Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. – författare

War Movies and Economics: Lessons from Hollywood’s Adaptations of Military Conflict applies ongoing research in the relatively new genre of economics in popular media to Hollywood’s war movies. Whether inadvertently or purposefully, these movies provide numerous examples of how economic principles often play an important role in military conflict.The authors of the chapters included in this edited collection work to illustrate economics lessons portrayed in adaptations such as Band of Brothers, Conspiracy, The Dirty Dozen, Dunkirk, Memphis Belle, Saving Private Ryan, Schindler’s List, Spartacus, Stalag 17, and Valkyrie. Aspects of these stories show how key economic principles of scarcity, limited resources, and incentives play important roles in military conflict. The movies also provide an avenue for discussion of the economics of public goods provision, the modern economic theory of bureaucracy, and various game-theoretic concepts such as strategic moves and commitment devices. Where applicable, lessons from closely related fields such as management are also provided.This book is ideal reading for students of economics looking for an approachable route to understanding basic principles of economics and game theory. It is also accessible to amateur and professional historians, and any reader interested in popular culture as it relates to television, movies, and military history.

War Movies and Economics: Lessons from Hollywood’s Adaptations of Military Conflict applies ongoing research in the relatively new genre of economics in popular media to Hollywood’s war movies. Whether inadvertently or purposefully, these movies provide numerous examples of how economic principles often play an important role in military conflict.The authors of the chapters included in this edited collection work to illustrate economics lessons portrayed in adaptations such as Band of Brothers, Conspiracy, The Dirty Dozen, Dunkirk, Memphis Belle, Saving Private Ryan, Schindler’s List, Spartacus, Stalag 17, and Valkyrie. Aspects of these stories show how key economic principles of scarcity, limited resources, and incentives play important roles in military conflict. The movies also provide an avenue for discussion of the economics of public goods provision, the modern economic theory of bureaucracy, and various game-theoretic concepts such as strategic moves and commitment devices. Where applicable, lessons from closely related fields such as management are also provided.This book is ideal reading for students of economics looking for an approachable route to understanding basic principles of economics and game theory. It is also accessible to amateur and professional historians, and any reader interested in popular culture as it relates to television, movies, and military history.

Public Choice Economics and the Salem Witchcraft Hysteria provides an economics perspective on the witchcraft episode, and adds to the growing body of work analyzing prominent historical events using the tools of economics.

This collection of chapters comprises timely aspects of two rapidly growing bodies of academic research: entrepreneurship and economic freedom.Expert editors add to an important field of research, the economics of entrepreneurship, and explore how institutions influence entrepreneurial behavior. This book provides comprehensive and contemporary insights into the interaction between economic behavior of firms and households, economic freedom, and entrepreneurship, and how it generates an environment with greater opportunities for growth and development for individuals, households, and private-sector firms.This advanced and revolutionary book will prove to be a valuable tool for academics conducting research in entrepreneurship and/or economic freedom as well as for graduate students studying in these areas. The volume also provides insight into the measurement and value of economic freedom around the world, making it a useful resource for policymakers and practitioners. Contributors: G.M. Alexander, N.J.Ashby, D.L. Bennett, J. Bologna, R. Boylan, S.B. Caudill, T. Cavusoglu, R.J. Cebula, J.R. Clark, S.O. Crofton, O. Dincer, R.K. Goel, D.M. Gropper, R.W. Hafer, Joshua C. Hall, V. Hartarska, J.C. Heckelman, R.G. Holcombe, J.V. Koch, R. Lawson, D.R. Lee, J.E. Long, F.G. Mixon, Jr., R. Murphy, M.A. Nelson, B. Nikolaev, J.E. Payne, R.M. Robinson, M.G. Simonton, D. Stansel, D. Tarabar, R. Vedder

This book provides numerous examples that apply the modern theory of bureaucracy developed in Breton and Wintrobe (1982 and 1986) to the Nazi Holocaust. More specifically, the book argues, as do Breton and Wintrobe (1986), that the subordinates in the Nazi bureaucracy were not “following orders” as they claimed during the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere, but were instead exhibiting an entrepreneurial spirit in competing with one another in order to find the most efficient way of exacting the Final Solution. This involved engaging in a process of exchange with their superiors, wherein the subordinates offered the kinds of informal services that are not codified in formal contracts. In doing so, they were competing for the rewards, or informal payments not codified in formal contracts, that were conferred by those at the top of the bureaucracy. These came in the form of rapid promotion, perquisites (pecuniary and in-kind), and other awards. The types of exchanges described above are based on “trust,” not formal institutions.