Herrade Igersheim - Böcker

The Philosophy of Economics primarily considers the economic agent as a moral subject. Economics, however, has long overlooked the agent’s moral – that is to say, reasonable – dimension, to focus instead on the strictly rational. This volume seeks to address this neglected topic through exploring the Individual and the Other.The economic agent refers to "himself" (herself) in terms of his desire and passions, yet also refers to others besides himself. For the rational economic agent, what is the nature of this relationship with the Other? Should it not be understood as undergoing a transformation once we come to consider the economic agent as a reasonable being? Through what process does the Other pass from being an instrument at the disposal of a rational agent to being an end in itself for a moral subject? In other words, how does another become "an Other"? These questions are behind the re-examination of certain fundamental notions which takes place in this book, an examination which involves a re-reading of certain great authors. With contributions from authors around the world, this work is divided into three main parts. The first deals with individuals from the history of economic thought such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt; this is then followed by a thematic section in which the concepts of recognition and subjectivity are questioned in a market context. Finally, the third part offers an analysis of the issue of "the Individual and the Other" in different fields of the recent economic analysis including game theory, decision theory or social choice.The Individual and the Other in Economic Thought aims to help the reader better understand how the relationship between the Individual and the Other has been conceived, conceptualized and framed in economic analysis. It will be of great use to graduate students, scholars and any reader interested in this crucial issue.

Starting from a distinction made by the American philosopher, John Rawls, in 2000 between two kinds of liberalism, "liberalism of freedom" and "liberalism of happiness", this book presents a range of articles by economists and philosophers debating the most fundamental aspects of the subject. These include the exact significance of Rawls’ distinction and how it can be related to European political philosophy on the one hand and to utilitarianism on the other hand; the various definitions of happiness and freedom and their implications and the informational basis of individual preferences. The objectives of the book are twofold: first, it is devoted to a thorough analysis of the founding texts of both liberalisms. It aims to determine the logic of selection of the concepts which these traditions consider as relevant. The Kantian pair "Reasonable"/"Rational" can be seen as the basis on which these concepts are defined, our final concern being to reveal the profound relations of complementarity between them: we call it reconciliation. Secondly, we consider a fundamental issue of welfare economics – how to appraise individual preferences – in light of the Rawlsian distinction. It is emphasized that neither a criterion based on liberalism of freedom by itself, nor an evaluation in terms of liberalism of happiness by itself exhausts the question of utility. One must combine both aspects in order to cope with that issue. To do so, it is claimed that one can resort to the concept of metaranking of preferences.All the contributions included in this book are the outcomes of a collective research project of three years. The contributors come from a variety of backgrounds and yet are unified in developing a specific position about freedom and happiness. This book should be of interest to those focusing on the history of economic thought as well as moral, political and economic philosophy.

Starting from a distinction made by the American philosopher, John Rawls, in 2000 between two kinds of liberalism, "liberalism of freedom" and "liberalism of happiness", this book presents a range of articles by economists and philosophers debating the most fundamental aspects of the subject. These include the exact significance of Rawls’ distinction and how it can be related to European political philosophy on the one hand and to utilitarianism on the other hand; the various definitions of happiness and freedom and their implications and the informational basis of individual preferences. The objectives of the book are twofold: first, it is devoted to a thorough analysis of the founding texts of both liberalisms. It aims to determine the logic of selection of the concepts which these traditions consider as relevant. The Kantian pair "Reasonable"/"Rational" can be seen as the basis on which these concepts are defined, our final concern being to reveal the profound relations of complementarity between them: we call it reconciliation. Secondly, we consider a fundamental issue of welfare economics – how to appraise individual preferences – in light of the Rawlsian distinction. It is emphasized that neither a criterion based on liberalism of freedom by itself, nor an evaluation in terms of liberalism of happiness by itself exhausts the question of utility. One must combine both aspects in order to cope with that issue. To do so, it is claimed that one can resort to the concept of metaranking of preferences.All the contributions included in this book are the outcomes of a collective research project of three years. The contributors come from a variety of backgrounds and yet are unified in developing a specific position about freedom and happiness. This book should be of interest to those focusing on the history of economic thought as well as moral, political and economic philosophy.