E. Sosa – författare

These Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Cognitive Science include work by outstanding researchers in the field. This volume contains three kinds of papers corresponding to three of the main disciplines in cognitive science: philosophy, psychology, and artificial intelligence. The title "Cognition, Agency and Rationality" captures the main issues addressed by the papers. All are concerned with cognition, but some are especially centred on the very concept of rationality, while others focus on (multiple) agency.

When I entered the graduate program in philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh in 1961, Nicholas Rescher had just joined the department of philosophy' to begin, with Adolf Grunbaum, the building of what is now a philosophy center of worldwide renown. Very soon his exceptional energy and versatility were in evidence, as he founded the American Philosophical Quarterly, generated a constantly rising stack of preprints, pursued impor­ tant scholarly research in Arabic logic, taught a staggering diversity of histori­ cal and thematic courses, and obtained, in cooperation with Kurt Baier, a major grant for work in value theory. That is all part of the record. What may come as a surprise is that none of it was accomplished at the expense of his students. Papers were returned in a matter of days, often the next class meet­ ing. And so easily accessible was he for philosophical discussion that, since (inevitably) we shared many philosophical interests, I asked him to serve as my dissertation advisor. My work in connection with this project led to a couple of journal articles while his, characteristically, led to a book. Our dis­ cussions certainly helped me, and while they may also have had some small influence on him, in the end our views were quite distinct. I was not only allowed complete independence, but was positively encouraged to think of my own ideas and to develop them independently. The length and breadth of Rescher's bibliography defy belief.

A tercentenary conference of March, 1985, drew to Newport, Rhode Island, nearly all the most distinguished Berkeley scholars now active. The conference was organized by the International Berkeley Society, with the support of several institutions and many people (whose help is acknowl­ edged below). This volume represents a selection of the lead papers deliv­ ered at that conference, most now revised. The Cartesian marriage of Mind and Body has proved an uneasy union. Each side has claimed supremacy and usurped the rights of the other. In anglophone philosophy Body has lately had it all pretty much its own way, most dramatically in the Disappearance Theory of Mind, whose varieties vary in appeal and sophistication, but uniformly shock sensibili­ ties. Only recently has Mind reasserted itself, yet the voices of support are already a swelling chorus. "Welcome," Berkeley would respond, since " ... all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth ... have not a subsis­ tence without a mind ... " (Principles, sect. 6). In fairness, Berkeley does playa Disappearance trick of his own - with Matter now into the hat. But his act is far subtler than any brute denial of the obvious, and seeks rather to explain than bluntly to reject. Perhaps we are today better prepared to appreciate his insights.

As usual, the Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Cognitive Science include leading-edge work by outstanding researchers in the field. This volume contains three kinds of papers corresponding to three of the main disciplines in cognitive science: philosophy, psychology, and artificial intelligence. The title - Cognition, Agency and Rationality - captures the main issues addressed by the papers. Of course, all are concerned with cognition, but some are especially centred on the very concept of rationality, while others focus on (multiple) agency. The diversity of their disciplinary origins and standpoints not only reflects the main topics and the range of different positions presented at ICCS-97, as well as demonstrating the richness, fruitfulness and diversity of research in cognitive science today.

When I entered the graduate program in philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh in 1961, Nicholas Rescher had just joined the department of philosophy' to begin, with Adolf Grunbaum, the building of what is now a philosophy center of worldwide renown. Very soon his exceptional energy and versatility were in evidence, as he founded the American Philosophical Quarterly, generated a constantly rising stack of preprints, pursued impor­ tant scholarly research in Arabic logic, taught a staggering diversity of histori­ cal and thematic courses, and obtained, in cooperation with Kurt Baier, a major grant for work in value theory. That is all part of the record. What may come as a surprise is that none of it was accomplished at the expense of his students. Papers were returned in a matter of days, often the next class meet­ ing. And so easily accessible was he for philosophical discussion that, since (inevitably) we shared many philosophical interests, I asked him to serve as my dissertation advisor. My work in connection with this project led to a couple of journal articles while his, characteristically, led to a book. Our dis­ cussions certainly helped me, and while they may also have had some small influence on him, in the end our views were quite distinct. I was not only allowed complete independence, but was positively encouraged to think of my own ideas and to develop them independently. The length and breadth of Rescher's bibliography defy belief.