Kent W. Staley – författare

The Evidence for the Top Quark offers both a historical and philosophical perspective on an important recent discovery in particle physics: evidence for the elementary particle known as the top quark. Drawing on published reports, oral histories, and internal documents from the large collaboration that performed the experiment, Kent Staley explores in detail the controversies and politics that surrounded this major scientific result. At the same time the book seeks to defend an objective theory of scientific evidence based on error probabilities. Such a theory provides an illuminating explication of the points of contention in the debate over the evidence for the top quark. Philosophers wishing to defend the objectivity of the results of scientific research must face unflinchingly the realities of scientific practice, and this book attempts to do precisely that.

The Evidence for the Top Quark offers both a historical and philosophical perspective on an important recent discovery in particle physics: evidence for the elementary particle known as the top quark. Drawing on published reports, oral histories, and internal documents from the large collaboration that performed the experiment, Kent Staley explores in detail the controversies and politics that surrounded this major scientific result. At the same time the book seeks to defend an objective theory of scientific evidence based on error probabilities. Such a theory provides an illuminating explication of the points of contention in the debate over the evidence for the top quark. Philosophers wishing to defend the objectivity of the results of scientific research must face unflinchingly the realities of scientific practice, and this book attempts to do precisely that.

This thoroughly updated second edition guides readers through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent W. Staley addresses questions about what science is, why it is important, and the basis for trust in scientific results. The first part of the book introduces the central concepts of philosophy of science, with updated discussions of the problem of induction, underdetermination, rationality, scientific progress, and important movements such as falsificationism, logical empiricism, and postpositivism, together with a new chapter on social constructionism. The second part offers updated chapters on probability, scientific realism, explanation, and values in science, along with new discussions of the role of models in science, science in policy-making, and feminist philosophy of science. This broad yet detailed overview will give readers a strong grounding in philosophy of science whilst also providing opportunities for further exploration.

This thoroughly updated second edition guides readers through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent W. Staley addresses questions about what science is, why it is important, and the basis for trust in scientific results. The first part of the book introduces the central concepts of philosophy of science, with updated discussions of the problem of induction, underdetermination, rationality, scientific progress, and important movements such as falsificationism, logical empiricism, and postpositivism, together with a new chapter on social constructionism. The second part offers updated chapters on probability, scientific realism, explanation, and values in science, along with new discussions of the role of models in science, science in policy-making, and feminist philosophy of science. This broad yet detailed overview will give readers a strong grounding in philosophy of science whilst also providing opportunities for further exploration.

This book guides readers by gradual steps through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent W. Staley shows how seemingly abstract philosophical issues are relevant to important aspects of scientific practice. Structured in two parts, the book first tackles the central concepts of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of induction, falsificationism, and underdetermination, and important figures and movements, such as the logical empiricists, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend. The second part turns to contemporary debates in the philosophy of science, such as scientific realism, explanation, the role of values in science, the different views of scientific inference, and probability. This broad yet detailed overview will give readers a strong grounding whilst also providing opportunities for further exploration. It will be of particular interest to students of philosophy, the philosophy of science, and science.