Gerald R. Uhlich - Böcker

This book deals with two- and three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form and presents two new descriptive theories, the Negotiation Agreement Area and the Proportional Division Payoff Bounds (PDPB). The evaluation of data for two-person games leads to a new descriptive theory called Negotiation Agreement Area which combines the influence of power and justice norms. The main emphasis of the book is on a new descriptive theory for three-person games, the PDPB. Comparison with other theories on the basis of 3088 plays of different games shows that the PDPB are significantly more successful in prediction than other theories. The PDPB concept is a modification and extension of Selten's Equal Division Payoff Bounds. The determination of the bounds is based on general principles and not on the estimation of parameters. From aspiration levels which depend on power, justice norms, and other reasonable principles the negotiation process leads to a proportional division of the prize.