Giandomenico Majone – författare

If one lesson emerges clearly from fifty years of European integration it is that political aims should be pursued by overtly political means, and not by roundabout economic or legal strategies. The functionalist strategy of promoting spillovers from one economic sector to another has failed to achieve a steady progress towards a federal union, as Jean Monnet and other functionalists had hoped. On the other hand, the unanticipated results of 'integration through law' have included over-regulation and an institutional framework which is too rigid to allow significant policy and institutional innovations. Thus, integration by stealth has produced sub-optimal policies and a steady loss of legitimacy by the supranational institutions. Both the functionalist approach and the classic Community Method are becoming obsolete. This major new statement from a leading European scholar provides the most thorough analysis currently available of the pitfalls and ambiguities of 50 years of European integration, without losing sight of its benefits. Majone provides a clear demonstration of how a number of European policies - including environmental protection - lack a logically defensible rationale, while showing how, in other cases, objectives may be better achieved by re-nationalizing the policy in question. He also shows how, in an information-rich environment, co-ordination by mutual adjustment becomes possible, meaning that member states are no longer as dependent on central institutions as in the past. He explains how the challenge for future research is to investigate methods-other than delegation to supranational institutions-by which member states can credibly commit themselves to collective action.Dilemmas of European Integration concludes by explaining exactly why the model of a United States of Europe is bound to fail-not just due to lack of popular support, but because it finds itself unable to deliver the public goods which Europeans expect to receive from a full fledged government. Although failing as a would-be federation, the present Union could become an effective confederation, built on the solid foundation of market integration. The new Constitutional Treaty, Majone argues, seems to point in this direction.

If one lesson emerges clearly from fifty years of European integration it is that political aims should be pursued by overtly political means, and not by roundabout economic or legal strategies. The functionalist strategy of promoting spillovers from one economic sector to another has failed to achieve a steady progress towards a federal union, as Jean Monnet and other functionalists had hoped. On the other hand, the unanticipated results of 'integration through law' have included over-regulation and an institutional framework which is too rigid to allow significant policy and institutional innovations. Thus, integration by stealth has produced sub-optimal policies and a steady loss of legitimacy by the supranational institutions. Both the functionalist approach and the classic Community Method are becoming obsolete. This major statement from a leading European scholar provides the most thorough analysis currently available of the pitfalls and ambiguities of 50 years of European integration, without losing sight of its benefits. Majone provides a clear demonstration of how a number of European policies - including environmental protection - lack a logically defensible rationale, while showing how, in other cases, objectives may be better achieved by re-nationalizing the policy in question. He also shows how, in an information-rich environment, co-ordination by mutual adjustment becomes possible, meaning that member states are no longer as dependent on central institutions as in the past. He explains how the challenge for future research is to investigate methods-other than delegation to supranational institutions-by which member states can credibly commit themselves to collective action.Dilemmas of European Integration concludes by explaining exactly why the model of a United States of Europe is bound to fail-not just due to lack of popular support, but because it finds itself unable to deliver the public goods which Europeans expect to receive from a full fledged government. Although failing as a would-be federation, the present Union could become an effective confederation, built on the solid foundation of market integration. The new Constitutional Treaty, Majone argues, seems to point in this direction.

In modern industrial democracies, the making of public policy is dependent on policy analysis—the generation, discussion, and evaluation of policy alternatives. Policy analysis is often characterized, especially by economists, as a technical, nonpartisan, objective enterprise, separate from the constraints of the political environment. however, says the eminent political scientist Giandomenico Majone, this characterization of policy analysis is seriously flawed. According to Majone, policy analysts do not engage in a purely technical analysis of alternatives open to policymakers, but instead produce policy arguments that are based on value judgments and are used in the course of public debate. In this book Majone offers his own definition of policy analysis and examines all aspects of it—from problem formulation and the choice of policy instruments to program development and policy evaluation. He argues that rhetorical skills are crucial for policy analysts when they set the norms that determine when certain conditions are to be regarded as policy problems, when they advise on technical issues, and when they evaluate policy. Policy analysts can improve the quality of public deliberation by refining the standards of appraisal of public programs and facilitating a wide-ranging dialogue among advocates of different criteria. In fact, says Majone, the essential need today is not to develop 'objective' measures of outcomes—the traditional aim of evaluation research—but to improve the methods and conditions of public discourse at all levels and stages of policy-making.

Regulating Europe explains why economic and social regulation is rapidly becoming the new frontier of public policy and public administration in Europe, both at the national and EU levels. Statutory regulation, implemented by independent regulatory bodies, is replacing not only older forms of state intervention but also, to some extent, the redistributive policies of the welfare state. Thus Regulating Europe is an examiniation of the emergence of the regulatory state as the successor of the Keynesian welfare state of the past. Contributions emphasize the parallelism of policy developments at the national and European levels. Part one provides the necessary theoretical background, including a new model of demand and supply of Community regulation. The second part presents a series of case studies of particular regulatory policies and institutions in the UK, Germany, France, Spain and the EU. Part three evaluates current policy and institutional developments, pointing out how the lack of a tradition of statutory regulation in Europe affects the design of the new institutions. Special attention is devoted to the issue of the democratic accountability of expert, politically independent agencies - a problem which, contrary to widespread opinion, is as severe at the national level as it is in Brussels. It is suggested that the requirements of democratic accountability, and of subsidiarity, cannot be met by re-nationalizing European policies, much less by increasing the current level of centralization. A more promising solution is the development of regulatory networks closely integrating national and supranational regulators.

Regulating Europe explains why economic and social regulation is rapidly becoming the new frontier of public policy and public administration in Europe, both at the national and EU levels. Statutory regulation, implemented by independent regulatory bodies, is replacing not only older forms of state intervention but also, to some extent, the redistributive policies of the welfare state. Thus Regulating Europe is an examiniation of the emergence of the regulatory state as the successor of the Keynesian welfare state of the past. Contributions emphasize the parallelism of policy developments at the national and European levels. Part one provides the necessary theoretical background, including a new model of demand and supply of Community regulation. The second part presents a series of case studies of particular regulatory policies and institutions in the UK, Germany, France, Spain and the EU. Part three evaluates current policy and institutional developments, pointing out how the lack of a tradition of statutory regulation in Europe affects the design of the new institutions. Special attention is devoted to the issue of the democratic accountability of expert, politically independent agencies - a problem which, contrary to widespread opinion, is as severe at the national level as it is in Brussels. It is suggested that the requirements of democratic accountability, and of subsidiarity, cannot be met by re-nationalizing European policies, much less by increasing the current level of centralization. A more promising solution is the development of regulatory networks closely integrating national and supranational regulators.

For fifty years European integration has been pursued according to an operational code based on rules which have never been publicly discussed. This book demonstrates the far-reaching consequences of the prioritisation of integration over competing values, fait accompli and other implicit rules of action. The willingness to sacrifice democracy on the altar of integration is demonstrated by the monopoly of legislative initiative granted to the non-elected Commission. Monetary union preceding, rather than following, political integration is a striking example of fait accompli, and the reason behind many holes in the EU system of economic governance. Until now, academics have avoided radical criticism; Giandomenico Majone argues that only an open acknowledgement of the obsolescence of the traditional methods can stem the rising tide of Euro-scepticism.

For fifty years European integration has been pursued according to an operational code based on rules which have never been publicly discussed. This book demonstrates the far-reaching consequences of the prioritisation of integration over competing values, fait accompli and other implicit rules of action. The willingness to sacrifice democracy on the altar of integration is demonstrated by the monopoly of legislative initiative granted to the non-elected Commission. Monetary union preceding, rather than following, political integration is a striking example of fait accompli, and the reason behind many holes in the EU system of economic governance. Until now, academics have avoided radical criticism; Giandomenico Majone argues that only an open acknowledgement of the obsolescence of the traditional methods can stem the rising tide of Euro-scepticism.

In this important new book, Giandomenico Majone examines the crucial but often overlooked distinction between the general aim of European integration and the specific method of integration employed in designing an (ill-considered) monetary union. Written with the author's customary insight and precision, this highly topical and provocative book reviews the Union's leaders' tradition of pushing through ambitious projects without considering the serious hurdles that lie in the way of their success. Regional and European integration topics are discussed, including credibility of commitments, delegation of powers, bargaining and influence activities, adverse selection and moral hazard. The author also offers a deeper examination of the specific crisis of monetary integration, arguing that it might be more effectively achieved with inter-jurisdictional competition and suggesting how integration should be managed in the globalized world.