Joel Michell – författare

This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so malleable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. It locates philosophical and social influences (such as scientism, practicalism and Pythagoreanism) reshaping the concept and, at the core of this reshaping, identifies a fundamental problem: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. It argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science and it urges a new direction. It relates views on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell, Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a non-technical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce.

This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so malleable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. It locates philosophical and social influences (such as scientism, practicalism and Pythagoreanism) reshaping the concept and, at the core of this reshaping, identifies a fundamental problem: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. It argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science and it urges a new direction. It relates views on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell, Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a non-technical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce.

This book declines to take for granted the widespread assumption that existing psychometric procedures provide scientific measurement. The currently fashionable concepts of measurement within psychology -- operationalism and representationalism -- are critically examined, and the classical view, that measurement is the assessment of quantity, is defended. Within this framework, it is shown how conjoint measurement can be used to test the hypothesis that variables are quantitative. This theme is developed in detail using familiar psychological examples, such as Thurstone's law of comparative judgment, multidimensional scaling, and Coombs' theory of unfolding.

This book declines to take for granted the widespread assumption that existing psychometric procedures provide scientific measurement. The currently fashionable concepts of measurement within psychology -- operationalism and representationalism -- are critically examined, and the classical view, that measurement is the assessment of quantity, is defended. Within this framework, it is shown how conjoint measurement can be used to test the hypothesis that variables are quantitative. This theme is developed in detail using familiar psychological examples, such as Thurstone's law of comparative judgment, multidimensional scaling, and Coombs' theory of unfolding.