James F. Goode – författare

The discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamun in 1922 was a landmark event in Egyptology that was celebrated around the world. Had Howard Carter found his prize a few years earlier, however, the treasures of Tut might now be in the British Museum in London rather than the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. That's because the years between World War I and World War II were a transitional period in Middle Eastern archaeology, as nationalists in Egypt and elsewhere asserted their claims to antiquities discovered within their borders. These claims were motivated by politics as much as by scholarship, with nationalists seeking to unite citizens through pride in their ancient past as they challenged Western powers that still exercised considerable influence over local governments and economies. James Goode's analysis of archaeological affairs in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq during this period offers fascinating new insight into the rise of nationalism in the Middle East, as well as archaeological and diplomatic history. The first such work to compare archaeological-nationalistic developments in more than one country, Negotiating for the Past draws on published and archival sources in Arabic, English, French, German, Persian, and Turkish. Those sources reveal how nationalists in Iraq and Iran observed the success of their counterparts in Egypt and Turkey, and were able to hold onto discoveries at legendary sites such as Khorsabad and Persepolis. Retaining artifacts allowed nationalists to build museums and control cultural heritage. As Goode writes, "Going to the national museum became a ritual of citizenship." Western archaeologists became identified (in the eyes of many) as agents of imperialism, thus making their work more difficult, and often necessitating diplomatic intervention. The resulting "negotiations for the past" pulled patrons (such as John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and Lord Carnarvon), archaeologists (James Breasted and Howard Carter), nationalist leaders (Ataturk and Sa'd Zaghlul), and Western officials (Charles Evan Hughes and Lord Curzon) into intractable historical debates with international implications that still resonate today.

In August 1974, while Richard Nixon resigned and Gerald Ford began a prolonged battle with Congress over executive power, a crisis was occurring in Cyprus. Desperate to shore up its declining popularity with a foreign policy triumph, the military government of Greece tried to overthrow the government of the independent island nation. In response, the Republic of Turkey invaded Cyprus in order to protect Turkish Cypriots. The invasion led to the downfall of the junta in Athens, the beginning of a United States embargo on arms sales to its ally Turkey, and years of increased tension and mistrust between the two nations.  In his book, James F. Goode offers a revolutionary analysis of the complex factors leading to the imposition and continuance of the Turkish Arms Embargo. He demonstrates that, alone, the human rights issues surrounding the invasion fail to explain the resulting US-Turkish estrangement. Instead, he contends, factors including deep-seated "Turkophobia," growing concern about a deadly heroin epidemic in the United States, and pro-Greek lobbies played important roles in heightening tensions and extending the embargo. Goode draws on newly available archival materials from the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries as well as the personal papers of key senators and congressmen to present the most complete analysis of the affair to date. This timely study will not only change how this period is understood, but it will also provide valuable insights into the future of international relations.

Drawing on newly available archival materials from the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries, James F. Goode offers a revolutionary analysis of the complex factors leading to the imposition and continuance of the 1975-1978 Turkish Arms Embargo. He demonstrates that, alone, the human rights issues surrounding the Republic of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus fail to explain the resulting US-Turkish estrangement. Instead, he contends, factors including deep-seated "Turkophobia," growing concern about a deadly heroin epidemic in the United States, and pro-Greek lobbies played important roles in heightening tensions and extending the embargo.  This timely study will not only change how this period is understood, but it will also provide valuable insights into the future of international relations in the Middle East and beyond.