Karol Zakowski – författare

This book analyses institutional reforms implemented by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, under his second administration from 2012 to 2020. Also examined is the evolution in the role of such actors in Japanese politics as bureaucrats, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions, and backbenchers of the ruling party.

Chapters offer multi-dimensional explanations for the preconditions of successful gradual institutional change in political systems, characterized by relatively strong veto players, rigid governmental structures, and numerous unofficial decision-making rules. It is argued that enhancement of the prime minister’s position was implemented through the creative use of pre-existing policy venues, coupled with minor institutional changes in decision-making bodies. Using three illustrated case studies, it is demonstrated how the prime minister managed to centralize the decision-making process: a result of strategic appointment of ministers, empowerment of the Cabinet Secretariat and also taking advantage of wider advisory organs, largely circumventing deliberations on key policies in the ruling party. Seemingly minor changes thus manifested in a major redefinition of decision-making patterns: a result of the long-term perspective of the Abe administration.

Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration will be useful for students seeking to understand the process of successful gradual institutional change and for scholars of Japanese studies and political science.

This book analyses institutional reforms implemented by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, under his second administration from 2012 to 2020. Also examined is the evolution in the role of such actors in Japanese politics as bureaucrats, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions, and backbenchers of the ruling party.

Chapters offer multi-dimensional explanations for the preconditions of successful gradual institutional change in political systems, characterized by relatively strong veto players, rigid governmental structures, and numerous unofficial decision-making rules. It is argued that enhancement of the prime minister’s position was implemented through the creative use of pre-existing policy venues, coupled with minor institutional changes in decision-making bodies. Using three illustrated case studies, it is demonstrated how the prime minister managed to centralize the decision-making process: a result of strategic appointment of ministers, empowerment of the Cabinet Secretariat and also taking advantage of wider advisory organs, largely circumventing deliberations on key policies in the ruling party. Seemingly minor changes thus manifested in a major redefinition of decision-making patterns: a result of the long-term perspective of the Abe administration.

Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration will be useful for students seeking to understand the process of successful gradual institutional change and for scholars of Japanese studies and political science.

This book examines the decision-making processes behind the formulation and evolution of the Japanese government’s official stance regarding diplomatic problems connected with the history of Japan’s territorial expansionism in East Asia.

Based on neoclassical realism and historical institutionalism, this book analyzes to what extent Japan’s reaction to history problems complied with external pressures and to what extent it was modified by domestic-level variables. Particular attention is paid to the ideological leanings of key decision makers as well as their position against veto players, such as ruling party decision-making bodies, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions, cabinet members, coalition parties, and ministerial bureaucrats. Through four case studies – apologies for the war of aggression, a history textbook screening system, prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the “comfort women” issue – it reveals which institutional actors formulated an initial response to issues of history, under what political circumstances Japan’s official stance on history problems was shaped and institutionalized, and what methods were utilized by the revisionists to challenge the status quo.

Exploring path-dependent processes that led to the formulation of a compromise in the Japanese government, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Japanese Politics, Asian Studies, International Studies, and Political Science.

This book examines the decision-making processes behind the formulation and evolution of the Japanese government’s official stance regarding diplomatic problems connected with the history of Japan’s territorial expansionism in East Asia.

Based on neoclassical realism and historical institutionalism, this book analyzes to what extent Japan’s reaction to history problems complied with external pressures and to what extent it was modified by domestic-level variables. Particular attention is paid to the ideological leanings of key decision makers as well as their position against veto players, such as ruling party decision-making bodies, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions, cabinet members, coalition parties, and ministerial bureaucrats. Through four case studies – apologies for the war of aggression, a history textbook screening system, prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the “comfort women” issue – it reveals which institutional actors formulated an initial response to issues of history, under what political circumstances Japan’s official stance on history problems was shaped and institutionalized, and what methods were utilized by the revisionists to challenge the status quo.

Exploring path-dependent processes that led to the formulation of a compromise in the Japanese government, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Japanese Politics, Asian Studies, International Studies, and Political Science.

In the election to the House of Representatives in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) almost tripled the number of its lower house members by winning 308 seats. It subsequently formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party. The new ruling party promised to completely overhaul policymaking mechanisms that had been shaped over the past decades. Yet, the Japanese people quickly felt disappointed with the DPJ’s ‘policymaking engineering’.

Examining the evolution of the decision-making process in Japan under the DPJ administration between the years 2009-2012, this book offers a multidimensional explanation for the reasons for the DPJ’s failure in producing effective policymaking mechanisms. Implementing conceptual tools borrowed from historical institutionalism, the author explains why the Democrats displayed inflexibility in introducing selected elements of the Westminster system, incoherence in regard to many aspects of the decision-making reform, and unwillingness to take advantage of all of the institutional resources at their disposal. The book argues that the examination of the DPJ’s origins and interactions with other parties is crucial in understanding its misconceptions regarding the institutional model, policy vision, and institutional tools required for a durable change in policymaking patterns.

Illustrating its argument with a range of case studies, this book explains why, ultimately, the DPJ’s concept of a politician-led government resulted in failure. It will also be helpful in understanding the prerequisites for the success of institutional reforms in general. As such it will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese studies, Political science, Asian studies.

In the election to the House of Representatives in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) almost tripled the number of its lower house members by winning 308 seats. It subsequently formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party. The new ruling party promised to completely overhaul policymaking mechanisms that had been shaped over the past decades. Yet, the Japanese people quickly felt disappointed with the DPJ’s ‘policymaking engineering’.

Examining the evolution of the decision-making process in Japan under the DPJ administration between the years 2009-2012, this book offers a multidimensional explanation for the reasons for the DPJ’s failure in producing effective policymaking mechanisms. Implementing conceptual tools borrowed from historical institutionalism, the author explains why the Democrats displayed inflexibility in introducing selected elements of the Westminster system, incoherence in regard to many aspects of the decision-making reform, and unwillingness to take advantage of all of the institutional resources at their disposal. The book argues that the examination of the DPJ’s origins and interactions with other parties is crucial in understanding its misconceptions regarding the institutional model, policy vision, and institutional tools required for a durable change in policymaking patterns.

Illustrating its argument with a range of case studies, this book explains why, ultimately, the DPJ’s concept of a politician-led government resulted in failure. It will also be helpful in understanding the prerequisites for the success of institutional reforms in general. As such it will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese studies, Political science, Asian studies.