Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock – författare

Gottlob Frege is one of the greatest logicians ever and also a philosopher of great significance. In this book Rosado Haddock offers a critical presentation of the main topics of Frege's philosophy, including, among others, his philosophy of arithmetic, his sense-referent distinction, his distinction between function and object, and his criticisms of formalism and psychologism. More than just an introduction to Frege's philosophy this book is also a highly critical and mature assessment of it as a whole in which the limitations, confusions and other weaknesses of Frege's thought are closely examined. The author is also a Husserlian scholar and this book contains valuable discussions of Husserl's neglected views and comparisons between the two great philosophers.

Examining the scholarly interest of the last two decades in the origins of logical empiricism, and especially the roots of Rudolf Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World), Rosado Haddock challenges the received view, according to which that book should be inserted in the empiricist tradition. In The Young Carnap's Unknown Master Rosado Haddock, builds on the interpretations of Aufbau propounded by Verena Mayer and of Carnap's earlier thesis Der Raum propounded by Sahotra Sarkar and offers instead the most detailed and complete argument on behalf of an Husserlian interpretation of both of these early works of Carnap, as well as offering a refutation of the rival Machian, Kantian, Neo-Kantian, and other more eclectic interpretations of the influences on the work of the young Carnap. The book concludes with an assessment of Quine's critique of Carnap's 'analytic-synthetic' distinction and a criticism of the direction that analytic philosophy has taken in following in the footsteps of Quine's views.

Gottlob Frege is one of the greatest logicians ever and also a philosopher of great significance. In this book Rosado Haddock offers a critical presentation of the main topics of Frege's philosophy, including, among others, his philosophy of arithmetic, his sense-referent distinction, his distinction between function and object, and his criticisms of formalism and psychologism. More than just an introduction to Frege's philosophy this book is also a highly critical and mature assessment of it as a whole in which the limitations, confusions and other weaknesses of Frege's thought are closely examined. The author is also a Husserlian scholar and this book contains valuable discussions of Husserl's neglected views and comparisons between the two great philosophers.

The present collection of seventeen papers, most of them already published in international philosophical journals, deals both with issues in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language and epistemology. The first part contains critical assessments and somewhat deviant renderings of the work of two seminal philosophers, Frege and Husserl, as well as of the young Carnap and Kripke. The second part contains analyses of central issues in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of mathematics and semantics, including arguments on behalf of Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics, a defense of second-order logic, a new definition of analyticity, a sketch of a semantics for mathematical statements and a critique of Kripke’s possible world semantics for modal logic.

The book contributes to the refutation of the separation of philosophy in the 20th century into analytic and continental. It is shown that Edmund Husserl was seriously concerned with issues of so-called analytic philosophy, that there are strict parallelisms between Husserl’s treatment of philosophical subjects and those of authors in the analytic tradition, and that Husserl had a strong influence on Rudolf Carnap’s ‘Aufbau’.