E.J. Kirk – författare

Risk assessment has come to assume acute importance in the former Soviet Union since money is so scarce, yet the needs for cleanup are so huge. Other factors contribute to this situation, too: New leaders are still emerging, and governmental structures are still evolving. This creates a particular difficulty for environmentalists who attempt to become involved in the risk assessment process. New information continues to surface on the fallout from Chernobyl and its consequences for human health. Scientists are still debating the effects of low doses of radiation delivered over a long period of time. This type of contamination is especially prevalent in the Russian North, for example, as a result of the dumping of nuclear submarine reactors into the Kara and Barents Seas. This volume examines the complexities of risk assessment in the former Soviet Union at this time in history.

Until the late 1970s, most commercial power plant operators outside the United States adopted a spent fuel management policy of immediate reprocessing and recycling of recovered products. In response to rising reprocessing prices, decreasing values of re­ covered products, concerns over proliferation risks, and a belief in the favorable eco­ nomics of direct disposal, many utilities have since opted to store spent fuel on an in­ terim basis pending the availability of direct disposal facilities or a change in the eco­ nomic and/or political climate for reprocessing and recycling uranium and plutonium. Spent fuel has traditionally been stored in water-filled pools located in the reactor building or fuel handling buildings, on reactor sites, or as part of large centralized fa­ cilities (e.g. Sellafield, La Hague, CLAB). Because the economics of pool storage are dependent on the size of the facility, the construction of additional separate pools on reactor sites has only been pursued in a few countries, such as Finland and Bulgaria.