Eva Heims – författare

In the years leading up to the outbreak of war in 1914, Britain was collaborating closely with Germany on the development of an improved telegraph service, despite preparations for war also being made by both countries. This cooperation rested upon both states' intensive participation in the global regulatory regime for telecommunications. Why states commit to cooperating in such multilateral regimes with other states while their relationship struggles with deepening mistrust is a longstanding puzzle. As tensions rise among great powers today and international organisations struggle again, this puzzle is as important now as it was when international regulatory regimes first emerged.The book challenges many of the conventional explanations for this puzzling situation and draws on neo-Durkheimian institutional theory to develop a novel explanation. It examines the case of Britain's relationship with the first global regulatory regime, which was concerned with international telegraphy, submarine telegraph cables, and radiotelegraphy from the 1860s through to 1914. The regime was created in a time of European wars and growing imperial conflicts. Although Britain seriously contemplated leaving the International Telegraph Union in 1901-2, the state went on to deepen cooperation with other countries in telegraphy, including with Germany even as preparations for war advanced. Drawing on extensive archival sources, Perri 6 and Eva Heims show that social organisation in government can cultivate institutional buffering between aspects of external policy which can sustain commitment despite deepening conflict. In doing so, they show how a neo-Durkheimian approach provides a powerful explanation for deepening cooperation even as mistrust rises, which has significant implications for understanding state formation.

In the years leading up to the outbreak of war in 1914, Britain was collaborating closely with Germany on the development of an improved telegraph service, despite preparations for war also being made by both countries. This cooperation rested upon both states' intensive participation in the global regulatory regime for telecommunications. Why states commit to cooperating in such multilateral regimes with other states while their relationship struggles with deepening mistrust is a longstanding puzzle. As tensions rise among great powers today and international organisations struggle again, this puzzle is as important now as it was when international regulatory regimes first emerged. The book challenges many of the conventional explanations for this puzzling situation and draws on neo-Durkheimian institutional theory to develop a novel explanation. It examines the case of Britain's relationship with the first global regulatory regime, which was concerned with international telegraphy, submarine telegraph cables, and radiotelegraphy from the 1860s through to 1914. The regime was created in a time of European wars and growing imperial conflicts. Although Britain seriously contemplated leaving the International Telegraph Union in 1901-2, the state went on to deepen cooperation with other countries in telegraphy, including with Germany even as preparations for war advanced. Drawing on extensive archival sources, Perri 6 and Eva Heims show that social organisation in government can cultivate institutional buffering between aspects of external policy which can sustain commitment despite deepening conflict. In doing so, they show how a neo-Durkheimian approach provides a powerful explanation for deepening cooperation even as mistrust rises, which has significant implications for understanding state formation.

In the years leading up to the outbreak of war in 1914, Britain was collaborating closely with Germany on the development of an improved telegraph service, despite preparations for war also being made by both countries. This cooperation rested upon both states' intensive participation in the global regulatory regime for telecommunications. Why states commit to cooperating in such multilateral regimes with other states while their relationship struggles with deepening mistrust is a longstanding puzzle. As tensions rise among great powers today and international organisations struggle again, this puzzle is as important now as it was when international regulatory regimes first emerged. The book challenges many of the conventional explanations for this puzzling situation and draws on neo-Durkheimian institutional theory to develop a novel explanation. It examines the case of Britain's relationship with the first global regulatory regime, which was concerned with international telegraphy, submarine telegraph cables, and radiotelegraphy from the 1860s through to 1914. The regime was created in a time of European wars and growing imperial conflicts. Although Britain seriously contemplated leaving the International Telegraph Union in 1901-2, the state went on to deepen cooperation with other countries in telegraphy, including with Germany even as preparations for war advanced. Drawing on extensive archival sources, Perri 6 and Eva Heims show that social organisation in government can cultivate institutional buffering between aspects of external policy which can sustain commitment despite deepening conflict. In doing so, they show how a neo-Durkheimian approach provides a powerful explanation for deepening cooperation even as mistrust rises, which has significant implications for understanding state formation.

This book examines regulatory capacity beyond the nation state. It suggests that we can only understand why EU agencies are able to build EU regulatory capacity if we acknowledge that national regulators provide their expertise, staff and resources to the regulatory processes taking place in these EU bodies. This raises the puzzle of why national regulators are willing to provide ‘life support’ to potentially rival organisations. The book is devoted to answering this question in order to understand how EU regulatory capacity is created in the absence of a full supranational regulatory bureaucracy. To do so, the book studies to what extent national regulators from two countries (the UK and Germany) support EU agencies in their work across four policy sectors (drug safety, food safety, maritime safety and banking supervision). The book makes a significant contribution by developing a bureaucratic politics perspective that highlights the importance of national regulators for EU regulatorycapacity building.

This book examines regulatory capacity beyond the nation state. It suggests that we can only understand why EU agencies are able to build EU regulatory capacity if we acknowledge that national regulators provide their expertise, staff and resources to the regulatory processes taking place in these EU bodies. This raises the puzzle of why national regulators are willing to provide ‘life support’ to potentially rival organisations. The book is devoted to answering this question in order to understand how EU regulatory capacity is created in the absence of a full supranational regulatory bureaucracy. To do so, the book studies to what extent national regulators from two countries (the UK and Germany) support EU agencies in their work across four policy sectors (drug safety, food safety, maritime safety and banking supervision). The book makes a significant contribution by developing a bureaucratic politics perspective that highlights the importance of national regulators for EU regulatorycapacity building.