Evan McGilvray – författare

Pilsudski was the leading proponent of armed Polish resistance to Tsarist Russian rule in the early years of the twentieth century. During the Russo-Japanese War he went to Japan to seek armed and funds for a Polish uprising. In WW1 he skilfully walked a perilous line. He raised the Polish Legion to fight alongside the Central Powers against the Russians. In the war’s closing stages he distanced himself from the Central Powers and secured independence for Poland.Having attained his great goal of a free Poland, he fought a series of wars. These little-known conflicts (with Ukraine and Lithuania) are illuminated by Evan McGilvray. When it became clear that Bolshevik Russia was preparing to invade Poland, Pilsudski launched a pre-emptive attack in 1920. Despite early successes, the Russians were able to gain the upper hand and were almost at the gates of Warsaw before Pilsudski’s masterful counterattack brought about ‘the miracle of the Vistula’ and turned the tide.This is a fascinating and long overdue study of a key figure in modern European history.

The invasion of Poland by German forces (quickly joined by their then-allies the Soviets) ignited the Second World War. Despite determined resistance, Poland was quickly conquered but Poles continued the struggle to the very last day of the war against Germany, resisting the occupier within their homeland and fighting in exile with the Allied forces.Evan McGilvray, drawing on intensive research in Polish sources, gives a comprehensive account of Poland's war. He reveals the complexities of Poland's relationship with the Allies (forced to accept their Soviet enemies as allies after 1941, then betrayed to Soviet occupation in the post-war settlement), as well as the divisions between Polish factions that led to civil war even before the defeat of Germany.The author narrates all the fighting involving Polish forces, including such famous actions as the Battle of Britain, Tobruk, Normandy, Arnhem and the Warsaw Rising, but also lesser known aspects such as Kopinski's Carpathian Brigade in Italy, Polish troops under Soviet command and the capture of Wilhelmshaven on the last day of the war.

This is a study of Sir Ian Hamilton VCs command of the Gallipoli campaign. Appointed by Kitchener after the failure of the initial Allied naval offensive in the Dardanelles, Hamilton was to lead the ambitious amphibious landings that were intended to open the way to Constantinople. In the event, however, opportunities immediately after the landings were squandered and, in the face of unexpectedly effective Turkish resistance, soon stalled in attritional trench warfare like that on the Western Front. 
Hamilton has often been criticized for this failure and in many ways seen to typify the stereotype of a British general clinging to outdated Victorian thinking. Yet this fresh reappraisal, drawing on original archival research, shows that Hamilton did display some progressive ideas and a realization that warfare was rapidly changing. Like all generals of this period he faced the challenge of unprecedented technological and tactical revolution as well as the political and media battle. It is as a case study of command in these circumstances that Evan Mcgilvray's assessment of Hamilton will be most valued.

Along with thousands of his compatriots, Wladyslaw Anders was imprisoned by the Soviets when they attacked Poland with their German allies in 1939. They endured terrible treatment until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 suddenly put Stalin in the Allied camp, after which they were evacuated to Iran and formed into the Polish Second Corps under Anders command.Once equipped and trained, the corps was eventually committed to the Italian campaign, notably at Monte Cassino. The author assesses Anders performance as a military commander, finding him merely adequate, but his political role was more significant and caused friction in the Allied camp. From the start he often opposed Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister in exile and Commander in Chief of Polish armed forces in the West. Indeed, Anders was suspected of collusion in Sikorskis death in July 1943 and of later sending Polish death squads into Poland to eliminate opponents, charges that Evan McGilvray investigates. Furthermore, Anders voiced his deep mistrust of Stalin and urged a war against the Soviets after the defeat of Hitler.

“If the Polish armed forces are of interest to you this title covering their distinguished service during World War II should appeal to many.” —Armorama   The First Polish Armored Division was formed in Scotland in February 1942 from Polish exiles who had escaped first Poland and then France. Its commander, Stanislaw Maczek, and many of its men had previously served in Polish 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade (10 BKS), which had taken part in the Polish invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and given a good account of itself in the defense of Poland against German and Soviet invasion of 1939. Under Maczek’s leadership the division was trained and equipped along British lines in preparation for the invasion of France.   Attached to 1st Canadian Army, the division was sent to Normandy in late July 1944. It suffered heavily during Operation Totalize but went on to play a crucial role in preventing an orderly German withdrawal from the Falaise Pocket by its stand at Hill 262. They then played their part in the advance across Western Europe and into Germany.   This detailed history, supported by dozens of archive photos, concludes by looking at the often-poor treatment of Maczek and his men after the war.  “A Polish armoured division comprising volunteers from Polish refugees—it reads like a story from the Boys Own Paper . . . Astonishing!” —Books Monthly

“If the Polish armed forces are of interest to you this title covering their distinguished service during World War II should appeal to many.” —Armorama   The First Polish Armored Division was formed in Scotland in February 1942 from Polish exiles who had escaped first Poland and then France. Its commander, Stanislaw Maczek, and many of its men had previously served in Polish 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade (10 BKS), which had taken part in the Polish invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and given a good account of itself in the defense of Poland against German and Soviet invasion of 1939. Under Maczek’s leadership the division was trained and equipped along British lines in preparation for the invasion of France.   Attached to 1st Canadian Army, the division was sent to Normandy in late July 1944. It suffered heavily during Operation Totalize but went on to play a crucial role in preventing an orderly German withdrawal from the Falaise Pocket by its stand at Hill 262. They then played their part in the advance across Western Europe and into Germany.   This detailed history, supported by dozens of archive photos, concludes by looking at the often-poor treatment of Maczek and his men after the war.  “A Polish armoured division comprising volunteers from Polish refugees—it reads like a story from the Boys Own Paper . . . Astonishing!” —Books Monthly

De Gaulle and Churchill examines the tense and complicated relationship between General de Gaulle as leader of the Free French on the one hand and Winston Churchill and the British Government on the other.Evan McGilvray shows that De Gaulle was a career soldier, not a politician by any means, prior to 1940 but stepped into the leadership vacuum after the fall of France to provide a vital figurehead and rallying point for the Free French movement. His experiences in WW1, where he had served with distinction and was decorated but then was captured and so missed the nadir of despair expressed in the mutiny of 1917, meant he did not share the general defeatism of his peers in 1940.De Gaulle had demonstrated between the wars that he understood modern warfare and the need for modernization and reform of the French forces.Churchill valued the Free French contribution, particularly the French colonies as bulwarks to the British Middle East and jumping-off points for a Mediterranean counteroffensive, but demonstrated his ruthless willingness to ride roughshod over French sensibilities. This was most famously demonstrated by the sinking of the French fleet to prevent it falling into German hands.The author traces their difficult relationship from the dark days of the Fall of France, to the final victory, with de Gaulle by then installed as head of the provisional government of the French Republic. This fascinating study concludes with the immediate post-war period, by which time Churchill and de Gaulle had developed a warmer, more mutually respectful relationship.

General Władysław Sikorski was the Head of the wartime Polish Government and Polish Commander-in-Chief, 1939-1943\. Sikorski rose to prominence in Poland between 1910 and 1918 as part of the movement towards Polish independence, achieved in 1918\. In 1920 Sikorski was largely responsible for the defeat of the Red Army. In 1926 he fell from favour following a military coup. During this fallow period, 1926-1939, Sikorski travelled, mainly in France. He also wrote influential military-science treatises.In September 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union invaded and annexed Poland. Sikorski, his military offices refused by the Polish Government, fled to Romania. There he was intercepted by the French ambassador to Poland and taken to Paris where he established a Polish Government-in-Exile and rebuilt the Polish Army. In May 1940 France was overrun by Germany. Sikorski removed himself and his government to London. There he began to re-build the Polish army largely lost in France.Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Sikorski was forced by the British Government to accept the Soviets as allies. This led to a larger Polish army being formed in the Soviet Union and sent to the Middle East, commanded by General Anders who was to become a thorn in Sikorski’s side. By 1943, the two men were clearly enemies. Sikorski died in an air crash off Gibraltar. The cause has never been satisfactory established.

The Black Devils March is an account of how the 1st (and only) Polish Armoured Division in the West under the leadership of General Stanislaw Maczek, arose out of the ashes of defeat and while attempting to avoid the internal politics of the Polish Government in Exile, was able to return to Europe in August 1944 on the side of the Western Allies. In Europe the Division achieved glory, honor and victory but was unable to liberate Poland owing to the politics of the post-war settlement in Europe.The account of the formation and combat service of the Division is fully researched from Polish, English and German sources, and includes training in Scotland, the unit's sharp introduction to warfare in the Normandy bocage, the Falaise Gap and Hill 262, the advance into Belgium and Holland, and final victory on German soil. The text is supported by nearly 100 photographs (many previously unpublished), maps, and detailed appendices, including a list of the Division's medal recipients. In addition, there are four pages of outstanding color profiles showing the camouflage and markings of the unit's tanks and other vehicles.The politics of the Polish Army are examined as well as the historical legacy of the Polish soldier in exile. Much of the book was researched from hard-to-find Polish sources. The text is supported by 4 pages of color AFV profiles, nearly 100 photographs (many previously unpublished), maps and appendices.

This work examines the nature of the relationship between the British Government and the Polish Government-in-Exile, 1939-1945. The relationship was extremely difficult owing to the extremity of the time and the situations of the two governments. Before 1939 there had been little contact between Poland and Britain. Between 1939 and 1945, however, the two countries were joined in a common desire for the military defeat of Germany: this was virtually the only common goal that the two governments shared; Polish ambitions to see Poland restored to its pre-war frontiers were not shared with the major allies (Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union) after 1941. The question of differing objectives caused friction between the Western allies, the Soviet Union and the Polish Government-in-Exile. As hosts the British Government was able to control the Polish Government-in-Exile but frequently found that the demands of the Soviet Government on the latter difficult to justify, although the British did so in order to maintain the unity of the alliance against Germany. However, the Polish Government-in-Exile failed to recognize its true position in the alliance: it was very much a junior partner - just another minor European power and irritant. Another problem in the relationship between the British Government and the Polish Government-in-Exile was, what kind of government was it? Between 1926 and 1939, a military clique had ruled Poland and the signs were that in exile very little had changed in the mindset of many Poles, especially those military officers who arrived in exile after 1939. This situation vexed the British Government, which sought to work with democratically minded Poles, but found this pool to be limited owing to the continuing political influence of the Polish military in exile. This attitude worsened as the war progressed until eventually the Polish Government-in-Exile lost any relevance in the war against Germany. Making full use of unpublished material and Polish sources, this is a detailed and lucid contribution to modern Polish and European history, including much information concerning the creation of the Polish Army following the end of the First World War, and the politics of the Army during the 1920s and 1930s, besides detailed coverage of its political role during the Second World War.

This work is a reexamination of the decisions regarding the 1944 Warsaw Uprising made by the leadership of the underground Polish Army (AK), as well as the questionable attitudes of senior Polish commanders in exile in London. The questions raised are, was the uprising necessary and why was it so poorly conducted by a totally indifferent leadership? The challenge is made that the Polish leaders in Warsaw and in London were clearly unfeeling. In Warsaw the uprising was allowed to happen and was doomed from the very beginning owing to poor generalship. The Soviets can be seen rather than to have betrayed the Poles, to have behaved in the same manner as they had always behaved to the Poles and Poland, that is underhanded and with great deceit. Therefore why did the Warsaw Poles rise up when encouraged by the Soviets? The Poles should have known that it was a trick. Despite plans laid down by the Allies to support such uprisings, as had been the case in Paris during August 1944, the Red Army watched the AK be destroyed by the Germans, to save themselves the same job. Once the uprising failed, the Polish leadership went into what could only be described as ‘genteel’ captivity, compared with the fate of hundreds of thousands of their countrymen and women who were herded out of Warsaw by German armed forces and sent to concentration camps, illegal prisoner of war camps or forced into slave labor. In the West senior Polish commanders did not consider a 100% casualty rate to be unacceptable as they pushed for Allied flights to resupply Warsaw. This callous disregard for life was part of the lack of understanding in the leadership of the reality of the Polish situation in 1944: the war was not about Poland but the complete defeat of Germany. If Polish freedom came out of this, then good, otherwise the Allies were not going to be diverted from the constant aerial bombardment of Germany, as the Allies swept eastward and westward towards Germany. This work is supplemented with Polish sources as well as interviews with five women who had been involved in the Warsaw Uprising as young women and girls in 1944. Now in their 80s these ladies kindly granted interviews with the author in Poland during 2012.EPUB3: Reflowable

Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck is a study not only of the individual but also of how the British Army, Indian Army and the Empire were transformed during his long military career. Auchinleck was commissioned into the Indian Army from 1904 and served with distinction against the Turks in Egypt and the Mesopotamian campaign, earning a DSO. Between the wars he was involved in the pacification of the Northwest Frontier (now Pakistan).In the Second World War he briefly led a division in the ill-fated Norway campaign before being appointed Commander-in-Chief, India. He is best remembered for his controversial stint in command in North Africa, where he replaced Wavell in July 1941\. He halted Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein but was then replaced by Montgomery and resumed as C-in-C India, where his logistical support for Fourteenth Army was vital to success in Burma. Post-war he planned and oversaw Partition and British withdrawal from India. Here, as in North Africa, interference from his political masters added to the burdens of command. Evan McGilvray appraises Auchinleck’s long and varied career in its entirety.