Kevin Carnahan – författare

After the re-emergence of the tradition of virtue ethics in the early 1980s Reinhold Niebuhr has often served as a foil for authors who locate themselves in that tradition. However, this exercise has often proved controversial. This collection of essays continues this work, across a wide range of subjects, with the aim of avoiding some of the polemics that have previously accompanied it.

The central thesis of this book is that putting the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian realism in dialogue with contemporary virtue theory is a profitable undertaking. An introductory essay argues against locating Niebuhr as a consequentialist and in favour of thinking of his work in terms of a dispositional ethics Contributors take different positions on whether Niebuhr’s dispositional ethics should be considered a form of virtue ethics or an alternative to virtue ethics. Several of the articles relate Niebuhr and Christian realism to particular virtues. Throughout there is an appreciation of the ways in which any Niebuhrian approach to dispositional ethics or virtue must be shaped by a sense of tragedy, paradox, or irony. The most moral disposition will be one which includes doubts about its own virtue.

This volume allows for a repositioning of Niebuhr in the context of contemporary moral theory as well as a rereading of the tradition of virtue ethics in the light of a distinctly Protestant, Christian realist and paradoxical view of virtue. As a result, it will be of great interest to scholars of Niebuhr and Christian Ethics and scholars working in Moral Philosophy and the Philosophy of Religion more generally.

After the re-emergence of the tradition of virtue ethics in the early 1980s Reinhold Niebuhr has often served as a foil for authors who locate themselves in that tradition. However, this exercise has often proved controversial. This collection of essays continues this work, across a wide range of subjects, with the aim of avoiding some of the polemics that have previously accompanied it.

The central thesis of this book is that putting the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian realism in dialogue with contemporary virtue theory is a profitable undertaking. An introductory essay argues against locating Niebuhr as a consequentialist and in favour of thinking of his work in terms of a dispositional ethics Contributors take different positions on whether Niebuhr’s dispositional ethics should be considered a form of virtue ethics or an alternative to virtue ethics. Several of the articles relate Niebuhr and Christian realism to particular virtues. Throughout there is an appreciation of the ways in which any Niebuhrian approach to dispositional ethics or virtue must be shaped by a sense of tragedy, paradox, or irony. The most moral disposition will be one which includes doubts about its own virtue.

This volume allows for a repositioning of Niebuhr in the context of contemporary moral theory as well as a rereading of the tradition of virtue ethics in the light of a distinctly Protestant, Christian realist and paradoxical view of virtue. As a result, it will be of great interest to scholars of Niebuhr and Christian Ethics and scholars working in Moral Philosophy and the Philosophy of Religion more generally.

For the last several decades, the Just-War debate amongst theologians has been dominated by two accounts of moral rationality. One side assumes a presumption against harm (PAH), and the other identifies with a presumption against injustice (PAI). From Presumption to Prudence in Just-War Rationality argues that the time has come to leave behind these two viewpoints in favour of a prudentially grounded approach to Just-War thinking.

In Parts 1 and 2 of the book, Kevin Carnahan offers immanent critiques of the PAI and PAH positions. In Part 3, utilising Paul’s treatment of the atonement and use of the idea of the imitation of Christ, he lays out an alternative to the ways in which theologians in favour of the PAI or PAH have construed the Christian narrative. In Part 4, Carnahan then develops a neo-Aristotelian account of prudence as a higher order virtue governing the interpretation of moral reality. Drawing on this account, he explores what Just-War rationality would look like if it were prudentially grounded. The work concludes with a case study on noncombatancy in the 2011 Israeli bombardment of Gaza.

This book offers a compelling new perspective on this important and pertinent subject. As such, academics and students in Religion, Theology, Philosophy, Ethics and Political Theory will all find it an invaluable resource on Just-War theory.

For the last several decades, the Just-War debate amongst theologians has been dominated by two accounts of moral rationality. One side assumes a presumption against harm (PAH), and the other identifies with a presumption against injustice (PAI). From Presumption to Prudence in Just-War Rationality argues that the time has come to leave behind these two viewpoints in favour of a prudentially grounded approach to Just-War thinking.

In Parts 1 and 2 of the book, Kevin Carnahan offers immanent critiques of the PAI and PAH positions. In Part 3, utilising Paul’s treatment of the atonement and use of the idea of the imitation of Christ, he lays out an alternative to the ways in which theologians in favour of the PAI or PAH have construed the Christian narrative. In Part 4, Carnahan then develops a neo-Aristotelian account of prudence as a higher order virtue governing the interpretation of moral reality. Drawing on this account, he explores what Just-War rationality would look like if it were prudentially grounded. The work concludes with a case study on noncombatancy in the 2011 Israeli bombardment of Gaza.

This book offers a compelling new perspective on this important and pertinent subject. As such, academics and students in Religion, Theology, Philosophy, Ethics and Political Theory will all find it an invaluable resource on Just-War theory.

The Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics continues to be an essential resource for students and faculty pursuing the latest developments in Christian and religious ethics, publishing refereed scholarly articles—a preeminent source for further research. The Journal also contains book reviews of the latest scholarship in the field.

After hundreds of years during which Eve was blamed for originating sin, St. Paul removed her from the narrative of the fall to create a "one man"/"one man" typology between Adam as the origin of sin and Christ as the source of salvation. This disappearance created a theological problem. Eve fell outside the narrative of sin and salvation. Early Christians, sensing the lack in Paul's formula, created an alternative typology between Eve, the mother of all the living, and Mary, the mother of Jesus. Eventually, early theologians attempted to solve the soteriological problem Eve posed by coordinating these two typologies. This solution, however, produced a furthur dilemma. Either Mary had to be posited as a second savior, or the salvation offered to Eve in the revised scheme had to be second-class. Neither option is theologically acceptable.

The Disappearance of Eve and the Gender of Christ proposes a solution to this problem. It revises Paul's original formula and with it a set of common claims about Christ's sex and gender. It accepts Christ as the new Adam and the new Eve and accepts that Christ is, theologically speaking, trans*.

Carnahan offers a new theology of sex and gender as a calling within a context of responsibility as a framework for making sense of Eve, Christ, and ourselves. He shows how, from first-century Roman culture to medieval mystical experience and into our own time, there exists a long tradition of seeing Christ as transgressing and even transitioning across sex and gender boundaries.