E. Agazzi – författare
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26 produkter
26 produkter
Del 18 - Episteme
Problem of Reductionism in Science
(Colloquium of the Swiss Society of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Zürich, May 18–19, 1990)
Inbunden, Engelska, 1991
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The topic to which this book is devoted is reductionism, and not reduction. The difference in the adoption of these two denominations is not, contrary to what might appear at first sight, just a matter of preference between a more abstract (reductionism) or a more concrete (reduction) terminology for indicating the same sUbject matter. In fact, the difference is that between a philosophical doctrine (or, perhaps, simply a philosophical tenet or claim) and a scientific procedure. Of course, this does not mean that these two fields are separated; they are only distinct, and this already means that they are also likely to be interrelated. However it is useful to consider them separately, if at least to better understand how and why they are interconnected. Just to give a first example of difference, we can remark that a philosophical doctrine is something which makes a claim and, as such, invites controversy and should, in a way, be challenged. A scientific procedure, on the other hand, is something which concretely exists, and as such must be first of all described, interpreted, understood, defined precisely and analyzed critically; this work may well lead to uncovering limitations of this procedure, or of certain ways of conceiving or defining it, but it does not lead to really challenging it.
Del 22 - Episteme
Philosophy of Mathematics Today
Inbunden, Engelska, 1996
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Mathematics is often considered as a body of knowledge that is essen tially independent of linguistic formulations, in the sense that, once the content of this knowledge has been grasped, there remains only the problem of professional ability, that of clearly formulating and correctly proving it. However, the question is not so simple, and P. Weingartner's paper (Language and Coding-Dependency of Results in Logic and Mathe matics) deals with some results in logic and mathematics which reveal that certain notions are in general not invariant with respect to different choices of language and of coding processes. Five example are given: 1) The validity of axioms and rules of classical propositional logic depend on the interpretation of sentential variables; 2) The language dependency of verisimilitude; 3) The proof of the weak and strong anti inductivist theorems in Popper's theory of inductive support is not invariant with respect to limitative criteria put on classical logic; 4) The language-dependency of the concept of provability; 5) The language dependency of the existence of ungrounded and paradoxical sentences (in the sense of Kripke). The requirements of logical rigour and consistency are not the only criteria for the acceptance and appreciation of mathematical proposi tions and theories.
Del 215 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
Reality of the Unobservable
Observability, Unobservability and Their Impact on the Issue of Scientific Realism
Inbunden, Engelska, 2000
1 623 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Observability and Scientific Realism It is commonly thought that the birth of modern natural science was made possible by an intellectual shift from a mainly abstract and specuJative conception of the world to a carefully elaborated image based on observations. There is some grain of truth in this claim, but this grain depends very much on what one takes observation to be. In the philosophy of science of our century, observation has been practically equated with sense perception. This is understandable if we think of the attitude of radical empiricism that inspired Ernst Mach and the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, who powerfully influenced our century's philosophy of science. However, this was not the atti tude of the f ounders of modern science: Galileo, f or example, expressed in a f amous passage of the Assayer the conviction that perceptual features of the world are merely subjective, and are produced in the 'anima!' by the motion and impacts of unobservable particles that are endowed uniquely with mathematically expressible properties, and which are therefore the real features of the world. Moreover, on other occasions, when defending the Copernican theory, he explicitly remarked that in admitting that the Sun is static and the Earth turns on its own axis, 'reason must do violence to the sense' , and that it is thanks to this violence that one can know the tme constitution of the universe.
Del 72 - Analecta Husserliana
Life Interpretation and the Sense of Illness within the Human Condition
Medicine and Philosophy in a Dialogue
Inbunden, Engelska, 2001
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
In medicine the understanding and interpretation of the complex reality of illness currently refers either to an organismic approach that focuses on the physical or to a 'holistic' approach that takes into account the patient's human sociocultural involvement. Yet as the papers of this collection show, the suffering human person refers ultimately to his/her existential sphere. Hence, praxis is supplemented by still other perspectives for valuation and interpretation: ethical, spiritual, and religious. Can medicine ignore these considerations or push them to the side as being subjective and arbitrary? Phenomenology/philosophy-of-life recognizes all of the above approaches to be essential facets of the Human Condition (Tymieniecka). This approach holds that all the facets of the Human Condition have equal objectivity and legitimacy. It completes the accepted medical outlook and points the way toward a new `medical humanism'.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1980
1 623 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The two volumes to which this is a preface consist of the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science. The Conference was organized by the Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS) of the IUHPS, the Italian Society for Logic and under the auspices Philosophy of Science, and the Domus Galilaeana of Pisa, headed by Professor Vincenzo Cappelletti. Domus GaIilaeana also served as the host institution, with some help from the University of Pisa. The Conference took place in Pisa, Italy, on September 4-8, 1978. The editors of these two volumes of the Proceedings of the Pisa Conference acknowledge with gratitude the help by the different sponsoring organizations, and in the first place that by both, Divisions of the IUHPS, which made the Conference possible.' A special recognition is due to Professor Evandro Agazzi, President of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, who was co- opted as an additional member of the Organizing Committee.This committee was otherwise identical with the Joint Commission, whose members were initially John Murdoch, John North, Arpad Szab6, Robert Butts, Jaakko Hintikka, and Vadim Sadovsky. Later, Erwin Hiebert and Lubos Novy were appointed as additional members.
Del 146 - Synthese Library
Probabilistic Thinking, Thermodynamics and the Interaction of the History and Philosophy of Science
Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science Volume II
Inbunden, Engelska, 1980
1 623 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The two volumes to which this is apreface consist of the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science. The Conference was organized by the Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS) under the auspices of the IUHPS, the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, and the Domus Galilaeana of Pisa, headed by Professor Vincenzo Cappelletti. Domus Galilaeana also served as the host institution, with some help from the University of Pisa. The Conference took place in Pisa, Italy, on September 4-8, 1978. The editors of these two volumes of the Proceedings of the Pisa Conference acknowledge with gratitude the help by the different sponsoring organizations, and in the first place that by both Divisions of the IUHPS, which made the Conference possible. A special recognition is due to Professor Evandro Agazzi, President of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, who was co opted as an additional member of the Organizing Committee. This committee was otherwise identical with the Joint Commission, whose members were initially John Murdoch, John North, Arpad Szab6, Robert Butts, Jaakko Hintikka, and Vadim Sadovsky. Later, Erwin Hiebert and Lubos Novy were appointed as additional members.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1980
2 161 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Logic has attained in our century a development incomparably greater than in any past age of its long history, and this has led to such an enrichment and proliferation of its aspects, that the problem of some kind of unified recom prehension of this discipline seems nowadays unavoidable. This splitting into several subdomains is the natural consequence of the fact that Logic has intended to adopt in our century the status of a science. This always implies that the general optics, under which a certain set of problems used to be con sidered, breaks into a lot of specialized sectors of inquiry, each of them being characterized by the introduction of specific viewpoints and of technical tools of its own. The first impression, that often accompanies the creation of one of such specialized branches in a diSCipline, is that one has succeeded in isolating the 'scientific core' of it, by restricting the somehow vague and redundant generality of its original 'philosophical' configuration. But, after a while, it appears that some of the discarded aspects are indeed important and a new specialized domain of investigation is created to explore them. By follOwing this procedure, one finally finds himself confronted with such a variety of independent fields of research, that one wonders whether the fact of labelling them under a common denomination be nothing but the contingent effect of a pure historical tradition.
Del 201 - Synthese Library
Probability in the Sciences
Inbunden, Engelska, 1988
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Probability has become one of the most characteristic con cepts of modern culture, and a 'probabilistic way of thinking' may be said to have penetrated almost every sector of our in tellectual life. However it would be difficult to determine an explicit list of 'positive' features, to be proposed as identifica tion marks of this way of thinking. One would rather say that it is characterized by certain 'negative' features, i. e. by certain at titudes which appear to be the negation of well established tra ditional assumptions, conceptual frameworks, world outlooks and the like. It is because of this opposition to tradition that the probabilistic approach is perceived as expressing a 'modern' in tellectual style. As an example one could mention the widespread diffidence in philosophy with respect to self -contained systems claiming to express apodictic truths, instead of which much weaker pretensions are preferred, that express 'probable' interpretations of reality, of history, of man (the hermeneutic trend). An ana logous example is represented by the interest devoted to the study of different patterns of 'argumentation', dealing wiht reasonings which rely not so much on the truth of the premisses and stringent formal logic links, but on a display of contextual conditions (depending on the audience, and on accepted stan dards, judgements, and values), which render the premisses and the conclusions more 'probable' (the new rhetoric).
Del 215 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
Reality of the Unobservable
Observability, Unobservability and Their Impact on the Issue of Scientific Realism
Häftad, Engelska, 2010
1 623 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Observability and Scientific Realism It is commonly thought that the birth of modern natural science was made possible by an intellectual shift from a mainly abstract and specuJative conception of the world to a carefully elaborated image based on observations. There is some grain of truth in this claim, but this grain depends very much on what one takes observation to be. In the philosophy of science of our century, observation has been practically equated with sense perception. This is understandable if we think of the attitude of radical empiricism that inspired Ernst Mach and the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, who powerfully influenced our century's philosophy of science. However, this was not the atti tude of the f ounders of modern science: Galileo, f or example, expressed in a f amous passage of the Assayer the conviction that perceptual features of the world are merely subjective, and are produced in the 'anima!' by the motion and impacts of unobservable particles that are endowed uniquely with mathematically expressible properties, and which are therefore the real features of the world. Moreover, on other occasions, when defending the Copernican theory, he explicitly remarked that in admitting that the Sun is static and the Earth turns on its own axis, 'reason must do violence to the sense' , and that it is thanks to this violence that one can know the tme constitution of the universe.
Del 146 - Synthese Library
Probabilistic Thinking, Thermodynamics and the Interaction of the History and Philosophy of Science
Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science Volume II
Häftad, Engelska, 2010
1 623 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The two volumes to which this is apreface consist of the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science. The Conference was organized by the Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS) under the auspices of the IUHPS, the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, and the Domus Galilaeana of Pisa, headed by Professor Vincenzo Cappelletti. Domus Galilaeana also served as the host institution, with some help from the University of Pisa. The Conference took place in Pisa, Italy, on September 4-8, 1978. The editors of these two volumes of the Proceedings of the Pisa Conference acknowledge with gratitude the help by the different sponsoring organizations, and in the first place that by both Divisions of the IUHPS, which made the Conference possible. A special recognition is due to Professor Evandro Agazzi, President of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, who was co opted as an additional member of the Organizing Committee. This committee was otherwise identical with the Joint Commission, whose members were initially John Murdoch, John North, Arpad Szab6, Robert Butts, Jaakko Hintikka, and Vadim Sadovsky. Later, Erwin Hiebert and Lubos Novy were appointed as additional members.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20121 416 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Probability has become one of the most characteristic con cepts of modern culture, and a ''probabilistic way of thinking'' may be said to have penetrated almost every sector of our in tellectual life. However it would be difficult to determine an explicit list of ''positive'' features, to be proposed as identifica tion marks of this way of thinking. One would rather say that it is characterized by certain ''negative'' features, i. e. by certain at titudes which appear to be the negation of well established tra ditional assumptions, conceptual frameworks, world outlooks and the like. It is because of this opposition to tradition that the probabilistic approach is perceived as expressing a ''modern'' in tellectual style. As an example one could mention the widespread diffidence in philosophy with respect to self -contained systems claiming to express apodictic truths, instead of which much weaker pretensions are preferred, that express ''probable'' interpretations of reality, of history, of man (the hermeneutic trend). An ana logous example is represented by the interest devoted to the study of different patterns of ''argumentation'', dealing wiht reasonings which rely not so much on the truth of the premisses and stringent formal logic links, but on a display of contextual conditions (depending on the audience, and on accepted stan dards, judgements, and values), which render the premisses and the conclusions more ''probable'' (the new rhetoric).
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20122 049 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Del 145 - Synthese Library
Theory Change, Ancient Axiomatics, and Galileo’s Methodology
Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science Volume I
Häftad, Engelska, 2011
1 623 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The two volumes to which this is a preface consist of the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science. The Conference was organized by the Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS) of the IUHPS, the Italian Society for Logic and under the auspices Philosophy of Science, and the Domus Galilaeana of Pisa, headed by Professor Vincenzo Cappelletti. Domus GaIilaeana also served as the host institution, with some help from the University of Pisa. The Conference took place in Pisa, Italy, on September 4-8, 1978. The editors of these two volumes of the Proceedings of the Pisa Conference acknowledge with gratitude the help by the different sponsoring organizations, and in the first place that by both, Divisions of the IUHPS, which made the Conference possible.' A special recognition is due to Professor Evandro Agazzi, President of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, who was co- opted as an additional member of the Organizing Committee.This committee was otherwise identical with the Joint Commission, whose members were initially John Murdoch, John North, Arpad Szab6, Robert Butts, Jaakko Hintikka, and Vadim Sadovsky. Later, Erwin Hiebert and Lubos Novy were appointed as additional members.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20122 840 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Logic has attained in our century a development incomparably greater than in any past age of its long history, and this has led to such an enrichment and proliferation of its aspects, that the problem of some kind of unified recom prehension of this discipline seems nowadays unavoidable. This splitting into several subdomains is the natural consequence of the fact that Logic has intended to adopt in our century the status of a science. This always implies that the general optics, under which a certain set of problems used to be con sidered, breaks into a lot of specialized sectors of inquiry, each of them being characterized by the introduction of specific viewpoints and of technical tools of its own. The first impression, that often accompanies the creation of one of such specialized branches in a diSCipline, is that one has succeeded in isolating the ''scientific core'' of it, by restricting the somehow vague and redundant generality of its original ''philosophical'' configuration. But, after a while, it appears that some of the discarded aspects are indeed important and a new specialized domain of investigation is created to explore them. By follOwing this procedure, one finally finds himself confronted with such a variety of independent fields of research, that one wonders whether the fact of labelling them under a common denomination be nothing but the contingent effect of a pure historical tradition.
Del 149 - Synthese Library
Modern Logic — A Survey
Historical, Philosophical and Mathematical Aspects of Modern Logic and its Applications
Häftad, Engelska, 2012
2 377 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Logic has attained in our century a development incomparably greater than in any past age of its long history, and this has led to such an enrichment and proliferation of its aspects, that the problem of some kind of unified recom prehension of this discipline seems nowadays unavoidable. This splitting into several subdomains is the natural consequence of the fact that Logic has intended to adopt in our century the status of a science. This always implies that the general optics, under which a certain set of problems used to be con sidered, breaks into a lot of specialized sectors of inquiry, each of them being characterized by the introduction of specific viewpoints and of technical tools of its own. The first impression, that often accompanies the creation of one of such specialized branches in a diSCipline, is that one has succeeded in isolating the 'scientific core' of it, by restricting the somehow vague and redundant generality of its original 'philosophical' configuration. But, after a while, it appears that some of the discarded aspects are indeed important and a new specialized domain of investigation is created to explore them. By follOwing this procedure, one finally finds himself confronted with such a variety of independent fields of research, that one wonders whether the fact of labelling them under a common denomination be nothing but the contingent effect of a pure historical tradition.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20121 416 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
In medicine the understanding and interpretation of the complex reality of illness currently refers either to an organismic approach that focuses on the physical or to a ''holistic'' approach that takes into account the patient''s human sociocultural involvement. Yet as the papers of this collection show, the suffering human person refers ultimately to his/her existential sphere. Hence, praxis is supplemented by still other perspectives for valuation and interpretation: ethical, spiritual, and religious. Can medicine ignore these considerations or push them to the side as being subjective and arbitrary? Phenomenology/philosophy-of-life recognizes all of the above approaches to be essential facets of the Human Condition (Tymieniecka). This approach holds that all the facets of the Human Condition have equal objectivity and legitimacy. It completes the accepted medical outlook and points the way toward a new `medical humanism''.
Del 72 - Analecta Husserliana
Life Interpretation and the Sense of Illness within the Human Condition
Medicine and Philosophy in a Dialogue
Häftad, Engelska, 2012
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
In medicine the understanding and interpretation of the complex reality of illness currently refers either to an organismic approach that focuses on the physical or to a 'holistic' approach that takes into account the patient's human sociocultural involvement. Yet as the papers of this collection show, the suffering human person refers ultimately to his/her existential sphere. Hence, praxis is supplemented by still other perspectives for valuation and interpretation: ethical, spiritual, and religious. Can medicine ignore these considerations or push them to the side as being subjective and arbitrary? Phenomenology/philosophy-of-life recognizes all of the above approaches to be essential facets of the Human Condition (Tymieniecka). This approach holds that all the facets of the Human Condition have equal objectivity and legitimacy. It completes the accepted medical outlook and points the way toward a new `medical humanism'.
Del 18 - Episteme
Problem of Reductionism in Science
(Colloquium of the Swiss Society of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Zürich, May 18–19, 1990)
Häftad, Engelska, 2013
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The topic to which this book is devoted is reductionism, and not reduction. The difference in the adoption of these two denominations is not, contrary to what might appear at first sight, just a matter of preference between a more abstract (reductionism) or a more concrete (reduction) terminology for indicating the same sUbject matter. In fact, the difference is that between a philosophical doctrine (or, perhaps, simply a philosophical tenet or claim) and a scientific procedure. Of course, this does not mean that these two fields are separated; they are only distinct, and this already means that they are also likely to be interrelated. However it is useful to consider them separately, if at least to better understand how and why they are interconnected. Just to give a first example of difference, we can remark that a philosophical doctrine is something which makes a claim and, as such, invites controversy and should, in a way, be challenged. A scientific procedure, on the other hand, is something which concretely exists, and as such must be first of all described, interpreted, understood, defined precisely and analyzed critically; this work may well lead to uncovering limitations of this procedure, or of certain ways of conceiving or defining it, but it does not lead to really challenging it.
Del 217 - Synthese Library
Philosophy and the Origin and Evolution of the Universe
Häftad, Engelska, 2012
546 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
It has often been noted that a kind of double dynamics char- terizes the development of science. On the one hand the progress in every discipline appears as the consequence of an increasing specialization, implying the restriction of the inquiry to very partial fields or aspects of a given domain. On the other hand, an opposite (but one might better say a complementary) trend points towards the construction of theoretical frameworks of great ge- rality, the aim of which seems to correspond not so much to the need of providing «explanations» for the details accumulated through partial investigation, as to the desire of attaining an - rizon of global comprehension of the whole field. This intell- tual dialectics is perceivable in every discipline, from mathe- tics, to physics, to biology, to history, to economics, to sociology, and it is not difficult to recognize there the presence of the two main attitudes according to which human beings try to make «intelligible» the world surrounding them (including themselves), attitudes which are sometimes called analysis and synthesis. They correspond respectively to the spontaneous inclination which pushes us to try to understand things by seeing «how they are made», in the sense of «looking into them» and breaking them into their constitutive parts, or rather to encompass things in a global picture, where they are accounted for as occupying a place, or playing a role, which are understandable from the point of view of the whole.
Del 22 - Episteme
Philosophy of Mathematics Today
Häftad, Engelska, 2012
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Mathematics is often considered as a body of knowledge that is essen tially independent of linguistic formulations, in the sense that, once the content of this knowledge has been grasped, there remains only the problem of professional ability, that of clearly formulating and correctly proving it. However, the question is not so simple, and P. Weingartner's paper (Language and Coding-Dependency of Results in Logic and Mathe matics) deals with some results in logic and mathematics which reveal that certain notions are in general not invariant with respect to different choices of language and of coding processes. Five example are given: 1) The validity of axioms and rules of classical propositional logic depend on the interpretation of sentential variables; 2) The language dependency of verisimilitude; 3) The proof of the weak and strong anti inductivist theorems in Popper's theory of inductive support is not invariant with respect to limitative criteria put on classical logic; 4) The language-dependency of the concept of provability; 5) The language dependency of the existence of ungrounded and paradoxical sentences (in the sense of Kripke). The requirements of logical rigour and consistency are not the only criteria for the acceptance and appreciation of mathematical proposi tions and theories.
Del 201 - Synthese Library
Probability in the Sciences
Häftad, Engelska, 2011
1 084 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Probability has become one of the most characteristic con cepts of modern culture, and a 'probabilistic way of thinking' may be said to have penetrated almost every sector of our in tellectual life. However it would be difficult to determine an explicit list of 'positive' features, to be proposed as identifica tion marks of this way of thinking. One would rather say that it is characterized by certain 'negative' features, i. e. by certain at titudes which appear to be the negation of well established tra ditional assumptions, conceptual frameworks, world outlooks and the like. It is because of this opposition to tradition that the probabilistic approach is perceived as expressing a 'modern' in tellectual style. As an example one could mention the widespread diffidence in philosophy with respect to self -contained systems claiming to express apodictic truths, instead of which much weaker pretensions are preferred, that express 'probable' interpretations of reality, of history, of man (the hermeneutic trend). An ana logous example is represented by the interest devoted to the study of different patterns of 'argumentation', dealing wiht reasonings which rely not so much on the truth of the premisses and stringent formal logic links, but on a display of contextual conditions (depending on the audience, and on accepted stan dards, judgements, and values), which render the premisses and the conclusions more 'probable' (the new rhetoric).
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20121 416 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
The topic to which this book is devoted is reductionism, and not reduction. The difference in the adoption of these two denominations is not, contrary to what might appear at first sight, just a matter of preference between a more abstract (reductionism) or a more concrete (reduction) terminology for indicating the same sUbject matter. In fact, the difference is that between a philosophical doctrine (or, perhaps, simply a philosophical tenet or claim) and a scientific procedure. Of course, this does not mean that these two fields are separated; they are only distinct, and this already means that they are also likely to be interrelated. However it is useful to consider them separately, if at least to better understand how and why they are interconnected. Just to give a first example of difference, we can remark that a philosophical doctrine is something which makes a claim and, as such, invites controversy and should, in a way, be challenged. A scientific procedure, on the other hand, is something which concretely exists, and as such must be first of all described, interpreted, understood, defined precisely and analyzed critically; this work may well lead to uncovering limitations of this procedure, or of certain ways of conceiving or defining it, but it does not lead to really challenging it.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2012712 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
It has often been noted that a kind of double dynamics char- terizes the development of science. On the one hand the progress in every discipline appears as the consequence of an increasing specialization, implying the restriction of the inquiry to very partial fields or aspects of a given domain. On the other hand, an opposite (but one might better say a complementary) trend points towards the construction of theoretical frameworks of great ge- rality, the aim of which seems to correspond not so much to the need of providing «explanations» for the details accumulated through partial investigation, as to the desire of attaining an - rizon of global comprehension of the whole field. This intell- tual dialectics is perceivable in every discipline, from mathe- tics, to physics, to biology, to history, to economics, to sociology, and it is not difficult to recognize there the presence of the two main attitudes according to which human beings try to make «intelligible» the world surrounding them (including themselves), attitudes which are sometimes called analysis and synthesis. They correspond respectively to the spontaneous inclination which pushes us to try to understand things by seeing «how they are made», in the sense of «looking into them» and breaking them into their constitutive parts, or rather to encompass things in a global picture, where they are accounted for as occupying a place, or playing a role, which are understandable from the point of view of the whole.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20121 416 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Mathematics is often considered as a body of knowledge that is essen tially independent of linguistic formulations, in the sense that, once the content of this knowledge has been grasped, there remains only the problem of professional ability, that of clearly formulating and correctly proving it. However, the question is not so simple, and P. Weingartner''s paper (Language and Coding-Dependency of Results in Logic and Mathe matics) deals with some results in logic and mathematics which reveal that certain notions are in general not invariant with respect to different choices of language and of coding processes. Five example are given: 1) The validity of axioms and rules of classical propositional logic depend on the interpretation of sentential variables; 2) The language dependency of verisimilitude; 3) The proof of the weak and strong anti inductivist theorems in Popper''s theory of inductive support is not invariant with respect to limitative criteria put on classical logic; 4) The language-dependency of the concept of provability; 5) The language dependency of the existence of ungrounded and paradoxical sentences (in the sense of Kripke). The requirements of logical rigour and consistency are not the only criteria for the acceptance and appreciation of mathematical proposi tions and theories.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20132 049 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Observability and Scientific Realism It is commonly thought that the birth of modern natural science was made possible by an intellectual shift from a mainly abstract and specuJative conception of the world to a carefully elaborated image based on observations. There is some grain of truth in this claim, but this grain depends very much on what one takes observation to be. In the philosophy of science of our century, observation has been practically equated with sense perception. This is understandable if we think of the attitude of radical empiricism that inspired Ernst Mach and the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, who powerfully influenced our century''s philosophy of science. However, this was not the atti tude of the f ounders of modern science: Galileo, f or example, expressed in a f amous passage of the Assayer the conviction that perceptual features of the world are merely subjective, and are produced in the ''anima!'' by the motion and impacts of unobservable particles that are endowed uniquely with mathematically expressible properties, and which are therefore the real features of the world. Moreover, on other occasions, when defending the Copernican theory, he explicitly remarked that in admitting that the Sun is static and the Earth turns on its own axis, ''reason must do violence to the sense'' , and that it is thanks to this violence that one can know the tme constitution of the universe.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 20132 049 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
The two volumes to which this is apreface consist of the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science. The Conference was organized by the Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS) under the auspices of the IUHPS, the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, and the Domus Galilaeana of Pisa, headed by Professor Vincenzo Cappelletti. Domus Galilaeana also served as the host institution, with some help from the University of Pisa. The Conference took place in Pisa, Italy, on September 4-8, 1978. The editors of these two volumes of the Proceedings of the Pisa Conference acknowledge with gratitude the help by the different sponsoring organizations, and in the first place that by both Divisions of the IUHPS, which made the Conference possible. A special recognition is due to Professor Evandro Agazzi, President of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, who was co opted as an additional member of the Organizing Committee. This committee was otherwise identical with the Joint Commission, whose members were initially John Murdoch, John North, Arpad Szab6, Robert Butts, Jaakko Hintikka, and Vadim Sadovsky. Later, Erwin Hiebert and Lubos Novy were appointed as additional members.