Hugo A. Keuzenkamp – författare

When John Maynard Keynes likened Jan Tinbergen's early work in econometrics to black magic and alchemy, he was expressing a widely held view of a new discipline. However, even after half a century of practical work and theorizing by some of the most accomplished social scientists, Keynes' comments are still repeated today. This book assesses the foundations and development of econometrics and sets out a basis for the reconstruction of the foundations of econometric inference by examining the various interpretations of probability theory which underlie econometrics. Keuzenkamp claims that the probabilistic foundations of econometrics are weak, and although econometric inferences may yield interesting knowledge, claims to be able to falsify or verify economic theories are unwarranted. Methodological falsificationism in econometrics is an illusion. Instead, it is argued, econometrics should locate itself in the tradition of positivism.

The idea that simplicity matters in science is as old as science itself, with the much cited example of Ockham's Razor, 'entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem': entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. A problem with Ockham's razor is that nearly everybody seems to accept it, but few are able to define its exact meaning and to make it operational in a non-arbitrary way. Using a multidisciplinary perspective including philosophers, mathematicians, econometricians and economists, this 2002 monograph examines simplicity by asking six questions: what is meant by simplicity? How is simplicity measured? Is there an optimum trade-off between simplicity and goodness-of-fit? What is the relation between simplicity and empirical modelling? What is the relation between simplicity and prediction? What is the connection between simplicity and convenience? The book concludes with reflections on simplicity by Nobel Laureates in Economics.

When John Maynard Keynes likened Jan Tinbergen's early work in econometrics to black magic and alchemy, he was expressing a widely held view of a new discipline. However, even after half a century of practical work and theorizing by some of the most accomplished social scientists, Keynes' comments are still repeated today. This book assesses the foundations and development of econometrics and sets out a basis for the reconstruction of the foundations of econometric inference by examining the various interpretations of probability theory which underlie econometrics. Keuzenkamp claims that the probabilistic foundations of econometrics are weak, and although econometric inferences may yield interesting knowledge, claims to be able to falsify or verify economic theories are unwarranted. Methodological falsificationism in econometrics is an illusion. Instead, it is argued, econometrics should locate itself in the tradition of positivism.