Francis J. Mootz III – författare

Known as the “swing justice,” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy provided the key vote determining which way the Supreme Court would decide on some of the most controversial cases in US history. Though criticized for his unpredictable rulings, Kennedy also gained a reputation for his opinion writing and, more so, for his legal rhetoric.This book examines Justice Kennedy’s legacy through the lenses of rhetoric, linguistics, and constitutional law. Essays analyze Kennedy’s opinion writing in landmark cases such as Romer v. Evans, Obergefell v. Hodges, and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Using the Justice’s rhetoric as an entry point into his legal philosophy, this volume reveals Kennedy as a justice with contradictions and blind spots—especially on race, women’s rights, and immigration—but also as a man of empathy deeply committed to American citizenship.A sophisticated assessment of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, this book provides new insight into Kennedy’s legacy on the Court and into the role that rhetoric plays in judging and in communicating judgment.In addition to the editors, the contributors to this volume are Ashutosh Bhagwat, Elizabeth C. Britt, Martin Camper, Michael Gagarin, James A. Gardner, Eugene Garver, Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Sean Patrick O’Rourke, Susan E. Provenzano, Clarke Rountree, Leticia M. Saucedo, Darien Shanske, Kathryn Stanchi, and Rebecca E. Zietlow.

Known as the “swing justice,” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy provided the key vote determining which way the Supreme Court would decide on some of the most controversial cases in US history. Though criticized for his unpredictable rulings, Kennedy also gained a reputation for his opinion writing and, more so, for his legal rhetoric.This book examines Justice Kennedy’s legacy through the lenses of rhetoric, linguistics, and constitutional law. Essays analyze Kennedy’s opinion writing in landmark cases such as Romer v. Evans, Obergefell v. Hodges, and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Using the Justice’s rhetoric as an entry point into his legal philosophy, this volume reveals Kennedy as a justice with contradictions and blind spots—especially on race, women’s rights, and immigration—but also as a man of empathy deeply committed to American citizenship.A sophisticated assessment of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, this book provides new insight into Kennedy’s legacy on the Court and into the role that rhetoric plays in judging and in communicating judgment.In addition to the editors, the contributors to this volume are Ashutosh Bhagwat, Elizabeth C. Britt, Martin Camper, Michael Gagarin, James A. Gardner, Eugene Garver, Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Sean Patrick O’Rourke, Susan E. Provenzano, Clarke Rountree, Leticia M. Saucedo, Darien Shanske, Kathryn Stanchi, and Rebecca E. Zietlow.

In recent years, there has been tremendous growth of interest in the connections between law and philosophy, but the diversity of approaches that claim to be working at the intersection of these disciplines might suggest that this area of inquiry is so fractured as to be incoherent. This volume gathers leading scholars to provide focused and straightforward articulations of the role that philosophy might play at this juncture of the history of American legal thought. It marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of Karl Llewellyn's essay 'On Philosophy in American Law' in which he rehearsed the broad development of American jurisprudence, diagnosed its contemporary failings and then charted a productive path opened by the variegated scholarship that claimed to initiate a realistic approach to law and legal theory. It is written in the spirit of Llewellyn's article: they are succinct and direct arguments about the potential for bringing law and philosophy together.

Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is especially relevant for law, which is grounded in the interpretation of authoritative texts from the past to resolve present-day disputes. In this collection, leading scholars consider the importance of Gadamer’s philosophy for ongoing disputes in legal theory. The work of prominent philosophers, including Fred Dallmayr, P. Christopher Smith and David Hoy, is joined with the work of leading legal theorists, such as William Eskridge, Lawrence Solum and Dennis Patterson, to provide an overview of the connections between law and Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy. Part I considers the relevance of Gadamer’s philosophy to longstanding disputes in legal theory such as the debate over originalism, the rule of law and proper modes of statutory and constitutional exegesis. Part II demonstrates Gadamer’s significance for legal theory by comparing his approach to the work of Nietzsche, Habermas and Dworkin.

Legal scholars have only recently begun to address the radical challenges for law and legal theory that follow from Friedrich Nietzsche's pathbreaking work. This collection brings together articles from leading thinkers who consider how Nietzsche's philosophical and rhetorical interventions illuminate the failures of contemporary legal theory. Part One considers the connections between law, political philosophy and Nietzsche's genealogy. Part Two provides a number of competing interpretations of Nietzsche's relevance for legal hermeneutics. Part Three includes articles that chart a course for legal critique that remains true to Nietzsche's radical character. The work of prominent philosophers, including P. Christopher Smith, is joined with the work of leading legal theorists, including Philippe Nonet and leading rhetoricians, including Marianne Constable, to provide complex and sophisticated overview of the manner in which Nietzsche problematizes law and legal theory.

Mootz offers an antidote to the fragmentation of contemporary legal theory with a collection of essays arguing that legal practice is a hermeneutical and rhetorical event that can best be understood and theorized in those terms. This is not a modern insight that wipes away centuries of dogmatic confusion; rather, Mootz draws on insights as old as the Western tradition itself. However, the essays are not antiquarian or merely descriptive, because hermeneutical and rhetorical philosophy have undergone important changes over the millennia. To "return" to hermeneutics and rhetoric as touchstones for law is to embrace dynamic traditions that provide the resources for theorists who seek to foster persuasion and understanding as an antidote to the emerging global order and the trend toward bureaucratization in accordance with expert administration, violent suppression, or both.

In recent years, there has been tremendous growth of interest in the connections between law and philosophy, but the diversity of approaches that claim to be working at the intersection of these disciplines might suggest that this area of inquiry is so fractured as to be incoherent. This volume gathers leading scholars to provide focused and straightforward articulations of the role that philosophy might play at this juncture of the history of American legal thought. It marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of Karl Llewellyn's essay 'On Philosophy in American Law' in which he rehearsed the broad development of American jurisprudence, diagnosed its contemporary failings and then charted a productive path opened by the variegated scholarship that claimed to initiate a realistic approach to law and legal theory. It is written in the spirit of Llewellyn's article: they are succinct and direct arguments about the potential for bringing law and philosophy together.

Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur were two of the most important hermeneutical philosophers of the twentieth century. Gadamer single-handedly revived hermeneutics as a philosophical field with his many essays and his masterpiece, Truth and Method. Ricoeur famously mediated the Gadamer-Habermas debate and advanced his own hermeneutical philosophy through a number of books addressing social theory, religion, psychoanalysis and political philosophy.This book brings Gadamer and Ricoeur into a hermeneutical conversation with each other through some of their most important commentators. Twelve leading scholars deliver contemporary assessments of the history and promise of hermeneutical philosophy, providing focused discussion on the work of these two key hermeneutical thinkers. The book shows how the horizons of their thought at once support and question each other and how, in many ways, the work of these two pioneering philosophers defines the issues and agendas for the new century.

Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur were two of the most important hermeneutical philosophers of the twentieth century. Gadamer single-handedly revived hermeneutics as a philosophical field with his many essays and his masterpiece, Truth and Method. Ricoeur famously mediated the Gadamer-Habermas debate and advanced his own hermeneutical philosophy through a number of books addressing social theory, religion, psychoanalysis and political philosophy. This book brings Gadamer and Ricoeur into a hermeneutical conversation with each other through some of their most important commentators. Twelve leading scholars deliver contemporary assessments of the history and promise of hermeneutical philosophy, providing focused discussion on the work of these two key hermeneutical thinkers. The book shows how the horizons of their thought at once support and question each other and how, in many ways, the work of these two pioneering philosophers defines the issues and agendas for the new century.

This book offers educational experiences, including reflections and the resulting essays, from the Roberta Kevelson Seminar on Law and Semiotics held during 2008 – 2011 at Penn State University’s Dickinson School of Law.  The texts address educational aspects of law that require attention and that also are issues in traditional jurisprudence and legal theory.  The book introduces education in legal semiotics as it evolves in a legal curriculum. Specific semiotic concepts, such as “sign”, “symbol” or “legal language,” demonstrate how a lawyer’s professionally important tasks of name-giving and meaning-giving are seldom completely understood by lawyers or laypeople.  These concepts require analyses of considerable depth to understand the expressiveness of these legal names and meanings, and to understand how lawyers can “say the law,” or urge such a saying correctly and effectively in the context of a natural language that is understandable to all of us.  The book brings together the structure of the Seminar, its foundational philosophical problems, the specifics of legal history, and the semiotics of the legal system with specific themes such as gender, family law, and business law.