Elizabeth Cooke - Böcker

The law of estoppel by representation concerns those critical circumstances when the law will not allow a person to go back on what he has previously said. We might call it the law of consistency. It has developed, from very simple origins, into a complex of ideas, which have proved to be of great practical importance in areas as diverse as land law, contract, and family law. Development continues, as does the interaction with other areas; changes in recent years in the law's conception of contract, and in its approach to problems of family property, as well as the growth of the law of restitution, have all had their impact on estoppel. The Modern Law of Estoppel seeks to explore, explain, and criticize the law of estoppel; to present a logical structure for it; and in particular to analyse the concept of `unconscionability', which is now seen as a basis for the law.

A clear and concise introduction to the land law of England and Wales written in the Clarendon style: as a letter to a friend, with a minimum of footnotes and statutory material. It explains the origins of land law in the feudal system, its transformation by the legislation of 1925, and the modern regime in which registration is the key to the validity and enforceability of interests in land.Elizabeth Cooke introduces the building blocks of land law, namely property rights in land, and explains how they have evolved by a mixture of design and accident. The book explores the unique role of the trust in English law, and the many complications that can arise where ownership of land is shared (whether concurrently or consecutively). Throughout the book the themes of management of complexity in land law, and the tension between dynamic and static security, are examined. The law of mortgages, leases, easements and covenants is explained. The third edition has been updated with important developments in land law, including recent decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and reform proposals by the Law Commission. Written in an accessible style, this book is an essential read for all those coming to the subject for the first time.

The Family Law & Society; Cases & Materials is an invaluable resource for students. Produced by an esteemed author team it provides a wealth of carefully selected materials offering an overview of the social, economic, and political trends which have come to shape contemporary family life. The materials are linked by the authors through detailed commentary, opening up the complex legal issues for discussion and offering academic and judicial viewpoints. This new edition has been developed extensively to more effectively meet the needs of the undergraduate student, and as such the authors have created a casebook which combines the expertise of previous editions with a strong awareness of today's family law student.

The philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is very important at every stage of the history of modern American thought. It informs William James's evolutionary metaphysics, John Dewey's theory of logic, W.V.O. Quine's naturalism, and Richard Rorty's notion of the Linguistic Turn. Similarly, many Continental philosophers, like Jurgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Jacques Derrida, and Umberto Eco, have developed Peirce's semiotic logic as central to their own philosophical views. Yet until now there has been a yawning gap in the literature on what is arguably the most essential idea in the entire Peircean corpus, namely his "fallibilism." The basic idea of fallibilism is that all knowledge claims, including those metaphysical, methodological, introspective, and even mathematical claims - all of these remain uncertain, provisional, merely fallible conjectures. As Elizabeth Cooke explains in Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry, one long-standing concern with the idea of fallibilism is that it might all too easily slide into "skepticism." And this would certainly undermine the overall project of making Peirce's fallibilism the linchpin for any realistic pragmatism.So, it is essential to show Peirce's philosophy does not require any claims to certitude, in order to keep his fallibilism from falling into skepticism or contextualism. Cooke's solution to this problem is to interpret Peirce as having reconceived knowledge - traditionally defined as "foundational" and even "static" - as a dynamic process of inquiry, one which evolves within a larger ontological process of evolution. Her book will be of great interest not only to Peirce and Pragmatism specialists but also to contemporary epistemologists more generally.