Jason Grant Allen – författare

This book traces the life and legacy of a German Jewish lawyer, F A Mann, who moved to the UK in 1933 fleeing racial persecution from Germany, and later became one of the best-known legal minds of his age, equally versed and experienced in legal practice and legal scholarship. With contributions from established and emerging scholars, legal practitioners, and members of the judiciary from around the world, F A Mann: The Lawyer and His Legacy is split into three parts. Part I sets out a legal biography of F A Mann, with a particular emphasis on his background, network, and the insights afforded by previously unstudied archival materials. Part II covers the broad range of sub-disciplines and practice areas in which Mann was active and explores the way in which he helped to form them. Part III, on monetary law, reflects both Mann's outstanding influence and the current topicality of monetary law issues. Drawing on some 12,500 letters of Mann's personal correspondence with judges, academics, and legal practitioners, this book explores how Mann's biography, his equal familiarity with German and English law and with academia and legal practice, and his wide range of legal interests have contributed to his lasting influence on law and legal scholarship.

That non-statutory executive powers are subject to judicial review is beyond doubt. But current judicial practice challenges prevailing theories of judicial review and raises a host of questions about the nature of official power and action. This is particularly the case for official powers not associated with the Royal Prerogative, which have been argued to comprise a "third source" of governmental authority. Looking at non-statutory powers directly, rather than incidentally, stirs up the intense but ultimately inconclusive debate about the conceptual basis of judicial review in English law. This provocative book argues that modern judges and scholars have neglected the very concepts necessary to understand the supervisory jurisdiction and that the law has become more complex than it needs to be. If we start from the concept of office and official action, rather than grand ideas about parliamentary sovereignty and the courts, the central questions answer themselves.

That non-statutory executive powers are subject to judicial review is beyond doubt. But current judicial practice challenges prevailing theories of judicial review and raises a host of questions about the nature of official power and action. This is particularly the case for official powers not associated with the Royal Prerogative, which have been argued to comprise a “third source” of governmental authority. Looking at non-statutory powers directly, rather than incidentally, stirs up the intense but ultimately inconclusive debate about the conceptual basis of judicial review in English law. This provocative book argues that modern judges and scholars have neglected the very concepts necessary to understand the supervisory jurisdiction and that the law has become more complex than it needs to be. If we start from the concept of office and official action, rather than grand ideas about parliamentary sovereignty and the courts, the central questions answer themselves.

That non-statutory executive powers are subject to judicial review is beyond doubt. But current judicial practice challenges prevailing theories of judicial review and raises a host of questions about the nature of official power and action. This is particularly the case for official powers not associated with the Royal Prerogative, which have been argued to comprise a “third source” of governmental authority. Looking at non-statutory powers directly, rather than incidentally, stirs up the intense but ultimately inconclusive debate about the conceptual basis of judicial review in English law. This provocative book argues that modern judges and scholars have neglected the very concepts necessary to understand the supervisory jurisdiction and that the law has become more complex than it needs to be. If we start from the concept of office and official action, rather than grand ideas about parliamentary sovereignty and the courts, the central questions answer themselves.