JosA(c) Luis BermAºdez – författare

Thought, Reference, and Experience is a collection of important new essays on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the papers is the brilliant work of the British philosopher Gareth Evans before his untimely death in 1980 at the age of 34. Evans''s work on reference and singular thought transformed the Fregean approach to the philosophy of thought and language, showing how seemingly technical issues in philosophical semantics are inextricably linked to fundamental questions about the structure of our thinking about ourselves and about the world. The papers, all newly written for this volume, explore different aspects of Evans''s philosophical legacy, showing its importance to central areas in contemporary analytic philosophy. The volume includes a substantial introduction that introduces the principal themes in Evans''s thought and places the papers in context.

No words in English are shorter than "I" and few, if any, play a more fundamental role in language and thought. In Understanding "I": Thought and Language José Luis Bermúdez continues his longstanding work on the self and self-consciousness. Bermúdez develops a model of how language-users understand sentences involving the first person pronoun "I". This model illuminates the unique psychological role that self-conscious thoughts (typicallyexpressed using "I") play in action and thought - a unique role often summarized by describing "I" as an essential indexical.The book opens with an argument directly supporting the indispensability of "I"-thoughts in explaining action. After motivating a broadly Fregean approach linguistic understanding it critically examines Frege''s own remarks on "I" as well as the Fregean account offered by Gareth Evans. The main part of the book develops an account of the sense of "I" that explains a cluster of related phenomena, including essential indexicality, immunity to error through misidentification, the shareability of"I"-thoughts, the relation between "I" and "you", and the role of autobiographical memory in self-consciousness.

No words in English are shorter than "I" and few, if any, play a more fundamental role in language and thought. In Understanding "I": Thought and Language José Luis Bermúdez continues his longstanding work on the self and self-consciousness. Bermúdez develops a model of how language-users understand sentences involving the first person pronoun "I". This model illuminates the unique psychological role that self-conscious thoughts (typicallyexpressed using "I") play in action and thought - a unique role often summarized by describing "I" as an essential indexical.The book opens with an argument directly supporting the indispensability of "I"-thoughts in explaining action. After motivating a broadly Fregean approach linguistic understanding it critically examines Frege''s own remarks on "I" as well as the Fregean account offered by Gareth Evans. The main part of the book develops an account of the sense of "I" that explains a cluster of related phenomena, including essential indexicality, immunity to error through misidentification, the shareability of"I"-thoughts, the relation between "I" and "you", and the role of autobiographical memory in self-consciousness.

Philosophical work on the nature of thought has, until recently, focused primarily on what it is for an individual to think, leaving aside important questions about the intersubjective dimension of thought. For example: In what sense, if any, can thoughts really be shared? Is there a shareability requirement on successful communication, disagreement, or the transmission of knowledge? Do particular types of thought such as those based on perception or self-location raise distinctive challenges to their shareability? More generally, how should we understand the communication and coordination of our thoughts in exchanges with others? Are there distinctive rationality constraints governing the intersubjective aspects of thought? Sharing Thoughts brings together original work by established and emerging philosophers to address these and related foundational issues, while also paying attention to more specific questions such as the interplay between the intersubjectivity of thought and the internalism/externalism debate, the elucidation of first-person or egocentric thought, our capacity for joint thinking, the conditions for knowledge transmission and collective inquiry, the expression of thought in music, and more.

Philosophical work on the nature of thought has, until recently, focused primarily on what it is for an individual to think, leaving aside important questions about the intersubjective dimension of thought. For example: In what sense, if any, can thoughts really be shared? Is there a shareability requirement on successful communication, disagreement, or the transmission of knowledge? Do particular types of thought such as those based on perception or self-location raise distinctive challenges to their shareability? More generally, how should we understand the communication and coordination of our thoughts in exchanges with others? Are there distinctive rationality constraints governing the intersubjective aspects of thought? Sharing Thoughts brings together original work by established and emerging philosophers to address these and related foundational issues, while also paying attention to more specific questions such as the interplay between the intersubjectivity of thought and the internalism/externalism debate, the elucidation of first-person or egocentric thought, our capacity for joint thinking, the conditions for knowledge transmission and collective inquiry, the expression of thought in music, and more.

Philosophical work on the nature of thought has, until recently, focused primarily on what it is for an individual to think, leaving aside important questions about the intersubjective dimension of thought. For example: In what sense, if any, can thoughts really be shared? Is there a shareability requirement on successful communication, disagreement, or the transmission of knowledge? Do particular types of thought such as those based on perception or self-location raise distinctive challenges to their shareability? More generally, how should we understand the communication and coordination of our thoughts in exchanges with others? Are there distinctive rationality constraints governing the intersubjective aspects of thought? Sharing Thoughts brings together original work by established and emerging philosophers to address these and related foundational issues, while also paying attention to more specific questions such as the interplay between the intersubjectivity of thought and the internalism/externalism debate, the elucidation of first-person or egocentric thought, our capacity for joint thinking, the conditions for knowledge transmission and collective inquiry, the expression of thought in music, and more.

Aristotle's De Anima is an extraordinarily influential text in the history of philosophy; it is also one of the earliest works in what we now call psychology. Aristotle explores the psuchA , a distinctively Greek concept that overlaps in certain respects with our modern notions of the mind and the soul, but also applies to plants and non-human animals. The De Anima develops an innovative and challenging account of the relation between the psuchA and the body, and offers thought-provoking analyses of the different capacities of the psuchA , starting with nutrition and reproduction. A general discussion of perception is followed by detailed accounts of the five individual sense modalities, as well as perceptual imagination. After subtly exploring the intellectual capacities that he considers distinctive to human beings (where we find his famous discussion of the "e;agent intellect"e;) Aristotle gives a sophisticated account of how desire leads to action.In this lively and accessible Oxford Guide, which presupposes no knowledge of Greek, JosA(c) Luis BermA dez situates the De Anima in the context of ancient Greek philosophy, and places it within Aristotle's corpus as a whole. Each chapter is organized around focus readings from the De Anima and elsewhere in Aristotle's writings (as well as from Plato's Phaedo and Theaetetus). BermA dez develops a historically-informed account of Aristotle's arguments in the De Anima that draws connections with contemporary philosophy of mind as appropriate. The reader is introduced to some of the key topics and controversies in modern Aristotle scholarship, as well as to the insights of the ancient and medieval commentators.

Aristotle's De Anima is an extraordinarily influential text in the history of philosophy; it is also one of the earliest works in what we now call psychology. Aristotle explores the psuchA , a distinctively Greek concept that overlaps in certain respects with our modern notions of the mind and the soul, but also applies to plants and non-human animals. The De Anima develops an innovative and challenging account of the relation between the psuchA and the body, and offers thought-provoking analyses of the different capacities of the psuchA , starting with nutrition and reproduction. A general discussion of perception is followed by detailed accounts of the five individual sense modalities, as well as perceptual imagination. After subtly exploring the intellectual capacities that he considers distinctive to human beings (where we find his famous discussion of the "e;agent intellect"e;) Aristotle gives a sophisticated account of how desire leads to action.In this lively and accessible Oxford Guide, which presupposes no knowledge of Greek, JosA(c) Luis BermA dez situates the De Anima in the context of ancient Greek philosophy, and places it within Aristotle's corpus as a whole. Each chapter is organized around focus readings from the De Anima and elsewhere in Aristotle's writings (as well as from Plato's Phaedo and Theaetetus). BermA dez develops a historically-informed account of Aristotle's arguments in the De Anima that draws connections with contemporary philosophy of mind as appropriate. The reader is introduced to some of the key topics and controversies in modern Aristotle scholarship, as well as to the insights of the ancient and medieval commentators.