This book considers diverse philosophical topics unified by the identification of false moves commonly found in modern philosophy, mainstream Anglo-American philosophy, and social theory. The authors expose the sources of fundamental problems that recur in philosophy—basic problems with what the authors call "factoring philosophy." Factoring philosophy fails to attend to the phenomenological task of determining when what is distinguishable is separable and when not. Consequently, factoring philosophy makes phenomenological mistakes—false moves—when it treats as separable what is only distinguishable. Analytic philosophy is prone to false moves when it fails to recognize that phenomenology is the necessary complement to analysis. There is nothing wrong with analysis—we might as well give up thinking as give up analysis—and nothing is wrong with the values prized by analytic philosophy. As Hegel observed, “philosophizing requires, above all, that each thought should be grasped in its full precision and that nothing should remain vague and indeterminate.” Ultimately, this book contends that false moves prevail in philosophical analysis and social theory when they neglect their phenomenological foundations. 

This book extends the approach that Murray and Schuler develop in their companion volume, False Moves in Philosophy and Social Theory: Losing Public Purpose. The chapters form a connected inquiry into consequences of capital, a far-reaching social form, through a critique of political economy and the mindset it shares with much modern philosophy and social theory. The authors call this bifurcating mentality factoring philosophy. Factoring philosophy mistakes the distinguishable for the separable. It splits the subjective and objective, form and content, and it takes the object of social theory to be an impossible economy-in-general, stripped of constitutive social forms. The critique of factoring philosophy structures the collection, which makes a wide-ranging contribution to the research field of the critique of political economy as critical social theory. Ultimately, this book solidifies Murray and Schuler’s impact on the study of political economy, political philosophy, modern philosophy, Hegel, Marx, and critical theory. 

This book considers diverse philosophical topics unified by the identification of false moves commonly found in modern philosophy, mainstream Anglo-American philosophy, and social theory. The authors expose the sources of fundamental problems that recur in philosophy—basic problems with what the authors call "factoring philosophy." Factoring philosophy fails to attend to the phenomenological task of determining when what is distinguishable is separable and when not. Consequently, factoring philosophy makes phenomenological mistakes—false moves—when it treats as separable what is only distinguishable. Analytic philosophy is prone to false moves when it fails to recognize that phenomenology is the necessary complement to analysis. There is nothing wrong with analysis—we might as well give up thinking as give up analysis—and nothing is wrong with the values prized by analytic philosophy. As Hegel observed, “philosophizing requires, above all, that each thought should be grasped in its full precision and that nothing should remain vague and indeterminate.” Ultimately, this book contends that false moves prevail in philosophical analysis and social theory when they neglect their phenomenological foundations. 

This book extends the approach that Murray and Schuler develop in their companion volume, False Moves in Philosophy and Social Theory: Losing Public Purpose. The chapters form a connected inquiry into consequences of capital, a far-reaching social form, through a critique of political economy and the mindset it shares with much modern philosophy and social theory. The authors call this bifurcating mentality factoring philosophy. Factoring philosophy mistakes the distinguishable for the separable. It splits the subjective and objective, form and content, and it takes the object of social theory to be an impossible economy-in-general, stripped of constitutive social forms. The critique of factoring philosophy structures the collection, which makes a wide-ranging contribution to the research field of the critique of political economy as critical social theory. Ultimately, this book solidifies Murray and Schuler’s impact on the study of political economy, political philosophy, modern philosophy, Hegel, Marx, and critical theory.