E. J. Bond – författare

The relations between reason, motivation and value present problems which, though ancient, remain intractable. If values are objective and rational how can they move us and if they are dependent on our contingent desires how can they be rational? E. J. Bond makes a bold attack on this dilemma. The widespread view among philosophers today is that judgements contain an irreducible element of personal commitment. To this Professor Bond proposes an account of values as objective and value judgements as true or false, employing a distinction between grounding and motivating reasons to establish their connection with action. He defines and tests his position against a number of recent theories, providing in the process forceful criticism of Williams, Wiggins, Foot, Narveson and Nagel, among others. A distinctive contribution to the subject, it will stimulate interest and worthwhile debate among philosophers, while also serving as an introduction to this vital topic.

This is an ideal introduction to moral philosophy for beginning students and general readers, dealing with the philosophical theories which often lie behind everyday opinions and inviting the reader to examine those theories thoroughly. Using numerous examples and diagrams, Professor Bond guides the reader through the key problems of theoretical ethics seeking to outline a substantial view of morality in universal practical reason, he concludes in an attempt to show that a viable universal morality can only relate to the thriving, flourishing or well-being of individuals in a community.