Edwin W. Martin - Böcker

Since the end of the war in Vietnam and the withdrawal of the American presence there, a marked realignment of power has taken place in Southeast Asia. The old rivalry between China and the United States has become a relationship of cautious rapprochement, while Sino-Soviet competition has been intensified by China's fear that the USSR will move to fill the power vacuum created by the U.S. departure. The United States no longer perceives a friendly Sino-Southeast Asian relationship to be as much of a danger to its security interests as it once did, but how that relationship develops remains of considerable importance to this country. In this book, Edwin Martin examines some of the principal factors in China's current relations with the Southeast Asian countries— China's domestic policies, Peking-oriented insurgency in Southeast Asian countries, the Overseas Chinese, trade considerations, the policies of third powers—and concludes that the newly emergent nationalism in Southeast Asia,coupled with Sino-Soviet rivalry, indeed diminishes the threat posed by a Communist Indochina and calls for a U.S. policy of encouraging stable relations in the area, both among the countries themselves and between them and the PRC. He asserts that a four-way balance of power— involving the United States, the USSR, the PRC, and Japan—will prevent a power vacuum in the area and will allow the Southeast Asian countries to develop their own strengths, both political and economic. It is thus to the advantage of the United States to encourage all steps toward regional cooperation; U.S. policy, Professor Martin concludes, should neither abandon Southeast Asia, nor attempt to dictate to it.

Since the end of the war in Vietnam and the withdrawal of the American presence there, a marked realignment of power has taken place in Southeast Asia. The old rivalry between China and the United States has become a relationship of cautious rapprochement, while Sino-Soviet competition has been intensified by China's fear that the USSR will move to fill the power vacuum created by the U.S. departure. The United States no longer perceives a friendly Sino-Southeast Asian relationship to be as much of a danger to its security interests as it once did, but how that relationship develops remains of considerable importance to this country. In this book, Edwin Martin examines some of the principal factors in China's current relations with the Southeast Asian countries— China's domestic policies, Peking-oriented insurgency in Southeast Asian countries, the Overseas Chinese, trade considerations, the policies of third powers—and concludes that the newly emergent nationalism in Southeast Asia,coupled with Sino-Soviet rivalry, indeed diminishes the threat posed by a Communist Indochina and calls for a U.S. policy of encouraging stable relations in the area, both among the countries themselves and between them and the PRC. He asserts that a four-way balance of power— involving the United States, the USSR, the PRC, and Japan—will prevent a power vacuum in the area and will allow the Southeast Asian countries to develop their own strengths, both political and economic. It is thus to the advantage of the United States to encourage all steps toward regional cooperation; U.S. policy, Professor Martin concludes, should neither abandon Southeast Asia, nor attempt to dictate to it.

In the long controversy over the failure of the United States to extend early recognition to the People's Republic of China, the story of American efforts to maintain an official presence in the Communist-controlled areas of China until 1950 has been largely neglected. Moreover, the often bitter partisan strife over Sino-American relations during this period has obscured important facts or so distorted them that making an independent judgment is difficult indeed. In this book, Edwin Martin seeks to set the confused record straight by providing a well-documented, detailed account of American responses to the policies and actions of the victorious Chinese Communists from their capture of Mukden in November 1948 to their intervention in the Korean War and rejection of U.N. cease-fire offers. Uniquely, Martin provides also a parallel account, based on recently released Foreign Office documents, of Sino-British relations during this period, shedding useful light on the course of American policy. Significantly neither the British nor the American approaches were successful; both governments overestimated their power to influence events in China and the vulnerability of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Only at the Geneva meetings in 1954 did the Chinese Communists reverse policy positions they had steadfastly maintained during 1949-1950.This corrective view of early American relations with the People's Republic of China will be welcomed by all concerned with Asian history and diplomacy.