Gerald A. Heuer – författare
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4 produkter
4 produkter
Del 365 - Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets
Häftad, Engelska, 1991
544 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T 1 and the penalty 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. the igher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mianly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal or the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory.
Häftad, Engelska, 1995
544 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This book brings together in an efficient and unified way virtually all that has been learned about this intriguing class of games since its appearance on the scene in 1979. The game on discrete sets is reduced to minimal strategy sets on which the payoff matrix has a canonical structure, and the game on intervals is analyzed for all possible pairs of intervals. For most cases, optimal strategies and game value can be explicitly obtained.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2012708 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
The structure of a Silverman game can be explained very quickly: Each of two players independently selects a number out of a prede termined set, not necessarily the same one for both of them. The higher number wins unless it is at least k times as high as the other one; if this is the case the lower number wins. The game ends in a draw if both numbers are equal. k is a constant greater than 1. The simplicity of the rules stimulates the curiosity of the the orist. Admittedly, Silverman games do not seem to have a direct applied significance, but nevertheless much can be learnt from their study. This book succeeds to give an almost complete overview over the structure of optimal strategies and it reveals a surprising wealth of interesting detail. A field like game theory does not only need research on broad questions and fundamental issues, but also specialized work on re stricted topics. Even if not many readers are interested in the subject matter, those who are will appreciate this monograph.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2012708 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T > 1 and the penalty v > 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory.