Efim Sandler – författare

In June 1967 Israel, which seemed on the verge of being annihilated by its Arab neighbors, took six days to redraw the Middle Eastern strategic map in one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in modern times.The success was almost a decade in the making following the Suez Crisis of 1956 with the Israeli forces being radically changed under the direction of the Magi. These changes created an army and air force upon which the country would rely when it became obvious the international community would take no action to implement guarantees made after the Suez Crisis.The Israeli forces were honed in low-level clashes during the 1960s, notably the Water Wars which the Israelis did so much to provoke. By contrast the Arab forces became complacent, usually due to supplies of arms from the Warsaw Pact, but – with proper training – this complacency could have been turned into military effectiveness. The Arab forces were, however, plagued by the fact that command too often depended upon political reliability rather than military effectiveness.In the case of the Egyptian forces their effectiveness was further undermined by their commitment to the debilitating Yemen Civil War which meant they were in no condition to confront Israel. Syria and Jordan, whose forces alone could not fight the Israelis, complained loudly about President Nasser’s lack of action against Israel. In the spring of 1967 Nasser decided to regain the prestige he had lost since the heady days of the Suez Crisis with a demonstration in the Sinai Peninsula. This was interpreted by the Israelis as preparations for an invasion and Nasser did nothing to persuade them otherwise. When it was clear the international community would do nothing, the Israelis decided to strike.Initially Israel aimed to attack only Egypt, but Syria and Jordan then provoked attacks upon their territory. The Israeli campaign was heralded by a massive surprise air attack first on the Egyptians and then on the other neighboring states. Ground offensives then followed in succession as the war, like Topsy in Uncle Tom’s Cabin ‘just growed.’ These campaigns were not always examples of military perfection, as will be scene, and the general post-war back-slapping drowned out serious questions about the future of Israel’s army.

The days of 11-13 June, 1982, proved that Arik Sharon’s plan was over-ambitious and adventuristic. Dragging the IDF into the fight with Syrians appeared to be more complicated despite IDF superiority in technology and training. The armored units were moving too slowly and were stuck in numerous engagements all over the place.In the Western zone, after several failed attempts to take higher ground and open the road to Beirut, IDF finally made its gain and secured Kfar Sil after a very tough fight that lasted not less than 18 hours.In the Central zone, after getting the upper hand over the Syrian forces in Ein Zhalta and Jezzine, Israelis continued to crawl towards Beirut-Damascus Highway but the tempo had been lost and it was obvious that the Sharon expectation could not be matched.In Bekaa Valley, Eastern zone, IDF moved 399 Brigade to the north in order to reach Beirut Damascus Highway in the quickest possible way. That move turned out to be a disaster and one of the worst fights in IDF history. It took tremendous effort of two Israeli divisions to recover the troubled Brigade while suffering losses in men and machines.Besides the major battles, Israeli forces continued to clear the area while having tough opposition hotspots like Ein-Hilweh and finally, the controversial engagement between IDF anti-tank units and Syrian T-72s.

Reconstructs the infamous New Year assault on Grozny, detailing the chaotic defeat of Russian forces through veteran accounts, research, and footage.The New Year assault on Grozny by Russian forces was the most famous and controversial action of the 1st Chechen War. Entering Grozny from four directions, Russian troops with poor knowledge of the city and totally unprepared found themselves trapped, isolated and annihilated by numerous Chechen detachments. Unfortunately, due to the complexity and chaotic nature of the events, almost no official documentation exists. The reconstruction of the assault has been created from numerous veteran accounts, research publications, and video footage. Battle for Grozny is the first attempt to present a complete picture to the English-speaking audience.At first, the resistance offered by Chechens on 31 December 1994 had been relatively moderate and sporadic. All Russian forces besides the Group West managed to reach their objectives way before the planned timeline. The 131st Separate Motor-Rifle Brigade received a controversial order to move towards the railway station. With no knowledge of Grozny and never having trained for urban combat, the Brigade moved in and reached the station by noon, meeting the 81st Motor-Rifle Regiment. In the late afternoon, Chechens started to hammer Russian forces from multiple directions, knocking out the armor one by one. Trying to organize defensive lines, both units were suffering heavy casualties while all relief efforts were completely blocked by Chechens. During the night and the next day most of the Russian units left Grozny with disastrous losses in men and materiel. On the morning of 1 January, Russian aviation mistakenly attacked the positions of the 129th Motor-Rifle Regiment with devastating results – making it the worst friendly fire incident of the entire war. The only Group that managed to hold their positions was that of General Lev Rokhlin, who skillfully organized the defenses of the city hospital and cannery plant, leaving a narrow corridor for reinforcements.Battle for Grozny, Volume 2, is based on numerous little-known publications, veterans’ accounts from both sides, extensive pictorial and video footage, and focuses on the reconstruction of the events that happened over two days of a New Year.