C. Marshall, his "great crusade" in Europe during World War II, and his two terms in the Oval Office. Kinnard's penetrating look at this great military leader and commander in chief serves as an introduction to Eisenhower's life and provides a concise account of the momentous military and political events of the first half of the twentieth century.

Long considered a classic for its enlightening analysis of what went wrong in Vietnam, this frank assessment of the American involvement in the war comes straight from the U.S. Army generals responsible for its conduct in the field. First published in 1977 to great acclaim, the painful indictment of both the military and civilian policy makers serves as a useful guide on how to avoid similar disasters in today''s conflicts. The author, an American general who was chief of staff of the most important field command in Vietnam before his retirement in 1970, sent an extensive questionnaire to 173 other generals in 1974, seeking their views on the war and guaranteeing anonymity. Nearly 70% responded, with many adding pages of comments about such sensitive subjects as leadership and integrity. General Kinnard then interviewed twenty of the respondents and supplemented their input with research of Army documents. What emerges from his analysis of the generals'' responses is a uniquely fascinating and penetrating look at the war, focusing on such central issues as the competence of American and Vietnamese troops, the clarity of U.S. objectives, the influence of body counts, and much more.