Geoffrey Wawro – författare

Combining original research with the latest scholarship Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792 - 1914 examines war and its aftermath from Napoleonic times to the outbreak of the First World War. Throughout, this fine book treats warfare as a social and political phenomenon no less than a military and technologial one, and includes discussions on:* The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars* Napoleon III and the militarization of Europe* Bismark, Molkte, and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71* new technologies and weapons* seapower, imperialism and naval warfare* the origins and outbreak of the First World War.For anyone studying, or with in interest in European warfare, this book details the evolution of land and naval warfare and highlights the swirling interplay of society, politics and military decision making.

Combining original research with the latest scholarship Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792 - 1914 examines war and its aftermath from Napoleonic times to the outbreak of the First World War. Throughout, this fine book treats warfare as a social and political phenomenon no less than a military and technologial one, and includes discussions on:* The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars* Napoleon III and the militarization of Europe* Bismark, Molkte, and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71* new technologies and weapons* seapower, imperialism and naval warfare* the origins and outbreak of the First World War.For anyone studying, or with in interest in European warfare, this book details the evolution of land and naval warfare and highlights the swirling interplay of society, politics and military decision making.

The Austro-Hungarian army that marched east and south to confront the Russians and Serbs in the opening campaigns of World War I had a glorious past but a pitiful present. Speaking a mystifying array of languages and lugging outdated weapons, the Austrian troops were hopelessly unprepared for the industrialized warfare that would shortly consume Europe.As prizewinning historian Geoffrey Wawro explains in A Mad Catastrophe , the doomed Austrian conscripts were an unfortunate microcosm of the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself,both equally ripe for destruction. After the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, Germany goaded the Empire into a war with Russia and Serbia. With the Germans massing their forces in the west to engage the French and the British, everything,the course of the war and the fate of empires and alliances from Constantinople to London,hinged on the Habsburgs' ability to crush Serbia and keep the Russians at bay. However, Austria-Hungary had been rotting from within for years, hollowed out by repression, cynicism, and corruption at the highest levels. Commanded by a dying emperor, Franz Joseph I, and a querulous celebrity general, Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austro-Hungarians managed to bungle everything: their ultimatum to the Serbs, their declarations of war, their mobilization, and the pivotal battles in Galicia and Serbia. By the end of 1914, the Habsburg army lay in ruins and the outcome of the war seemed all but decided. Drawing on deep archival research, Wawro charts the decline of the Empire before the war and reconstructs the great battles in the east and the Balkans in thrilling and tragic detail. A Mad Catastrophe is a riveting account of a neglected face of World War I, revealing how a once-mighty empire collapsed in the trenches of Serbia and the Eastern Front, changing the course of European history.

This 2003 collection of essays is based on five lectures organized jointly by Matrix Chambers of human rights lawyers and the Wiener Library between April and June 2002. Presented by leading experts in the field, this fascinating collection of papers examines the evolution of international criminal justice from its post World War II origins at Nuremberg through to the concrete proliferation of courts and tribunals with international criminal law jurisdictions based at The Hague today. Original and provocative, the lectures provide various stimulating perspectives on the subject of international criminal law. Topics include its corporate and historical dimension as well as a discussion of the International Criminal Court Statute and the role of the national courts. The volume offers a challenging insight into the future of international criminal legal system. This is an intelligent and thought-provoking book, accessible to anyone interested in international criminal law, from specialists to non-specialists alike.

This is a history of the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, which paved the way for German and Italian unification. It is based upon extensive new research in the state and military archives of Austria, Germany, and Italy. Geoffrey Wawro describes Prussia's successful invasion of Habsburg Venetia, and the wretched collapse of the Austrian army in July 1866. Although the book gives a thorough accounting of both the Prussian and Italian war efforts, it is most notable for the light it sheds on the Austrians. Through painstaking archival research, Wawro reconstructs the Austrian campaign, blow-by-blow, hour-by-hour. Blending military and social history, he describes the terror and panic that overtook Austria's regiments of the line in each clash with the Prussians. He reveals the unconscionable blundering of the Austrian commandant and his chief deputies who fumbled away key strategic advantages and ultimately lost a war - crucial to the fortunes of the Habsburg Monarchy - that most European pundits had predicted they would win.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 violently changed the course of European History. Alarmed by Bismarck's territorial ambitions and the Prussian army's crushing defeats of Denmark in 1864 and Austria in 1866, French Emperor Napoleon III vowed to bring Prussia to heel. Digging into many European and American archives for the first time, Geoffrey Wawro's The Franco-Prussian War describes the war that followed in thrilling detail. While the armies mobilized in July 1870, the conflict appeared 'too close to call'. Prussia and its German allies overwhelmingly outnumbered the French. But Marshal Achille Bazaine's grognards ('old grumblers') were the stuff of legend, the most resourceful, battle-hardened, sharp-shooting troops in Europe. From the political intrigues that began and ended the war to the bloody battles at Gravelotte and Sedan and the last murderous fights on the Loire and in Paris, this is a stunning, authoritative history of the Franco-Prussian War.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 violently changed the course of European History. Alarmed by Bismarck's territorial ambitions and the Prussian army's crushing defeats of Denmark in 1864 and Austria in 1866, French Emperor Napoleon III vowed to bring Prussia to heel. Digging into many European and American archives for the first time, Geoffrey Wawro's The Franco-Prussian War describes the war that followed in thrilling detail. While the armies mobilized in July 1870, the conflict appeared 'too close to call'. Prussia and its German allies overwhelmingly outnumbered the French. But Marshal Achille Bazaine's grognards ('old grumblers') were the stuff of legend, the most resourceful, battle-hardened, sharp-shooting troops in Europe. From the political intrigues that began and ended the war to the bloody battles at Gravelotte and Sedan and the last murderous fights on the Loire and in Paris, this is a stunning, authoritative history of the Franco-Prussian War.

This is a history of the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, which paved the way for German and Italian unification. It is based upon extensive new research in the state and military archives of Austria, Germany, and Italy. Geoffrey Wawro describes Prussia's successful invasion of Habsburg Venetia, and the wretched collapse of the Austrian army in July 1866. Although the book gives a thorough accounting of both the Prussian and Italian war efforts, it is most notable for the light it sheds on the Austrians. Through painstaking archival research, Wawro reconstructs the Austrian campaign, blow-by-blow, hour-by-hour. Blending military and social history, he describes the terror and panic that overtook Austria's regiments of the line in each clash with the Prussians. He reveals the unconscionable blundering of the Austrian commandant and his chief deputies who fumbled away key strategic advantages and ultimately lost a war - crucial to the fortunes of the Habsburg Monarchy - that most European pundits had predicted they would win.

An unprecedented history of our involvement in the Middle East that traces our current quandaries there-in Iraq, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere-back to their roots almost a century ago. Geoffrey Wawro approaches America''s role in the Middle East in a fundamentally new way-by encompassing the last century of the entire region, rather than focusing narrowly on a particular country or era. The result is a definitive and revelatory history whose drama, tragedy, and rich irony he relates with unprecedented verve. Wawro combed archives in the United States and Europe and traveled the Middle East to unearth new insights into the hidden motivations, backroom dealing, and outright espionage that shaped some of the most tumultuous events of the last one hundred years. Wawro offers piercing analysis of iconic events from the birth of Israel to the death of Sadat, from the Suez crisis to the energy crisis, from the Six-Day War to Desert One, from Iran-contra to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the rise of al- Qaeda. Throughout, he draws telling parallels between America''s past mistakes and its current quandaries, proving that we''re in today''s muddle not just because of our old errors, but because we keep repeating those errors. America has juggled multiple commitments and conflicting priorities in the Middle East for nearly a century. Strands of idealism and ruthless practicality have alternated- and sometimes run together-in our policy. Quicksand untangles these strands as no history has done before by showing how our strategies unfolded over the entire century and across the entire region. We''ve persistently misread the intentions and motivations of every major player in the region because we''ve insisted on viewing them through the lens of our own culture, hopes, and fears. Most administrations since Eisenhower''s have adopted their own "doctrine" for the Middle East, and almost every doctrine has failed precisely because it''s a doctrine-a template into which events on the ground refuse to fit. Geoffrey Wawro''s peerless and remarkably lively history is key to understanding our errors and the Middle East-at last- on its own terms.