Jon Robson - Böcker

Aesthetic judgements that are formed on the basis of testimony are commonly held to be defective, illegitimate, or otherwise problematic. This book assesses the debate surrounding aesthetic testimony and argues for the surprising conclusion that this widespread view is mistaken. Aesthetic testimony is in no way inferior as a source of judgement when compared to either first-hand aesthetic judgement or testimony concerning non-aesthetic matters. Alongside establishing this position (an extreme form of 'optimism' concerning aesthetic testimony), Jon Robson also responds to the most prominent arguments for the opposing view ('pessimism' concerning aesthetic testimony). Along the way, it also re-examines our understanding of the norms which govern both judgement and assertion in aesthetics.

Through much of the twentieth century, philosophical thinking about works of art, design, and other aesthetic products has emphasized intuitive and reflective methods, often tied to the idea that philosophy's business is primarily to analyze concepts. This 'philosophy from the armchair' approach contrasts with methods used by psychologists, sociologists, evolutionary thinkers, and others who study the making and reception of the arts empirically. How far should philosophers be sensitive to the results of these studies? Is their own largely a priori method basically flawed? Are their views on aesthetic value, interpretation, imagination, and the emotions of art to be rethought in the light of best science? The essays in this volume seek answers to these questions, many through detailed studies of problems traditionally regarded as philosophical but where empirical inquiry seems to be shedding interesting light. No common view is looked for or found in this volume: a number of authors argue that the current enthusiasm for scientific approaches to aesthetics is based on a misunderstanding of the philosophical enterprise and sometimes on misinterpretation of the science; others suggest various ways that philosophy can and should accommodate and sometimes yield to the empirical approach. The editors provide a substantial introduction which sets the scene historically and conceptually before summarizing the claims and arguments of the essays.

Through much of the twentieth century, philosophical thinking about works of art, design, and other aesthetic products has emphasized intuitive and reflective methods, often tied to the idea that philosophy's business is primarily to analyze concepts. This 'philosophy from the armchair' approach contrasts with methods used by psychologists, sociologists, evolutionary thinkers, and others who study the making and reception of the arts empirically. How far should philosophers be sensitive to the results of these studies? Is their own largely a priori method basically flawed? Are their views on aesthetic value, interpretation, imagination, and the emotions of art to be rethought in the light of best science? The essays in this volume seek answers to these questions, many through detailed studies of problems traditionally regarded as philosophical but where empirical inquiry seems to be shedding interesting light. No common view is looked for or found in this volume: a number of authors argue that the current enthusiasm for scientific approaches to aesthetics is based on a misunderstanding of the philosophical enterprise and sometimes on misinterpretation of the science; others suggest various ways that philosophy can and should accommodate and sometimes yield to the empirical approach. The editors provide a substantial introduction which sets the scene historically and conceptually before summarizing the claims and arguments of the essays.

This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. Trials are centrally concerned with determining truth: whether a criminal defendant has in fact culpably committed the act of which they are accused, or whether a civil defendant is in fact responsible for the damages alleged by the plaintiff. Truth is not, however, the only epistemic value which seems relevant to how trials proceed. We may think that a jury shouldn’t convict a defendant, even one who is as a matter of fact guilty, unless its members know or at least are justified in believing that the defendant committed the crime in question. Similarly, we might reasonably assume that the trier of fact must have some level of understanding to reach an adequate verdict in any case, but legitimate questions arise as to what level of understanding should be required.The essays collected in this volume consider a range of epistemological issues raised by trials, such as how much credence jurors should give to eyewitness testimony, the admissibility and role of statistical evidence, and the appropriate standards of proof in different contexts.The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials will be of interest to scholars and upper-level students working on issues at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of law.

This collection of essays is devoted to the philosophical examination of the aesthetics of videogames. Videogames represent one of the most significant developments in the modern popular arts, and it is a topic that is attracting much attention among philosophers of art and aestheticians. As a burgeoning medium of artistic expression, videogames raise entirely new aesthetic concerns, particularly concerning their ontology, interactivity, and aesthetic value. The essays in this volume address a number of pressing theoretical issues related to these areas, including but not limited to: the nature of performance and identity in videogames; their status as an interactive form of art; the ethical problems raised by violence in videogames; and the representation of women in videogames and the gaming community. The Aesthetics of Videogames is an important contribution to analytic aesthetics that deals with an important and growing art form.

This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. Trials are centrally concerned with determining truth: whether a criminal defendant has in fact culpably committed the act of which they are accused, or whether a civil defendant is in fact responsible for the damages alleged by the plaintiff. Truth is not, however, the only epistemic value which seems relevant to how trials proceed. We may think that a jury shouldn’t convict a defendant, even one who is as a matter of fact guilty, unless its members know or at least are justified in believing that the defendant committed the crime in question. Similarly, we might reasonably assume that the trier of fact must have some level of understanding to reach an adequate verdict in any case, but legitimate questions arise as to what level of understanding should be required.The essays collected in this volume consider a range of epistemological issues raised by trials, such as how much credence jurors should give to eyewitness testimony, the admissibility and role of statistical evidence, and the appropriate standards of proof in different contexts.The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials will be of interest to scholars and upper-level students working on issues at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of law.

How do we arrive at aesthetic knowledge? This might seem an odd question for philosophers to ask. Some will take its answer to be obvious: we learn about the aesthetic qualities of paintings by looking at them, of musical works by listening to them, and so on. Others will take the question to be misguided, how can there be aesthetic knowledge when aesthetics is merely 'a matter of taste'? Finally, aesthetic knowledge itself might seem singularly unimportant. We don't engage with beautiful artworks to learn that they're beautiful but, rather, to appreciate that beauty. This Element argues that each of these objections is misplaced. Aesthetic knowledge is both valuable and attainable, but canonical philosophical (and folk) views of how we attain it are mistaken. The Element surveys some recent arguments against the reliability of aesthetic perception and in favour of other, more social, sources of aesthetic knowledge.

How do we arrive at aesthetic knowledge? This might seem an odd question for philosophers to ask. Some will take its answer to be obvious: we learn about the aesthetic qualities of paintings by looking at them, of musical works by listening to them, and so on. Others will take the question to be misguided, how can there be aesthetic knowledge when aesthetics is merely 'a matter of taste'? Finally, aesthetic knowledge itself might seem singularly unimportant. We don't engage with beautiful artworks to learn that they're beautiful but, rather, to appreciate that beauty. This Element argues that each of these objections is misplaced. Aesthetic knowledge is both valuable and attainable, but canonical philosophical (and folk) views of how we attain it are mistaken. The Element surveys some recent arguments against the reliability of aesthetic perception and in favour of other, more social, sources of aesthetic knowledge.

This collection of essays is devoted to the philosophical examination of the aesthetics of videogames. Videogames represent one of the most significant developments in the modern popular arts, and it is a topic that is attracting much attention among philosophers of art and aestheticians. As a burgeoning medium of artistic expression, videogames raise entirely new aesthetic concerns, particularly concerning their ontology, interactivity, and aesthetic value. The essays in this volume address a number of pressing theoretical issues related to these areas, including but not limited to: the nature of performance and identity in videogames; their status as an interactive form of art; the ethical problems raised by violence in videogames; and the representation of women in videogames and the gaming community. The Aesthetics of Videogames is an important contribution to analytic aesthetics that deals with an important and growing art form.

What is the nature of time? Does it flow? Do the past and future exist? Drawing connections between historical and present-day questions, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time provides an up-to-date guide to one of the most central and debated topics in contemporary metaphysics.Introducing the views and arguments of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, this accessible introduction covers the history of the philosophy of time from the Pre-Socratics to the beginning of the 20th Century. The historical survey presents the necessary background to understanding more recent developments, including McTaggart’s 1908 argument for the unreality of time, the open future, the perdurance/endurance debate, the possibility of time travel, and the relevance of current physics to the philosophy of time.Informed by cutting-edge philosophical research, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time evaluates influential historical arguments in the context of contemporary developments. For students looking to gain insights into how ideas within the philosophy of time have developed and better understand recent arguments, this is the ideal starting point.