This volume attempts to deal in a systematic manner with the range and limits of scientific method, utilizing numerous findings in the logic and methodology of science.

Professor Mehlberg''s main conclusion is the universality of scientific problem-solving methods, i.e., that if any cognitive problems is meaningful and solvable, then its solution can in principle be found by applying scientific method. This conclusion is reached through a detailed analysis of the main fact-finding and law-finding scientific methods, as well as of the more intricate methods of forming scientific theory. While it implies the universal applicability of scientific method, this book involves neither a positivistic monopoly of science nor a ban on those traditional philosophical investigations of a meta-physical, epistemological and ethnical nature which have so far resisted a scientific approach.

Professor Mehlberg is concerned with the scope of her knowledge which science can provide rather than with the social value and impact of such knowledge. However, the meaning of science to society depends upon the scope of scientific knowledge, and the book should, therefore, be of interest not only to philosophers and scientists engaged in foundational research, but to many who are concerned with the social and ideological repercussions of scientific findings.

This volume attempts to deal in a systematic manner with the range and limits of scientific method, utilizing numerous findings in the logic and methodology of science.

Professor Mehlberg''s main conclusion is the universality of scientific problem-solving methods, i.e., that if any cognitive problems is meaningful and solvable, then its solution can in principle be found by applying scientific method. This conclusion is reached through a detailed analysis of the main fact-finding and law-finding scientific methods, as well as of the more intricate methods of forming scientific theory. While it implies the universal applicability of scientific method, this book involves neither a positivistic monopoly of science nor a ban on those traditional philosophical investigations of a meta-physical, epistemological and ethnical nature which have so far resisted a scientific approach.

Professor Mehlberg is concerned with the scope of her knowledge which science can provide rather than with the social value and impact of such knowledge. However, the meaning of science to society depends upon the scope of scientific knowledge, and the book should, therefore, be of interest not only to philosophers and scientists engaged in foundational research, but to many who are concerned with the social and ideological repercussions of scientific findings.