J. Cable – författare

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 were widely welcomed. They ended a seven-year war in Indochina; gave France a dignified exit; averted wider conflict. In later years first Americans and Vietnamese, then Russians, Chinese, Cambodians and even Laotians tried to force Indochina into different patterns of their own devising. These new wars triggered by rejection of the Geneva compromise lasted longer, killed more people, did greater damage and achieved less - for everybody. Perhaps Churchill was right: jaw-jaw is better than war-war. Certainly this lively, first-hand, up-dated account of the Geneva Conference of 1954 - that triumph of old-fashioned diplomacy, which Britain initiated and France completed - offers a better model for the twenty-first century to follow.

This book examines naval history, and provides explanation, argument, and prediction for the future.

For five centuries, since Vasco de Gama's ships began making the Indian Ocean a Portuguese lake, many governments used naval force to serve their political purposes. The sceptre of the seas passed from one nation to another, but political success did not always reward the strongest navy. This selective, international history of naval force as a political instrument, whether in peace or war, ranges from Calicut, navally cannonaded in 1501, to Baghdad, assailed by sea launched missiles in 1991.

For five centuries, since Vasco de Gama's ships began making the Indian Ocean a Portuguese lake, many governments used naval force to serve their political purposes. The sceptre of the seas passed from one nation to another, but political success did not always reward the strongest navy. This selective, international history of naval force as a political instrument, whether in peace or war, ranges from Calicut, navally cannonaded in 1501, to Baghdad, assailed by sea launched missiles in 1991.

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 were widely welcomed. They ended a seven-year war in Indochina; gave France a dignified exit; averted wider conflict. In later years first Americans and Vietnamese, then Russians, Chinese, Cambodians and even Laotians tried to force Indochina into different patterns of their own devising. These new wars triggered by rejection of the Geneva compromise lasted longer, killed more people, did greater damage and achieved less - for everybody. Perhaps Churchill was right: jaw-jaw is better than war-war. Certainly this lively, first-hand, up-dated account of the Geneva Conference of 1954 - that triumph of old-fashioned diplomacy, which Britain initiated and France completed - offers a better model for the twenty-first century to follow.