Eliot A. Cohen – författare

More than any other episode since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in Kosovo revealed the distinctive attributes of a new American "way of war." In so doing, Kosovo also brought into sharp focus the military, political, and moral dilemmas confronting a liberal democracy intent on wielding preeminent power on a global scale. What are the moral implications posed by waging high-tech warfare for humanitarian purposes? Does the precedent set by intervention of this type point toward peace and stability or toward more war? How well suited are the United States military and American society as a whole to the security challenges of the age of globalization? According to Bacevich and Cohen, gauging the "success" achieved in Kosovo yields important answers to these and related questions. The volume includes a well-crafted historical overview of the war and six essays that place it in a broader context. The contributors explore the conflict's relationship to U.S. grand strategy, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and American civil-military relations, among other topics. Contributors: William A. Arkin, Andrew J. Bacevich, Eliot A. Cohen, Alberto R.Coll, James Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Michael Vickers

More than any other episode since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in Kosovo revealed the distinctive attributes of a new American "way of war." In so doing, Kosovo also brought into sharp focus the military, political, and moral dilemmas confronting a liberal democracy intent on wielding preeminent power on a global scale. What are the moral implications posed by waging high-tech warfare for humanitarian purposes? Does the precedent set by intervention of this type point toward peace and stability or toward more war? How well suited are the United States military and American society as a whole to the security challenges of the age of globalization? According to Bacevich and Cohen, gauging the "success" achieved in Kosovo yields important answers to these and related questions. The volume includes a well-crafted historical overview of the war and six essays that place it in a broader context. The contributors explore the conflict's relationship to U.S. grand strategy, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and American civil-military relations, among other topics. Contributors: William A. Arkin, Andrew J. Bacevich, Eliot A. Cohen, Alberto R.Coll, James Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Michael Vickers

Why do competent armies fail? What made the 1915 British-led invasion of Gallipoli one of the bloodiest catastrophes of the First World War? How did a dozen German U-Boats manage to humiliate the U.S. navy for nine months in 1942, sinking an average of 650,000 tons of shipping monthly? Why was the sophisticated Israeli intelligence service so thoroughly surprised by the onslaught of combined Arab armies during the Yom Kippur War of 1973? MILITARY MISFORTUNES, written by the prominent American strategic analyst, Eliot Cohen and British historian John Gooch, has become the classic, standard answer to these recurring conundrums. Cohen and Gooch's theory of defeat combines gripping battlefield narratives with an innovative look at the hidden factors that undermine armies and lead otherwise well-equipped nations to stunning defeat. It is a must read for anyone who hopes to avoid the same fate.

Why has the United States, unlike every other 20th-century world power, failed to settle on a durable system of military service? In this lucid book, Eliot Cohen studies the enduring problems of America's methods of raising an army.

This fascinating study was first published in 1978 by the Harvard University Center for International Affairs.

This fascinating study was first published in 1978 by the Harvard University Center for International Affairs.