The digital age has afforded the governments new technologies of control, allowing them to co-opt, pre-empt and repress dissent. But, what if they lack the technical capacity to access digital tools of control? In what ways have digital technologies altered the way governments conduct statecraft? Based on an analysis of more than 3,000 public procurement documents, and a dozen elite interviews with various stakeholders, we found that the Chinese state has outsourced various functions of online surveillance to private and for-profit arms of state-owned corporations. We found that outsourcing surveillance is intended to augment state technical capacity to moderate and fine-tune the conduct of digital repression. Outsourcing digital repression opens a Pandora's box of state-business collaborations. This Element contributes to the literature on outsourcing repression, state‒business relations, and conduct of digital statecraft.

The digital age has afforded the governments new technologies of control, allowing them to co-opt, pre-empt and repress dissent. But, what if they lack the technical capacity to access digital tools of control? In what ways have digital technologies altered the way governments conduct statecraft? Based on an analysis of more than 3,000 public procurement documents, and a dozen elite interviews with various stakeholders, we found that the Chinese state has outsourced various functions of online surveillance to private and for-profit arms of state-owned corporations. We found that outsourcing surveillance is intended to augment state technical capacity to moderate and fine-tune the conduct of digital repression. Outsourcing digital repression opens a Pandora's box of state-business collaborations. This Element contributes to the literature on outsourcing repression, state‒business relations, and conduct of digital statecraft.

By analyzing the interactions between China’s central government and its local governments and enterprises, this book constructs an analytical framework of government-enterprise collusion, analyzing the impact of collusion within the China model on Chinese society. Against the background of decentralization and under information asymmetry, this text argues that Chinese local governments connive at enterprises’ adoption of a low-cost ‘bad’ mode of production — a ‘stimulus’ for quick growth at the cost of safer working conditions — so as to obtain fiscal or political capital for further promotion. Through an examination of coalmine mortality rate, environmental pollution, food safety and house pricing, the book argues that collusion is the intrinsic drive of the China model. It consider how against a backdrop of political centralization and economic decentralization, collusion exacerbates corruption and impacts both on the country’s social development and on its foreign direct investment. Offering an analysis of future prospects for the China model, it puts forward key policy proposals to improve domestic institutional construction through reform.

By analyzing the interactions between China’s central government and its local governments and enterprises, this book constructs an analytical framework of government-enterprise collusion, analyzing the impact of collusion within the China model on Chinese society. Against the background of decentralization and under information asymmetry, this text argues that Chinese local governments connive at enterprises’ adoption of a low-cost ‘bad’ mode of production — a ‘stimulus’ for quick growth at the cost of safer working conditions — so as to obtain fiscal or political capital for further promotion. Through an examination of coalmine mortality rate, environmental pollution, food safety and house pricing, the book argues that collusion is the intrinsic drive of the China model. It consider how against a backdrop of political centralization and economic decentralization, collusion exacerbates corruption and impacts both on the country’s social development and on its foreign direct investment. Offering an analysis of future prospects for the China model, it puts forward key policy proposals to improve domestic institutional construction through reform.

The digital age has afforded the governments new technologies of control, allowing them to co-opt, pre-empt and repress dissent. But, what if they lack the technical capacity to access digital tools of control? In what ways have digital technologies altered the way governments conduct statecraft? Based on an analysis of more than 3,000 public procurement documents, and a dozen elite interviews with various stakeholders, we found that the Chinese state has outsourced various functions of online surveillance to private and for-profit arms of state-owned corporations. We found that outsourcing surveillance is intended to augment state technical capacity to moderate and fine-tune the conduct of digital repression. Outsourcing digital repression opens a Pandora's box of state-business collaborations. This Element contributes to the literature on outsourcing repression, state‒business relations, and conduct of digital statecraft.

The digital age has afforded the governments new technologies of control, allowing them to co-opt, pre-empt and repress dissent. But, what if they lack the technical capacity to access digital tools of control? In what ways have digital technologies altered the way governments conduct statecraft? Based on an analysis of more than 3,000 public procurement documents, and a dozen elite interviews with various stakeholders, we found that the Chinese state has outsourced various functions of online surveillance to private and for-profit arms of state-owned corporations. We found that outsourcing surveillance is intended to augment state technical capacity to moderate and fine-tune the conduct of digital repression. Outsourcing digital repression opens a Pandora's box of state-business collaborations. This Element contributes to the literature on outsourcing repression, state‒business relations, and conduct of digital statecraft.

By analyzing the interactions between China’s central government and its local governments and enterprises, this book constructs an analytical framework of government-enterprise collusion, analyzing the impact of collusion within the China model on Chinese society. Against the background of decentralization and under information asymmetry, this text argues that Chinese local governments connive at enterprises’ adoption of a low-cost ‘bad’ mode of production — a ‘stimulus’ for quick growth at the cost of safer working conditions — so as to obtain fiscal or political capital for further promotion. Through an examination of coalmine mortality rate, environmental pollution, food safety and house pricing, the book argues that collusion is the intrinsic drive of the China model. It consider how against a backdrop of political centralization and economic decentralization, collusion exacerbates corruption and impacts both on the country’s social development and on its foreign direct investment. Offering an analysis of future prospects for the China model, it puts forward key policy proposals to improve domestic institutional construction through reform.

By analyzing the interactions between China’s central government and its local governments and enterprises, this book constructs an analytical framework of government-enterprise collusion, analyzing the impact of collusion within the China model on Chinese society. Against the background of decentralization and under information asymmetry, this text argues that Chinese local governments connive at enterprises’ adoption of a low-cost ‘bad’ mode of production — a ‘stimulus’ for quick growth at the cost of safer working conditions — so as to obtain fiscal or political capital for further promotion. Through an examination of coalmine mortality rate, environmental pollution, food safety and house pricing, the book argues that collusion is the intrinsic drive of the China model. It consider how against a backdrop of political centralization and economic decentralization, collusion exacerbates corruption and impacts both on the country’s social development and on its foreign direct investment. Offering an analysis of future prospects for the China model, it puts forward key policy proposals to improve domestic institutional construction through reform.