Edmund Dell – författare

First published in 1973, Political Responsibility and Industry discusses the nature of industrial policy and the capacity of the British governmental system to conduct it. This theme is illustrated by particular examples of the working of government-industry relations with which the author was intimately connected, such as the aluminium smelter project and the textile industry enquiry; and by discussion of particular instruments of industrial policy such as the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation and the Geddes Report on shipbuilding.

The author is critical of the tendency to regard industrial policy as some new catalyst of industrial growth. He describes it, at its best, as simply ‘casework in the public interest’. In a penetrating analysis of the machinery of government in Britain, he shows that this is inadequate as an instrument for the effective control of industrial policy. This in turn leads on to a discussion of the ‘myth of ministerial responsibility’ which, the author suggests, rather than locating effective responsibility for policy, ensures that it is not located anywhere at all. The arguments presented should be of interest not only to those concerned with Government-industry relations, but to anyone worried about the working of Parliamentary government in Britain.

First published in 1973, Political Responsibility and Industry discusses the nature of industrial policy and the capacity of the British governmental system to conduct it. This theme is illustrated by particular examples of the working of government-industry relations with which the author was intimately connected, such as the aluminium smelter project and the textile industry enquiry; and by discussion of particular instruments of industrial policy such as the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation and the Geddes Report on shipbuilding.

The author is critical of the tendency to regard industrial policy as some new catalyst of industrial growth. He describes it, at its best, as simply ‘casework in the public interest’. In a penetrating analysis of the machinery of government in Britain, he shows that this is inadequate as an instrument for the effective control of industrial policy. This in turn leads on to a discussion of the ‘myth of ministerial responsibility’ which, the author suggests, rather than locating effective responsibility for policy, ensures that it is not located anywhere at all. The arguments presented should be of interest not only to those concerned with Government-industry relations, but to anyone worried about the working of Parliamentary government in Britain.