Eric A. Posner - Böcker

In Terror in the Balance, Posner and Vermeule take on civil libertarians of both the left and the right, arguing that the government should be given wide latitude to adjust policy and liberties in the times of emergency. They emphasize the virtues of unilateral executive actions and argue for making extensive powers available to the executive as warranted. The judiciary should neither second-guess security policy nor interfere on constitutional grounds. In order to protect citizens, government can and should use any legal instrument that is warranted under ordinary cost-benefit analysis. The value gained from the increase in security will exceed the losses from the decrease in liberty. At a time when the 'struggle against violent extremism' dominates the United States' agenda, this important and controversial work will spark discussion in the classroom and intellectual press alike.

A trenchant account of an unacknowledged driver of inequality and wage stagnation in America: the abandonment of antitrust law, which has allowed corporations to combine into a smaller number of massive conglomerates whose market dominance robs workers of their bargaining power. The consequences of the massive consolidation wave in corporate America that began decades ago are now increasingly apparent: labor markets are no longer competitive. Since the 1970s, Americans have seen income and wealth inequality skyrocket--and job opportunities stagnate. There are many theories of why this happened, including the decline of organized labor and the introduction of tax policies that favored the rich. However, another crucial event was the precipitous decline in antitrust enforcement that began in earnest during the Reagan administration. With ever-increasing combination and consolidation, workers had fewer options to turn to. In How Antitrust Law Failed Workers, Eric Posner documents the role of antitrust in our economy and why it failed. Only through reforming antitrust law can we shield workers from employers' overwhelming market power. As Posner explains, antitrust laws were created to protect the labor market by attacking monopolies, like Facebook and Google today, that are able to either charge high prices or degrade the quality of their services because customers cannot switch to competitors. Antitrust laws are also used to attack business cartels that can fix prices. In recent years, it has become clear that firms with market power not only charge higher prices; they also suppress wages and output. Many employers use anticompetitive devices--like covenants not to compete for workers and no-poaching agreements--to advance their market power at the expense of workers.Posner shares stories that illustrate how the problem is playing out on the ground, and then contextualizes what is going on via a concise history of the American economy and labor relations since the 1980s. Essential reading for anyone interested in fighting economic inequality, How Antitrust Failed Workers also offers a sharp primer on the true nature of the American economy--one that is increasingly uncompetitive and tilted against workers.

Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used "imperial presidency" as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power such as Dick Cheney gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done? The answer, according to legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is nothing. In The Executive Unbound, they provide a bracing challenge to conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. Most scholars, they note, object to today's level of executive power because it varies so dramatically from the vision of the framers of the Constitution. But Posner and Vermeule find fault with James Madison's premises. Like an ideal market, they write, Madison's separation of powers has no central director, but it lacks the price system which gives an economy its structure; there is nothing in checks and balances that intrinsically generates order or promotes positive arrangements. In fact, the greater complexity of the modern world produces a concentration of power, particularly in the White House. The authors chart the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution. Piety toward the founders and a historic fear of tyranny have been powerful forces in American political thinking. Posner and Vermeule confront them both in this startlingly original contribution.

Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used "imperial presidency" as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power such as Dick Cheney gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done? The answer, according to legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is nothing. In The Executive Unbound, they provide a bracing challenge to conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. Most scholars, they note, object to today's level of executive power because it varies so dramatically from the vision of the framers of the Constitution. But Posner and Vermeule find fault with James Madison's premises. Like an ideal market, they write, Madison's separation of powers has no central director, but it lacks the price system which gives an economy its structure; there is nothing in checks and balances that intrinsically generates order or promotes positive arrangements. In fact, the greater complexity of the modern world produces a concentration of power, particularly in the White House. The authors chart the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution. Piety toward the founders and a historic fear of tyranny have been powerful forces in American political thinking. Posner and Vermeule confront them both in this startlingly original contribution.

Cost-benefit analysis is a widely used governmental evaluation tool, though academics remain skeptical. This volume gathers prominent contributors from law, economics, and philosophy for discussion of cost-benefit analysis, specifically its moral foundations, applications and limitations.This new scholarly debate includes not only economists, but also contributors from philosophy, cognitive psychology, legal studies, and public policy who can further illuminate the justification and moral implications of this method and specify alternative measures.These articles originally appeared in the Journal of Legal Studies.Contributors:- Matthew D. Adler - Gary S. Becker- John Broome - Robert H. Frank- Robert W. Hahn - Lewis A. Kornhauser- Martha C. Nussbaum - Eric A. Posner- Richard A. Posner - Henry S. Richardson- Amartya Sen - Cass R. Sunstein- W. Kip Viscusi

The bailouts during the recent financial crisis enraged the public. They felt unfair--and counterproductive: people who take risks must be allowed to fail. If we reward firms that make irresponsible investments, costing taxpayers billions of dollars, aren't we encouraging them to continue to act irresponsibly, setting the stage for future crises? And beyond the ethics of it was the question of whether the government even had the authority to bail out failing firms like Bear Stearns and AIG. The answer, according to Eric A. Posner, is no. The federal government freely and frequently violated the law with the bailouts--but it did so in the public interest. An understandable lack of sympathy toward Wall Street has obscured the fact that bailouts have happened throughout economic history and are unavoidable in any modern, market-based economy. And they're actually good. Contrary to popular belief, the financial system cannot operate properly unless the government stands ready to bail out banks and other firms. During the recent crisis, Posner agues, the law didn't give federal agencies sufficient power to rescue the financial system. The legal constraints were damaging, but harm was limited because the agencies--with a few exceptions--violated or improvised elaborate evasions of the law. Yet the agencies also abused their power. If illegal actions were what it took to advance the public interest, Posner argues, we ought to change the law, but we need to do so in a way that also prevents agencies from misusing their authority. In the aftermath of the crisis, confusion about what agencies did do, should have done, and were allowed to do, has prevented a clear and realistic assessment and may hamper our response to future crises. Taking up the common objections raised by both right and left, Posner argues that future bailouts will occur. Acknowledging that inevitability, we can and must look ahead and carefully assess our policy options before we need them.

The first two years of the Obama administration have led to expectations, both in the United States and abroad, that in the coming years America will increasingly promote the international rule of law - a position that many believe is both ethically necessary and in the nation's best interests. With "The Perils of Global Legalism", Eric A. Posner explains that such views demonstrate a dangerously naive tendency toward legalism - an idealistic belief that law can be effective even in the absence of legitimate institutions of governance. After tracing the historical roots of the concept, Posner carefully lays out the many illusions - such as universalism, sovereign equality, and the possibility of disinterested judgment by politically unaccountable officials - on which the legalistic view is founded.Drawing on such examples as NATO's invasion of Serbia, attempts to ban the use of land mines, and the free-trade provisions of the WTO, Posner demonstrates throughout that the weaknesses of international law confound legalist ambitions - and that whatever their professed commitments, all nations stand ready to dispense with international agreements when it suits their short- or long-term interests.

Since the earliest days of philosophy, thinkers have debated the meaning of the term happiness and the nature of the good life. But it is only in recent years that the study of happiness - or 'hedonics' - has developed into a formal field of inquiry, cutting across a broad range of disciplines and offering insights into a variety of crucial questions of law and public policy. "Law and Happiness" brings together the best and most influential thinkers in the field to explore the question of what happiness is - and what factors can be demonstrated to increase or decrease it. Martha C. Nussbaum offers an account of the way that hedonics can productively be applied to psychology; Cass R. Sunstein considers the unexpected relationship between happiness and health problems; Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner view hedonics through the lens of cost-benefit analysis; David A. Weisbach considers the relationship between happiness and taxation; Mark A. Cohen examines the role that crime - and fear of crime - can play in people's assessment of their happiness; and, other distinguished contributors take similarly innovative approaches to the topic of happiness.The result is a kaleidoscopic overview of this increasingly prominent field, offering surprising new perspectives and incisive analyses that will have profound implications for the law and our lives.

The ever-increasing exchange of goods and ideas among nations, as well as cross-border pollution, global warming, and international crime, pose urgent questions for international law. Here, two respected scholars provide an intellectual framework for assessing these pressing legal problems from a rational choice perspective.The approach assumes that states are rational, forward-looking agents which use international law to address the actions of other states that may have consequences for their own citizens, and to obtain the benefits of international cooperation. It further assumes that in the absence of a central enforcement agency—that is, a world government—international law must be self-enforcing. States must believe that if they violate international agreements, other states will retaliate.Consequently, Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes devote considerable attention to the challenges of enforcing international law, which begin with the difficulties of determining what it is. In the absence of an international constitution, the sources for international law are vague. Lawyers must rely on statements contained in all manner of official documents and on simple observation of states’ behavior. This looseness leads international institutions such as the United Nations to deliver conflicting interpretations of the law’s most basic principles. The authors describe the conditions under which international law succeeds or fails, across a wide range of issues, including war crimes, human rights, international criminal law, principles of state responsibility, law of the sea, international trade regulation, and international investment law.

Climate change and justice are so closely associated that many people take it for granted that a global climate treaty should--indeed, must--directly address both issues together. But, in fact, this would be a serious mistake, one that, by dooming effective international limits on greenhouse gases, would actually make the world's poor and developing nations far worse off. This is the provocative and original argument of Climate Change Justice. Eric Posner and David Weisbach strongly favor both a climate change agreement and efforts to improve economic justice. But they make a powerful case that the best--and possibly only--way to get an effective climate treaty is to exclude measures designed to redistribute wealth or address historical wrongs against underdeveloped countries. In clear language, Climate Change Justice proposes four basic principles for designing the only kind of climate treaty that will work--a forward-looking agreement that requires every country to make greenhouse--gas reductions but still makes every country better off in its own view.This kind of treaty has the best chance of actually controlling climate change and improving the welfare of people around the world.

Climate change and justice are so closely associated that many people take it for granted that a global climate treaty should--indeed, must--directly address both issues together. But, in fact, this would be a serious mistake, one that, by dooming effective international limits on greenhouse gases, would actually make the world's poor and developing nations far worse off. This is the provocative and original argument of Climate Change Justice. Eric Posner and David Weisbach strongly favor both a climate change agreement and efforts to improve economic justice. But they make a powerful case that the best--and possibly only--way to get an effective climate treaty is to exclude measures designed to redistribute wealth or address historical wrongs against underdeveloped countries. In clear language, Climate Change Justice proposes four basic principles for designing the only kind of climate treaty that will work--a forward-looking agreement that requires every country to make greenhouse--gas reductions but still makes every country better off in its own view.This kind of treaty has the best chance of actually controlling climate change and improving the welfare of people around the world.

Revolutionary ideas on how to use markets to bring about fairness and prosperity for allMany blame today's economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? Radical Markets turns this thinking—and pretty much all conventional thinking about markets, both for and against—on its head. The book reveals bold new ways to organize markets for the good of everyone. It shows how the emancipatory force of genuinely open, free, and competitive markets can reawaken the dormant nineteenth-century spirit of liberal reform and lead to greater equality, prosperity, and cooperation.Eric Posner and Glen Weyl demonstrate why private property is inherently monopolistic, and how we would all be better off if private ownership were converted into a public auction for public benefit. They show how the principle of one person, one vote inhibits democracy, suggesting instead an ingenious way for voters to effectively influence the issues that matter most to them. They argue that every citizen of a host country should benefit from immigration—not just migrants and their capitalist employers. They propose leveraging antitrust laws to liberate markets from the grip of institutional investors and creating a data labor movement to force digital monopolies to compensate people for their electronic data.Only by radically expanding the scope of markets can we reduce inequality, restore robust economic growth, and resolve political conflicts. But to do that, we must replace our most sacred institutions with truly free and open competition—Radical Markets shows how.

Revolutionary ideas on how to use markets to achieve fairness and prosperity for allMany blame today's economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? Radical Markets turns this thinking on its head. With a new foreword by Ethereum creator Vitalik Buterin and virtual reality pioneer Jaron Lanier as well as a new afterword by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, this provocative book reveals bold new ways to organize markets for the good of everyone. It shows how the emancipatory force of genuinely open, free, and competitive markets can reawaken the dormant nineteenth-century spirit of liberal reform and lead to greater equality, prosperity, and cooperation.Only by radically expanding the scope of markets can we reduce inequality, restore robust economic growth, and resolve political conflicts. But to do that, we must replace our most sacred institutions with truly free and open competition—Radical Markets shows how.

Law and economics is an influential field of legal theory in the United States. Its practitioners use the methodology of economics for the purpose of analyzing a diverse assortment of legal topics. This volume contains a selection of recent work in law and economics. The first part includes representative articles from different fields of law, including contracts, torts, criminal law, intellectual property and civil procedure. The second part shows ways in which law and economics has been changing in the last decade. It includes articles representing recent work that relaxes the rational actor model by introducing biases discovered by cognitive psychology; that tests law and economics with experimental techniques that are now popular in economics; that introduces computer modeling to law and economics; and that expands the domain of law and economics to take account of social norms and political structures. The articles are accessible to students and scholars with no prior expertise in economics and minimal familiarity with American law.

Something is definitely wrong with Donald Trump’s presidency, but what exactly? The extraordinary negative reaction to Trump’s election - by conservative intellectuals, liberals, Democrats, and global leaders alike - goes beyond ordinary partisan and policy disagreements. It reflects genuine fear about the vitality of our constitutional system. The Founders, reaching back to classical precedents, feared that their experiment in self-government could produce a demagogue: a charismatic ruler who would gain and hold on to power by manipulating the public rather than by advancing the public good.President Trump, who has played to the mob and attacked institutions from the judiciary to the press, appears to embody these fears. How can we move past his rhetoric and maintain faith in our nation? In The Demagogue’s Playbook, acclaimed legal scholar Eric Posner offers a blueprint for how America can prevent the rise of a demagogue and protect the features of a democracy that help it thrive - and restore national greatness, for one and all.

This authoritative collection brings together a careful selection of previously published articles that use economics to analyze the interaction of law, on the one hand, and social norms and nonlegal sanctions on the other. The articles cover a range of foundational questions. What are social norms and nonlegal sanctions? Do strong laws undermine social norms, thus weakening other valuable forms of social cooperation? Can laws be used to exploit existing social norms, so that the laws are more effective than they would be otherwise? The contributing authors use a variety of economic models and concepts to address these questions.