L. Samuelson – författare

A major production site of Soviet KV and T-34 tanks in WWII, the town of Cheliabinsk in the Urals was nicknamed 'Tankograd', its civilian machine-building factories swiftly converted to arms production. This book gives a social, economic and political panorama that describes everyday life in a typical Soviet company town during the Stalin era.

In the interwar period, Red Army commanders headed by Tukhachevskii developed a new doctrine of mobile warfare and ''deep operations''. The military requirements of armaments and industrial production in the event of war was a central parameter in Stalinist industrialization. Based on recently opened Russian archives, the book analyzes military dimensions of Soviet long-term economic and military reconstruction plans from the mid-1920s until 1941. It presents a new framework for estimating the Soviet war-economic preparations, drastically underestimated by contemporaries.

A major production site of Soviet KV and T-34 tanks in WWII, the town of Cheliabinsk in the Urals was nicknamed ''Tankograd'', its civilian machine-building factories swiftly converted to arms production. This book gives a social, economic and political panorama that describes everyday life in a typical Soviet company town during the Stalin era.

In the interwar period, Red Army commanders headed by Tukhachevskii developed a new doctrine of mobile warfare and 'deep operations'. Based on recently opened Russian archives, the book analyzes military dimensions of Soviet long-term economic and military reconstruction plans from the mid-1920s until 1941.

In the interwar period, Red Army commanders headed by Tukhachevskii developed a new doctrine of mobile warfare and 'deep operations'. The military requirements of armaments and industrial production in the event of war was a central parameter in Stalinist industrialization. Based on recently opened Russian archives, the book analyzes military dimensions of Soviet long-term economic and military reconstruction plans from the mid-1920s until 1941. It presents a new framework for estimating the Soviet war-economic preparations, drastically underestimated by contemporaries.