John Hacker-Wright – författare

This Element presents an interpretation and defence of Philippa Foot''s ethical naturalism. It begins with the often neglected grammatical method that Foot derives from an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein''s later philosophy. This method shapes her approach to understanding goodness as well as the role that she attributes to human nature in ethical judgment. Moral virtues understood as perfections of human powers are central to Foot''s account of ethical judgment. The thrust of the interpretation offered here is that Foot''s metaethics takes ethical judgment to be tied to our self-understanding as a sort of rational animal. Foot''s metaethics thereby offers a compelling contemporary approach that preserves some of the best insights of the Aristotelian tradition in practical philosophy.

This Element presents an interpretation and defence of Philippa Foot''s ethical naturalism. It begins with the often neglected grammatical method that Foot derives from an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein''s later philosophy. This method shapes her approach to understanding goodness as well as the role that she attributes to human nature in ethical judgment. Moral virtues understood as perfections of human powers are central to Foot''s account of ethical judgment. The thrust of the interpretation offered here is that Foot''s metaethics takes ethical judgment to be tied to our self-understanding as a sort of rational animal. Foot''s metaethics thereby offers a compelling contemporary approach that preserves some of the best insights of the Aristotelian tradition in practical philosophy.

This Element presents an interpretation and defence of Philippa Foot's ethical naturalism. It begins with the often neglected grammatical method that Foot derives from an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This method shapes her approach to understanding goodness as well as the role that she attributes to human nature in ethical judgment. Moral virtues understood as perfections of human powers are central to Foot's account of ethical judgment. The thrust of the interpretation offered here is that Foot's metaethics takes ethical judgment to be tied to our self-understanding as a sort of rational animal. Foot's metaethics thereby offers a compelling contemporary approach that preserves some of the best insights of the Aristotelian tradition in practical philosophy.

Philippa Foot (1920-2010) is widely regarded as one of the most important Anglophone moral philosophers of the 20th century. She pioneered a distinctive approach to philosophical treatment of ethics using the tools of analytic philosophy. She defended the objectivity of moral judgment and took controversial positions on abortion and euthanasia. She was also a leading figure behind the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy.This book represents the first comprehensive and accessible introduction to Foot's work. It offers a complete chronological and thematic overview, emphasising the role Foot played in the development of contemporary virtue ethics. It situates her thought in the context of the historical development of analytic moral philosophy and discusses the various objections to her views. Foot's writings take the form of essays that take up small problems within moral philosophy. Yet John Hacker-Wright argues that there is nevertheless a coherent, systematic moral perspective throughout Foot's work that she does not make fully explicit. This is the ideal introduction for students seeking a synthetic grasp of Foot's moral vision.

Philippa Foot (1920-2010) is widely regarded as one of the most important Anglophone moral philosophers of the 20th century. She pioneered a distinctive approach to philosophical treatment of ethics using the tools of analytic philosophy. She defended the objectivity of moral judgment and took controversial positions on abortion and euthanasia. She was also a leading figure behind the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy. This book represents the first comprehensive and accessible introduction to Foot's work. It offers a complete chronological and thematic overview, emphasising the role Foot played in the development of contemporary virtue ethics. It situates her thought in the context of the historical development of analytic moral philosophy and discusses the various objections to her views. Foot's writings take the form of essays that take up small problems within moral philosophy. Yet John Hacker-Wright argues that there is nevertheless a coherent, systematic moral perspective throughout Foot's work that she does not make fully explicit. This is the ideal introduction for students seeking a synthetic grasp of Foot's moral vision.

Philippa Foot (1920-2010) is widely regarded as one of the most important Anglophone moral philosophers of the 20th century. She pioneered a distinctive approach to philosophical treatment of ethics using the tools of analytic philosophy. She defended the objectivity of moral judgment and took controversial positions on abortion and euthanasia. She was also a leading figure behind the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy. This book represents the first comprehensive and accessible introduction to Foot's work. It offers a complete chronological and thematic overview, emphasising the role Foot played in the development of contemporary virtue ethics. It situates her thought in the context of the historical development of analytic moral philosophy and discusses the various objections to her views. Foot's writings take the form of essays that take up small problems within moral philosophy. Yet John Hacker-Wright argues that there is nevertheless a coherent, systematic moral perspective throughout Foot's work that she does not make fully explicit. This is the ideal introduction for students seeking a synthetic grasp of Foot's moral vision.

Philippa Foot (1920-2010) is widely regarded as one of the most important Anglophone moral philosophers of the 20th century. She pioneered a distinctive approach to philosophical treatment of ethics using the tools of analytic philosophy. She defended the objectivity of moral judgment and took controversial positions on abortion and euthanasia. She was also a leading figure behind the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy.This book represents the first comprehensive and accessible introduction to Foot's work. It offers a complete chronological and thematic overview, emphasising the role Foot played in the development of contemporary virtue ethics. It situates her thought in the context of the historical development of analytic moral philosophy and discusses the various objections to her views. Foot's writings take the form of essays that take up small problems within moral philosophy. Yet John Hacker-Wright argues that there is nevertheless a coherent, systematic moral perspective throughout Foot's work that she does not make fully explicit. This is the ideal introduction for students seeking a synthetic grasp of Foot's moral vision.

This volume focuses on controversial issues that stem from Philippa Foot’s later writings on natural goodness which are at the center of contemporary discussions of virtue ethics. The chapters address questions about how Foot relates judgments of moral goodness to human nature, how Foot understands happiness, and addresses objections to her framework from the perspective of empirical biology.  The volume will be of value to any student or scholar with an interest in virtue ethics and analytic moral philosophy.

This volume focuses on controversial issues that stem from Philippa Foot’s later writings on natural goodness which are at the center of contemporary discussions of virtue ethics. The chapters address questions about how Foot relates judgments of moral goodness to human nature, how Foot understands happiness, and addresses objections to her framework from the perspective of empirical biology.  The volume will be of value to any student or scholar with an interest in virtue ethics and analytic moral philosophy.