Jason D. Ellis – författare

American foreign policy since 1947 cannot be understood apart from the U.S. security assistance program. Beginning with Truman, every president has considered security assistance programs important means for furthering U.S. national interests. Security assistance has been used to support a wide variety of policies, including the Truman Doctrine and containment, the underwriting of the Camp David Accords, and the channeling of aid to the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe.American foreign policy since 1947 cannot be understood apart from the U.S. security assistance program. Beginning with Truman, every president has considered security assistance programs important means for furthering U.S. national interests. Security assistance has been used to support a wide variety of policies, including the Truman Doctrine and containment, the underwriting of the Camp David Accords, and the channeling of aid to the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe.This book provides a comprehensive treatment of the program from 1947 through fiscal year 1996. After discussing the legal foundations and components of the program, the authors provide an historical survey from 1947 through the first Clinton administration. They then detail the role of Congress, public opinion, and interest groups. Separate treatment is given to countries such as Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Turkey. The authors also suggest ideas on how the programs can be changed to mesh with American objectives and resources in the 21st century. This is a major study of interest to students, scholars, researchers, and policymakers.

American foreign policy since 1947 cannot be understood apart from the U.S. security assistance program. Beginning with Truman, every president has considered security assistance programs important means for furthering U.S. national interests. Security assistance has been used to support a wide variety of policies, including the Truman Doctrine and containment, the underwriting of the Camp David Accords, and the channeling of aid to the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe.American foreign policy since 1947 cannot be understood apart from the U.S. security assistance program. Beginning with Truman, every president has considered security assistance programs important means for furthering U.S. national interests. Security assistance has been used to support a wide variety of policies, including the Truman Doctrine and containment, the underwriting of the Camp David Accords, and the channeling of aid to the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe.This book provides a comprehensive treatment of the program from 1947 through fiscal year 1996. After discussing the legal foundations and components of the program, the authors provide an historical survey from 1947 through the first Clinton administration. They then detail the role of Congress, public opinion, and interest groups. Separate treatment is given to countries such as Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Turkey. The authors also suggest ideas on how the programs can be changed to mesh with American objectives and resources in the 21st century. This is a major study of interest to students, scholars, researchers, and policymakers.

The quest to limit nuclear weapons was a notable feature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in what history may come to judge as the Clinton administration's greatest foreign-policy achievement, an agreement was reached with key former Soviet republics to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Ellis provides a timely and authoritative analysis of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which removed nuclear arsenals equivalent to the combined stockpiles of Britain, France, and China, and ultimately made a significant contribution to U.S. national security at a relatively small cost.In a fascinating examination of the interplay of domestic and foreign policy, Ellis traces the debates within Congress and the foreign policy establishment, as well as the situation on the ground in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and he details the implementation of the CTR program. He concludes with a look at the current challenges, especially the thousands of non-strategic nuclear warheads still in Russian possession, and prospects of ongoing CTR efforts.

The intelligence community's flawed assessment of Iraq's weapons systems-and the Bush administration's decision to go to war in part based on those assessments-illustrates the political and policy challenges of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this comprehensive assessment, defense policy specialists Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer find disturbing trends in both the collection and analysis of intelligence and in its use in the development and implementation of security policy. Analyzing a broad range of recent case studies-Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's defiance of U.N. watchdogs, Russia's transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran and China's to Pakistan, the Soviet biological warfare program, weapons inspections in Iraq, and others-the authors find that intelligence collection and analysis relating to WMD proliferation are becoming more difficult, that policy toward rogue states and regional allies requires difficult tradeoffs, and that using military action to fight nuclear proliferation presents intractable operational challenges.Ellis and Kiefer reveal that decisions to use-or overlook-intelligence are often made for starkly political reasons. They document the Bush administration's policy shift from nonproliferation, which emphasizes diplomatic tools such as sanctions and demarches, to counterproliferation, which at times employs interventionist and preemptive actions. They conclude with cogent recommendations for intelligence services and policy makers.