Katherin A. Rogers – författare

Katherin A. Rogers presents a new theory of free will, based on the thought of Anselm of Canterbury. We did not originally produce ourselves. Yet, according to Anselm, we can engage in self-creation, freely and responsibly forming our characters by choosing ''from ourselves'' (a se) between open options. Anselm introduces a new, agent-causal libertarianism which is parsimonious in that, unlike other agent-causal theories, it does not appeal to any unique andmysterious powers to explain how the free agent chooses. After setting out Anselm''s original theory, Rogers defends and develops it by addressing a series of standard problems levelled against libertarianism. These include the problem of ''internalism—in that an agent is not the source of his originalmotivations, how can the structure of his choice ground his responsibility?; the problem of Frankfurt-style counterexamples—Do we really need open options to choose freely?; and the problem of luck—If nothing about an agent before he chooses explains his choice, then isn''t the choice just dumb luck? (The Anselmian answer to this perennial criticism is especially innovative, proposing that the critic has the relationship between choices and character exactly backwards.) Finally, as a theoryabout self-creation, Anselmian Libertarianism must defend the tracing thesis, the claim that an agent can be responsible for character-determined choices, if he, himself, formed his character through earlier a se choices. Throughout, the book defends and exemplifies a new methodological suggestion:someone debating free will ought to make his background world view explicit. In the on-going debate over the possibility of human freedom and responsibility, Anselmian Libertarianism constitutes a new and plausible approach.

Katherin A. Rogers presents a new theory of free will, based on the thought of Anselm of Canterbury. We did not originally produce ourselves. Yet, according to Anselm, we can engage in self-creation, freely and responsibly forming our characters by choosing ''from ourselves'' (a se) between open options. Anselm introduces a new, agent-causal libertarianism which is parsimonious in that, unlike other agent-causal theories, it does not appeal to any unique andmysterious powers to explain how the free agent chooses. After setting out Anselm''s original theory, Rogers defends and develops it by addressing a series of standard problems levelled against libertarianism. These include the problem of ''internalism—in that an agent is not the source of his originalmotivations, how can the structure of his choice ground his responsibility?; the problem of Frankfurt-style counterexamples—Do we really need open options to choose freely?; and the problem of luck—If nothing about an agent before he chooses explains his choice, then isn''t the choice just dumb luck? (The Anselmian answer to this perennial criticism is especially innovative, proposing that the critic has the relationship between choices and character exactly backwards.) Finally, as a theoryabout self-creation, Anselmian Libertarianism must defend the tracing thesis, the claim that an agent can be responsible for character-determined choices, if he, himself, formed his character through earlier a se choices. Throughout, the book defends and exemplifies a new methodological suggestion:someone debating free will ought to make his background world view explicit. In the on-going debate over the possibility of human freedom and responsibility, Anselmian Libertarianism constitutes a new and plausible approach.

Katherin A. Rogers presents a new theory of free will, based on the thought of Anselm of Canterbury. We did not originally produce ourselves. Yet, according to Anselm, we can engage in self-creation, freely and responsibly forming our characters by choosing 'from ourselves' (a se) between open options. Anselm introduces a new, agent-causal libertarianism which is parsimonious in that, unlike other agent-causal theories, it does not appeal to any unique and mysterious powers to explain how the free agent chooses. After setting out Anselm's original theory, Rogers defends and develops it by addressing a series of standard problems levelled against libertarianism. These include the problem of 'internalism--in that an agent is not the source of his original motivations, how can the structure of his choice ground his responsibility?; the problem of Frankfurt-style counterexamples--Do we really need open options to choose freely?; and the problem of luck--If nothing about an agent before he chooses explains his choice, then isn't the choice just dumb luck? (The Anselmian answer to this perennial criticism is especially innovative, proposing that the critic has the relationship between choices and character exactly backwards.) Finally, as a theory about self-creation, Anselmian Libertarianism must defend the tracing thesis, the claim that an agent can be responsible for character-determined choices, if he, himself, formed his character through earlier a se choices. Throughout, the book defends and exemplifies a new methodological suggestion: someone debating free will ought to make his background world view explicit. In the on-going debate over the possibility of human freedom and responsibility, Anselmian Libertarianism constitutes a new and plausible approach.

That being than which a greater cannot be conceived.' This was the way in which the living God of biblical tradition was described by the great Medieval philosophers such as Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas.Contemporary philosophers find much to question, criticise and reject in the traditional analysis of that description. Some hold that the attributes traditionally ascribed to God - simplicity, necessity, immutability, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, creativity and goodness - are inherently incoherent individually, or mutually inconsistent. Others argue that the divinity described by philosophers cannot be the same as the providential God of revelation.In Perfect Being Theology Katherin A. Rogers defends the traditional approach, considering contemporary criticisms but concluding that the most adequate account of the nature of God should build upon the foundation laid by the Medieval philosophers.Written in a lively and accessible style and offering an important historical perspective, this book covers key areas of contention and many of the major ideas and thinkers from all sides of the debate are included.

Recently, psychologists and neurobiologists have conducted experiments taken to show that human beings do not have free will. Many, including a number of philosophers, assume that, even if science has not decided the free will question yet, it is just a matter of time. In The Experimental Approach to Free Will, Katherin A. Rogers accomplishes several tasks. First, canvasing the literature critical of these recent experiments (or of conclusions drawn from them) and adding new criticisms of her own, she shows why these experiments should not undermine belief in human freedom – even robust, libertarian freedom. Indeed, many of the experiments do not even connect with any philosophical understanding of free will. Through this discussion, she generates a long list of problems – ethical as well as practical – facing the attempt to study free will experimentally. With these problems highlighted, she shows that even in the distant future, supposing the brain sciences to have advanced far beyond where they are today, it will likely be impossible to settle the question of free will experimentally. She concludes that, since philosophy has not, and science cannot, settle the question of free will, it is more reasonable to suppose that humans do indeed have freedom.

Brings together, and adds to, criticisms of recent experiments (or conclusions drawn from them) which supposedly show that human beings do not have free will Analyzes recent experiments supposedly related to human freedom through the lens of a philosophically informed portrait of a robust, libertarian free choice Develops a long list of problems – both practical and ethical – facing the experimental study of human freedom Proposes a thought experiment set in a distant future of advanced brain science to show that it is likely impossible for science ever to settle the question of free will.

Recently, psychologists and neurobiologists have conducted experiments taken to show that human beings do not have free will. Many, including a number of philosophers, assume that, even if science has not decided the free will question yet, it is just a matter of time. In The Experimental Approach to Free Will, Katherin A. Rogers accomplishes several tasks. First, canvasing the literature critical of these recent experiments (or of conclusions drawn from them) and adding new criticisms of her own, she shows why these experiments should not undermine belief in human freedom – even robust, libertarian freedom. Indeed, many of the experiments do not even connect with any philosophical understanding of free will. Through this discussion, she generates a long list of problems – ethical as well as practical – facing the attempt to study free will experimentally. With these problems highlighted, she shows that even in the distant future, supposing the brain sciences to have advanced far beyond where they are today, it will likely be impossible to settle the question of free will experimentally. She concludes that, since philosophy has not, and science cannot, settle the question of free will, it is more reasonable to suppose that humans do indeed have freedom.

Brings together, and adds to, criticisms of recent experiments (or conclusions drawn from them) which supposedly show that human beings do not have free will Analyzes recent experiments supposedly related to human freedom through the lens of a philosophically informed portrait of a robust, libertarian free choice Develops a long list of problems – both practical and ethical – facing the experimental study of human freedom Proposes a thought experiment set in a distant future of advanced brain science to show that it is likely impossible for science ever to settle the question of free will.

This book explores central philosophical questions in Christian theology and doctrine through the perspectives of three of the most influential Christian thinkers: St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas.

Chapters analze long-contested debates around the Trinity, Original Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will, the Afterlife, and Christian Exclusivity. From these topics emerge the "hard questions":

How are ideas of monotheism and the Trinity reconciled?

Is the doctrine of the Incarnation coherent?

Why does God give grace to some and not others?

How can the afterlife be understood?

How should non-Christians be treated?

Through a compelling comparative investigation of these ideas, Christianity and Western Theism uses the enduring concepts of three towering philosophers to show that Christian doctrine, though difficult, is coherent and, to some extent, understandable.

As an engaging and accessible introduction to this topic, this book is the ideal resource for new students of Christian Thought, Christian Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, and Medieval Philosophy.

This book explores central philosophical questions in Christian theology and doctrine through the perspectives of three of the most influential Christian thinkers: St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas.

Chapters analze long-contested debates around the Trinity, Original Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will, the Afterlife, and Christian Exclusivity. From these topics emerge the "hard questions":

How are ideas of monotheism and the Trinity reconciled?

Is the doctrine of the Incarnation coherent?

Why does God give grace to some and not others?

How can the afterlife be understood?

How should non-Christians be treated?

Through a compelling comparative investigation of these ideas, Christianity and Western Theism uses the enduring concepts of three towering philosophers to show that Christian doctrine, though difficult, is coherent and, to some extent, understandable.

As an engaging and accessible introduction to this topic, this book is the ideal resource for new students of Christian Thought, Christian Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, and Medieval Philosophy.

This book explores central philosophical questions in Christian theology and doctrine through the perspectives of three of the most influential Christian thinkers: St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas.Chapters analze long-contested debates around the Trinity, Original Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will, the Afterlife, and Christian Exclusivity. From these topics emerge the "hard questions": How are ideas of monotheism and the Trinity reconciled? Is the doctrine of the Incarnation coherent? Why does God give grace to some and not others? How can the afterlife be understood? How should non-Christians be treated?Through a compelling comparative investigation of these ideas, Christianity and Western Theism uses the enduring concepts of three towering philosophers to show that Christian doctrine, though difficult, is coherent and, to some extent, understandable. As an engaging and accessible introduction to this topic, this book is the ideal resource for new students of Christian Thought, Christian Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, and Medieval Philosophy.

This book explores central philosophical questions in Christian theology and doctrine through the perspectives of three of the most influential Christian thinkers: St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas.Chapters analze long-contested debates around the Trinity, Original Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will, the Afterlife, and Christian Exclusivity. From these topics emerge the "hard questions": How are ideas of monotheism and the Trinity reconciled? Is the doctrine of the Incarnation coherent? Why does God give grace to some and not others? How can the afterlife be understood? How should non-Christians be treated?Through a compelling comparative investigation of these ideas, Christianity and Western Theism uses the enduring concepts of three towering philosophers to show that Christian doctrine, though difficult, is coherent and, to some extent, understandable. As an engaging and accessible introduction to this topic, this book is the ideal resource for new students of Christian Thought, Christian Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, and Medieval Philosophy.

Recently, psychologists and neurobiologists have conducted experiments taken to show that human beings do not have free will. Many, including a number of philosophers, assume that, even if science has not decided the free will question yet, it is just a matter of time. In The Experimental Approach to Free Will, Katherin A. Rogers accomplishes several tasks. First, canvasing the literature critical of these recent experiments (or of conclusions drawn from them) and adding new criticisms of her own, she shows why these experiments should not undermine belief in human freedom – even robust, libertarian freedom. Indeed, many of the experiments do not even connect with any philosophical understanding of free will. Through this discussion, she generates a long list of problems – ethical as well as practical – facing the attempt to study free will experimentally. With these problems highlighted, she shows that even in the distant future, supposing the brain sciences to have advanced far beyond where they are today, it will likely be impossible to settle the question of free will experimentally. She concludes that, since philosophy has not, and science cannot, settle the question of free will, it is more reasonable to suppose that humans do indeed have freedom.Brings together, and adds to, criticisms of recent experiments (or conclusions drawn from them) which supposedly show that human beings do not have free willAnalyzes recent experiments supposedly related to human freedom through the lens of a philosophically informed portrait of a robust, libertarian free choiceDevelops a long list of problems – both practical and ethical – facing the experimental study of human freedomProposes a thought experiment set in a distant future of advanced brain science to show that it is likely impossible for science ever to settle the question of free will.