Franck Fischbach – författare

A provocative study of the intersection of Spinoza and Marx that shows how their respective philosophies engage overlapping questions and problems Offers the first translation of Fischbach's work, and the most important book published in France on Spinoza and Marx, into EnglishPairs these philosophers of production who are both critical philosophers of subjectivityPresents a major study of the points of intersection in the thought of Spinoza and MarxDevelops original approaches to concepts such as alienation, history, and nature Spinoza and Marx would seem to be two very opposed philosophers. Spinoza was interested in contemplating eternal truths of nature while Marx was interested in the history of capital.Franck Fischbach suggests that by reading the two together we may better understand both history and nature, as well as ourselves, making possible a new understanding of human nature. Rather than see history and nature as opposed, history is nothing but the constant transformation of nature.Central to this transformation is a new understanding of alienation not as loss of the self in a world of objects, but as loss of objects in a world that disconnects us from nature and social relations, leaving us isolated as a subject. The isolated individual, the kingdom within a kingdom, as Spinoza put it, is not the condition of our liberation but the basis of our subjection.

Spinoza and Marx would seem to be two very opposed philosophers. Spinoza was interested in contemplating eternal truths of nature while Marx was interested in the history of capital. Franck Fischbach suggests that by reading the two together we may better understand both history and nature, as well as ourselves, making possible a new understanding of human nature. Rather than see history and nature as opposed, history is nothing but the constant transformation of nature. Central to this transformation is a new understanding of alienation not as loss of the self in a world of objects, but as loss of objects in a world that disconnects us from nature and social relations, leaving us isolated as a subject. The isolated individual, the kingdom within a kingdom, as Spinoza put it, is not the condition of our liberation but the basis of our subjection.

Commentant Schelling, Heidegger note : « Être et vouloir (perceptio – appetitus); comme [il appert] à partir de la tradition de la métaphysique théologique, là derrière se tient “l’actus” ». Mais, au lieu de mener l’enquête en direction de l’arrière plan où se tient l’actus, Heidegger fait porter son attention sur ce qui se situe au premier plan, c’est-à-dire sur la détermination de l’être de l’étant comme volonté. Si le vouloir se laisse comprendre comme le trait essentiel en fonction duquel la subjectivité de l’ego a été interprété par la métaphysique moderne, l’actus en revanche paraît ne pas appartenir en propre à cette dernière : traduction latine de l’energeia grecque, on le retrouve dans l’actus purus médiéval, dans l’actuositas leibnizienne, dans la Tathandlung (l’action de l’acte) fichtéenne et jusque dans la Selbstbetätigung (l’autoactivation) de Marx. Qu’en est-il de cet actus qui semble traverser la métaphysique occidentale sous diverses formes, qui « se tient derrière » les conceptions les plus diverses de l’être de l’étant? Explorer et mettre au jour d’autres possibles toujours recelés par l’ontologie de l’agir : telle est la tâche à laquelle l’auteur se consacre dans le présent ouvrage.Franck Fischbach est professeur en Philosophie allemande moderne et contemporaine à l’Université de Strasbourg.

El propósito de este libro no está guiado por el prejuicio del "todo estaba ya en Marx", todo lo contrario; la manera en que el propio Marx querría ser leído hoy en día pasa por actualizar "El capital". En el contexto de redescubrimiento de "El capital" imperante, y si queremos evitar la repetición de algunos errores del pasado, debemos dejar de ver "El capital" como el monumento intocable que ciertamente no es, y tratar de continuar la investigación que Marx inaugurara, pero que él mismo no pudo concluir.