L. Aschenbrenner – författare

Tbis inquiry may be thought of as a sequel to The Concepts of Value and as an extension of the brief core-vocabulary of aesthetic concepts found in one of the appendices to it. In terms of sheer numbers, most of the value concepts of our language are to be found in the area of human relations and of the aesthetic. There are also other value vocabularies, shorter but equally important, for example, the cognitive and logical. These and other objects of pbilosopbical study (for example, the question of "other minds") deserve the kind of empirical survey that has been made of moral and aesthetic notions, if only to test a priori approaches to them. In the present studyan even more determined empirical approach than that adopted for the first has been found necessary. Once the moral or human value vocabulary has been identified, sentential contexts for the use of the terms readily come to mind. In a study of the language of criticism, however, the vocabulary has first to be sought in the utterances of critics themselves and quoted in sufficient context to make their critical intentions clear. The outcome is that the present study is of great length, about half of it being quotations from critics. The rule adopted for arriving at tbis length go on collecting quotations as long as new types of appraisal came was to to light.

The present work addresses itself to the question of the nature of appraisive concepts such as were the subject of investigation in The Concepts of Value* and The Concepts of Criticism. ** Many problems of prime importance in the theory of value could not be adequately treated there without diminishing the basic purpose of those studies which was above all to identify, classify and provide a general theoretical framework for the host of concepts with which we characterize and commend subjects of appraisal in all of the principal areas of human interest. The author might have forestalled the disappointment of some of his critics had he then explicitly promised to consider those problems at a later time. But his reluctance to promise what he might not be in a position to produce outweighed a keen awareness of what the problems are and of their evident seriousness. Although my treatment of such problems has only now been undertaken, in point of time my concern with them antedates by far the em­ pirical explorations of the two texts mentioned. Anyone who undertakes such a study is likely to have come under the in­ fluence of Professor Frank Sibley's 'Aesthetic Concepts't and of later develop­ ments in his analysis of certain appraisive concepts. What do such concepts mean and how do they mean9 These are the questions he treated in such a stimulating fashion.

This book concerns a single topic, coherence in the several arts, which is vague to begin with, but becomes progressively more precise as we proceed. While the book is not a formalist theory of art it aims to take steps toward clearing up the concept of form, which is of central interest in art, either by its observance or by deliberate defiance. While our interest is thus in one concept, it is as a matter of fact complex and covers some seven subordinate topics. Each of these important subjects is covered in separate chapters: the number of principal parts of artworks, their extent, size or magnitude, the intervallic relation between them, and their dimensional, contextual, tendentive, and connotational relations, all of which will be explained as we proceed. There are ample analyses or critiques devoted to particular artworks which appear in Part Two. While the book keeps to a fairly narrow range of subjects, breadth is there too, and the implication for all the arts is manifest. The examples cover mainly music, but there is a broad selection of architecture, sculpture, painting, both abstract and figural, and a brief selection from the field of narrative poetic art. Many more types of the arts had to be excluded to make the book of manageable size.

The present work addresses itself to the question of the nature of appraisive concepts such as were the subject of investigation in The Concepts of Value* and The Concepts of Criticism. ** Many problems of prime importance in the theory of value could not be adequately treated there without diminishing the basic purpose of those studies which was above all to identify, classify and provide a general theoretical framework for the host of concepts with which we characterize and commend subjects of appraisal in all of the principal areas of human interest. The author might have forestalled the disappointment of some of his critics had he then explicitly promised to consider those problems at a later time. But his reluctance to promise what he might not be in a position to produce outweighed a keen awareness of what the problems are and of their evident seriousness. Although my treatment of such problems has only now been undertaken, in point of time my concern with them antedates by far the em­ pirical explorations of the two texts mentioned. Anyone who undertakes such a study is likely to have come under the in­ fluence of Professor Frank Sibley''s ''Aesthetic Concepts''t and of later develop­ ments in his analysis of certain appraisive concepts. What do such concepts mean and how do they mean9 These are the questions he treated in such a stimulating fashion.

The present work addresses itself to the question of the nature of appraisive concepts such as were the subject of investigation in The Concepts of Value* and The Concepts of Criticism. ** Many problems of prime importance in the theory of value could not be adequately treated there without diminishing the basic purpose of those studies which was above all to identify, classify and provide a general theoretical framework for the host of concepts with which we characterize and commend subjects of appraisal in all of the principal areas of human interest. The author might have forestalled the disappointment of some of his critics had he then explicitly promised to consider those problems at a later time. But his reluctance to promise what he might not be in a position to produce outweighed a keen awareness of what the problems are and of their evident seriousness. Although my treatment of such problems has only now been undertaken, in point of time my concern with them antedates by far the em­ pirical explorations of the two texts mentioned. Anyone who undertakes such a study is likely to have come under the in­ fluence of Professor Frank Sibley's 'Aesthetic Concepts't and of later develop­ ments in his analysis of certain appraisive concepts. What do such concepts mean and how do they mean9 These are the questions he treated in such a stimulating fashion.

Tbis inquiry may be thought of as a sequel to The Concepts of Value and as an extension of the brief core-vocabulary of aesthetic concepts found in one of the appendices to it. In terms of sheer numbers, most of the value concepts of our language are to be found in the area of human relations and of the aesthetic. There are also other value vocabularies, shorter but equally important, for example, the cognitive and logical. These and other objects of pbilosopbical study (for example, the question of "other minds") deserve the kind of empirical survey that has been made of moral and aesthetic notions, if only to test a priori approaches to them. In the present studyan even more determined empirical approach than that adopted for the first has been found necessary. Once the moral or human value vocabulary has been identified, sentential contexts for the use of the terms readily come to mind. In a study of the language of criticism, however, the vocabulary has first to be sought in the utterances of critics themselves and quoted in sufficient context to make their critical intentions clear. The outcome is that the present study is of great length, about half of it being quotations from critics. The rule adopted for arriving at tbis length go on collecting quotations as long as new types of appraisal came was to to light.

Tbis inquiry may be thought of as a sequel to The Concepts of Value and as an extension of the brief core-vocabulary of aesthetic concepts found in one of the appendices to it. In terms of sheer numbers, most of the value concepts of our language are to be found in the area of human relations and of the aesthetic. There are also other value vocabularies, shorter but equally important, for example, the cognitive and logical. These and other objects of pbilosopbical study (for example, the question of "other minds") deserve the kind of empirical survey that has been made of moral and aesthetic notions, if only to test a priori approaches to them. In the present studyan even more determined empirical approach than that adopted for the first has been found necessary. Once the moral or human value vocabulary has been identified, sentential contexts for the use of the terms readily come to mind. In a study of the language of criticism, however, the vocabulary has first to be sought in the utterances of critics themselves and quoted in sufficient context to make their critical intentions clear. The outcome is that the present study is of great length, about half of it being quotations from critics. The rule adopted for arriving at tbis length go on collecting quotations as long as new types of appraisal came was to to light.

The task of presenting for explicit view the store of appraisive terms our language affords has been undertaken in the conviction that it will be of interest not only to ethics and other philosophical studies but also to various areas of social science and linguistics. I have principally sought to do justice to the complexities of this vocabulary, the uses to which it is put, and the capacities its use reflects. I have given little thought to whether the inquiry was philosophical and whether it was being conducted in a philosophical manner. Foremost in my thoughts were the tasks that appeared to need doing, among them these: explicit attention was to be given to the vocabulary by means of which we say we commend,judge, appraise, or evaluate subjects and subject matters in our experience; it was to be segregated from other language at least for the purpose of study; the types of appraisive resources that are at hand in a language such as English were to be classified in some convincing and not too artificial manner; and an empirical standpoint was to be developed for a better view of appraisal, evaluation, and judging within the framework of other ways we have of responding to our surround­ ings such as appetition and emotion on one side and factual registering and theorizing about states of affairs on the other. Such an inquiry has never been undertaken in quite this manner before.

The task of presenting for explicit view the store of appraisive terms our language affords has been undertaken in the conviction that it will be of interest not only to ethics and other philosophical studies but also to various areas of social science and linguistics. I have principally sought to do justice to the complexities of this vocabulary, the uses to which it is put, and the capacities its use reflects. I have given little thought to whether the inquiry was philosophical and whether it was being conducted in a philosophical manner. Foremost in my thoughts were the tasks that appeared to need doing, among them these: explicit attention was to be given to the vocabulary by means of which we say we commend,judge, appraise, or evaluate subjects and subject matters in our experience; it was to be segregated from other language at least for the purpose of study; the types of appraisive resources that are at hand in a language such as English were to be classified in some convincing and not too artificial manner; and an empirical standpoint was to be developed for a better view of appraisal, evaluation, and judging within the framework of other ways we have of responding to our surround­ ings such as appetition and emotion on one side and factual registering and theorizing about states of affairs on the other. Such an inquiry has never been undertaken in quite this manner before.