F.C. Brentano - Böcker

This book contains the definitive statement of Franz Brentano's views on meta­ physics. It is made up of essays which were dictated by Brentano during the last ten years of his life, between 1907 and 1917. These dictations were assembled and edited by Alfred Kastil and first published by the Felix Meiner Verlag in 1933 under the title Kategorienlehre. Kastil added copious notes to Brentano's text. These notes have been included, with some slight omissions, in the present edition; the bibliographical references have been brought up to date. Brentano's approach to philosophy is unfamiliar to many contemporay readers. I shall discuss below certain fundamental points which such readers are likely to find the most difficult. I believe that once these points are properly understood, then what Brentano has to say will be seen to be of first importance to philosophy. THE PRIMACY OF THE INTENTIONAL To understand Brentano's theory of being, one must realize that he appeals to what he calls inner perception for his paradigmatic uses of the word "is". For inner perception, according to Brentano, is the source of our knowledge of the nature of being, just as it is the source of our knowledge of the nature of truth and of the nature of good and evil. And what can be said about the being of things that are not apprehended in inner perception can be understood only by analogy with what we are able to say about ourselves as thinking subjects.

Of the works by Franz Brentano (1838-1917) which have appeared in thus far, perhaps none is better suited to convey a clear idea of the English spirit of the man that this volume of his lectures on proving the existence of God. In order to understand his metaphysics, it would he better to read The Theory of Categories; in order to master the finer points of his psychology, it would be better to read Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint; in order to appreciate his ethical theory, it would be better to read The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong or, for a more thorough treatment, The Foundation and Construction of Ethics. But in order to see what it was that gave Brentano the enthusiasm and dedication to do all that work and much more besides, it is necessary to find out what Brentano believed the philosophical enterprise itself to be; and this comes forth most vividly when he bends his philosophical efforts to the subject he considered most important of all, namely, natural theology. For, like Socrates, Brentano brought a kind of religious fervor to his philosophy precisely because he saw it as dealing much better than religion does with the matters that are closest to our hearts.

This book contains the definitive statement of Franz Brentano's views on meta­ physics. It is made up of essays which were dictated by Brentano during the last ten years of his life, between 1907 and 1917. These dictations were assembled and edited by Alfred Kastil and first published by the Felix Meiner Verlag in 1933 under the title Kategorienlehre. Kastil added copious notes to Brentano's text. These notes have been included, with some slight omissions, in the present edition; the bibliographical references have been brought up to date. Brentano's approach to philosophy is unfamiliar to many contemporay readers. I shall discuss below certain fundamental points which such readers are likely to find the most difficult. I believe that once these points are properly understood, then what Brentano has to say will be seen to be of first importance to philosophy. THE PRIMACY OF THE INTENTIONAL To understand Brentano's theory of being, one must realize that he appeals to what he calls inner perception for his paradigmatic uses of the word "is". For inner perception, according to Brentano, is the source of our knowledge of the nature of being, just as it is the source of our knowledge of the nature of truth and of the nature of good and evil. And what can be said about the being of things that are not apprehended in inner perception can be understood only by analogy with what we are able to say about ourselves as thinking subjects.