Giuseppina Moneta – författare

of A first attempt to formulate the phenomenological problem identity was originally made in my doctoral dissertation, "The Identity of the Logical Proposition," (Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, 1969). Further development of the problem, both direct and indirect, as well as extensive revision, has found expression in "The Foundation of Predicative Experience and the Spontaneity of Consciousness" (Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, 1972), "Gurwitsch's Concept of Per­ ceptual Unity as the Basic Form of Rational Consciousness," (Social Research, April, 1975), and "The Refinement of the Concept of Constitution" (Research in Phenomenology, Vol. IV, 1974). These studies, in turn, formed the springboard for the present study of the problem of identity. No more than the other studies, this study far from claiming finality, is rather an ever-widening beginning of a phenomenological inquiry into the constitution of identity. I am enormously indebted to my friend and colleague, Professor Fred Kersten of the University of Wisconsin at Green Bay. No tribute is sufficient to acknowledge his invaluable assistance and counsel in the preparation of this work for publication. I would also like to thank Professor Werner Marx of the University of Freiburg for his sustaining encouragement in the later phase of this work. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this essay is to investigate the meaning of the concept of identity within a framework of the phenomenological theory of consciousness.

It is our hope that this volume will serve to document both the history of the Collegium Phaenomenologicum during its first ten years as well as some of the philosophical work that has grown out of the annual gatherings in Perugia. The Introduction narrates the history and is supplemented by the Appendices, in which the programs and the participants for each of the ten years are listed. The essays, on the other hand, present in more finished form work that was developed in connection with courses, lectures, or seminars conducted during the first ten years of the Collegium. Giuseppina Moneta John Sallis Jacques Taminiaux Introduction The Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Its First Ten Years GIUSEPPINA C. MONETA The idea of the Collegium Phaenomenologicum first took shape in a conversa­ tion that I had with Werner Marx at his home in Bollschweil in the Spring of 1975. Previously I had thought of the possibility of a gathering of phenom­ enologists somewhere in Italy during the summer months. And when I ex­ plained to Werner Marx that it would not be difficult to find accommodation for such a gathering in a Franciscan monastery in Umbria, he responded enthusiastically and assured me that such a project would have the support of the Husserl Archives in Leuven and in Freiburg.

It is our hope that this volume will serve to document both the history of the Collegium Phaenomenologicum during its first ten years as well as some of the philosophical work that has grown out of the annual gatherings in Perugia. The Introduction narrates the history and is supplemented by the Appendices, in which the programs and the participants for each of the ten years are listed. The essays, on the other hand, present in more finished form work that was developed in connection with courses, lectures, or seminars conducted during the first ten years of the Collegium. Giuseppina Moneta John Sallis Jacques Taminiaux Introduction The Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Its First Ten Years GIUSEPPINA C. MONETA The idea of the Collegium Phaenomenologicum first took shape in a conversa­ tion that I had with Werner Marx at his home in Bollschweil in the Spring of 1975. Previously I had thought of the possibility of a gathering of phenom­ enologists somewhere in Italy during the summer months. And when I ex­ plained to Werner Marx that it would not be difficult to find accommodation for such a gathering in a Franciscan monastery in Umbria, he responded enthusiastically and assured me that such a project would have the support of the Husserl Archives in Leuven and in Freiburg.

of A first attempt to formulate the phenomenological problem identity was originally made in my doctoral dissertation, "The Identity of the Logical Proposition," (Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, 1969). Further development of the problem, both direct and indirect, as well as extensive revision, has found expression in "The Foundation of Predicative Experience and the Spontaneity of Consciousness" (Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, 1972), "Gurwitsch''s Concept of Per­ ceptual Unity as the Basic Form of Rational Consciousness," (Social Research, April, 1975), and "The Refinement of the Concept of Constitution" (Research in Phenomenology, Vol. IV, 1974). These studies, in turn, formed the springboard for the present study of the problem of identity. No more than the other studies, this study far from claiming finality, is rather an ever-widening beginning of a phenomenological inquiry into the constitution of identity. I am enormously indebted to my friend and colleague, Professor Fred Kersten of the University of Wisconsin at Green Bay. No tribute is sufficient to acknowledge his invaluable assistance and counsel in the preparation of this work for publication. I would also like to thank Professor Werner Marx of the University of Freiburg for his sustaining encouragement in the later phase of this work. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this essay is to investigate the meaning of the concept of identity within a framework of the phenomenological theory of consciousness.