Jon Moran – författare

This timely and controversial book shows how crime, and the authorities' response to crime, became central to the peace process in Northern Ireland.At times, paramilitary activity threatened to destabilise the peace in Northern Ireland after 1998, but crime was central to maintaining capacity should the groups return to war. Over time, the reduction of crime was central to these groups’ own attempts to reform and official judgements as to whether they were genuinely demobilising.The state’s response to crime added controversy. Police reform produced the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the new Organised Crime Task Force signalled the importance of crime control, but the Assets Recovery Agency, supposedly the ‘magic bullet’ for organised crime, misfired. Law enforcement was also deeply affected by the British state’s response to paramilitary crime. By 2007, peace was apparently secure and paramilitaries were ‘de-criminalising’, but this often chaotic process was marked with questions about the British state’s adherence to the rule of law.Incorporating first-hand research in the PSNI, the book will be of interest to general readers and scholars of Irish Studies, criminology, and British and comparative politics.

This timely and controversial book shows how crime, and the authorities' response to crime, became central to the peace process in Northern Ireland.At times, paramilitary activity threatened to destabilise the peace in Northern Ireland after 1998, but crime was central to maintaining capacity should the groups return to war. Over time, the reduction of crime was central to these groups’ own attempts to reform and official judgements as to whether they were genuinely demobilising.The state’s response to crime added controversy. Police reform produced the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the new Organised Crime Task Force signalled the importance of crime control, but the Assets Recovery Agency, supposedly the ‘magic bullet’ for organised crime, misfired. Law enforcement was also deeply affected by the British state’s response to paramilitary crime. By 2007, peace was apparently secure and paramilitaries were ‘de-criminalising’, but this often chaotic process was marked with questions about the British state’s adherence to the rule of law.Incorporating first-hand research in the PSNI, the book will be of interest to general readers and scholars of Irish Studies, criminology, and British and comparative politics.

Moran concentrates on three aims: to provide an overview of British military intelligence operations in the last 30 years which concentrates on operational not strategic intelligence; to examine the debates over ethics and effectiveness that have followed these operations; and to examine the increasing attempts to place military intelligence under the same type of regulation that police and security intelligence operations have been subject to. As such, he provides a timely overview of intelligence effectiveness and ethics in this area of heightened interest and relevance in terms of the recent UK deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the light of the UK Strategic Defence Review. This book is not a philosophical discussion of military ethics; nor is it a study of operations alone. In the light of experiences from Northern Ireland to Afghanistan, it examines the debates over effectiveness which have surrounded British military intelligence activities whilst tying these debates closely to the ethical issues they raise. Each stage of operations is evaluated in context. Interest will cut across disciplines and as such this book will appeal to intelligence, counter-terrorism, military studies, politics, human rights and philosophy practitioners, scholars and students.