Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski – författare

In this book Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains.Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques.

This original analysis examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Though all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and Zagzebski concludes that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The discussion includes the relation between the foreknowledge dilemma and problems about the nature of time and the causal relation; the logic of counterfactual conditionals; and the differences between divine and human knowing states. An appendix introduces a new foreknowledge dilemma that purports to show that omniscient foreknowledge conflicts with deep intuitions about temporal asymmetry, quite apart from considerations of free will. Zagzebski shows that only a narrow range of solutions can handle this new dilemma. A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

This original analysis examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Though all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and Zagzebski concludes that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The discussion includes the relation between the foreknowledge dilemma and problems about the nature of time and the causal relation; the logic of counterfactual conditionals; and the differences between divine and human knowing states. An appendix introduces a new foreknowledge dilemma that purports to show that omniscient foreknowledge conflicts with deep intuitions about temporal asymmetry, quite apart from considerations of free will. Zagzebski shows that only a narrow range of solutions can handle this new dilemma. A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

This collection showcases the most influential published essays by philosopher Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. One of the most distinguished thinkers working in epistemology today, particularly where the theory of knowledge meets ethics and the philosophy of religion, Zagzebski is well-known for broadening epistemology and refocusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. Her work has greatly influenced the trajectory of contemporary epistemology, opening up new fields in analytic epistemology. The papers collected here are organized into six sections to underline the scope of her impact on six key subject areas of epistemology: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem.

This collection showcases the most influential published essays by philosopher Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. One of the most distinguished thinkers working in epistemology today, particularly where the theory of knowledge meets ethics and the philosophy of religion, Zagzebski is well-known for broadening epistemology and refocusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. Her work has greatly influenced the trajectory of contemporary epistemology, opening up new fields in analytic epistemology. The papers collected here are organized into six sections to underline the scope of her impact on six key subject areas of epistemology: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem.

This collection showcases the most influential published essays by philosopher Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. One of the most distinguished thinkers working in epistemology today, particularly where the theory of knowledge meets ethics and the philosophy of religion, Zagzebski is well-known for broadening epistemology and refocusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. Her work has greatly influenced the trajectory of contemporary epistemology, opening up new fields in analytic epistemology. The papers collected here are organized into six sections to underline the scope of her impact on six key subject areas of epistemology: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem.

This volume collects the published articles in philosophy of religion by the pre-eminent philosopher Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. The volume focuses on the major themes of her career, which is reflected in the sections of the volume: 1) Foreknowledge and Fatalism, 2) The Problem of Evil, 3) Death, Hell, and Resurrection, 4) God and Morality, 5) Omnisubjectivity, 6) The Rationality of Religious Belief, 7) Rational Religious Belief, Self-Trust, and Authority, and 8) God, Trinity, and the Metaphysics of Modality.A companion volume to Epistemic Values, her collected articles in epistemology, this volume will be an important resource for scholars in the philosophy of religion, religious epistemology, and religious ethics.

This volume collects the published articles in philosophy of religion by the pre-eminent philosopher Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. The volume focuses on the major themes of her career, which is reflected in the sections of the volume: 1) Foreknowledge and Fatalism, 2) The Problem of Evil, 3) Death, Hell, and Resurrection, 4) God and Morality, 5) Omnisubjectivity, 6) The Rationality of Religious Belief, 7) Rational Religious Belief, Self-Trust, and Authority, and 8) God, Trinity, and the Metaphysics of Modality.A companion volume to Epistemic Values, her collected articles in epistemology, this volume will be an important resource for scholars in the philosophy of religion, religious epistemology, and religious ethics.

This volume collects the published articles in philosophy of religion by the pre-eminent philosopher Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. The volume focuses on the major themes of her career, which is reflected in the sections of the volume: 1) Foreknowledge and Fatalism, 2) The Problem of Evil, 3) Death, Hell, and Resurrection, 4) God and Morality, 5) Omnisubjectivity, 6) The Rationality of Religious Belief, 7) Rational Religious Belief, Self-Trust, and Authority, and 8) God, Trinity, and the Metaphysics of Modality.A companion volume to Epistemic Values, her collected articles in epistemology, this volume will be an important resource for scholars in the philosophy of religion, religious epistemology, and religious ethics.

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski here explains and defends the idea that the God of the monotheistic religions does not only know all objective facts, but he also perfectly grasps the conscious states of all conscious beings from their own point of view. She calls that property omnisubjectivity. God not only knows that you are in pain, for instance, but is present in your pain, grasping your pain the way you grasp it. The same point applies to every feeling, every belief, every thought, every desire you have. It also applies to the conscious states of animals.Zagzebski begins with an account of what subjectivity is and why it differs from anything in the objective world, then argues that omnisubjectivity is entailed by divine omniscience and omnipresence, divine love and justice, and practices of prayer. She offers three models of how omnisubjectivity is possible: the empathy model, the perceptual model, and panentheism. She answers objections that it is incompatible with other attributes such as timelessness, immutability, impassibility, divine goodness, divine holiness, and infinity. She extends the account of omnisubjectivity to the divine grasp of possible but non-actual subjective states, arguing that God grasps all possible subjective states of all possible conscious beings in his imagination. She then applies the conclusions of the book to the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Many arguments in the book apply to all the monotheistic religions and some arguments apply to monotheistic Hinduism. The book concludes with the claim that subjectivity is primary in the universe. God is intrinsically subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Objectivity is being from the outside viewpoint, and it exists only relative to the created world.

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski here explains and defends the idea that the God of the monotheistic religions does not only know all objective facts, but he also perfectly grasps the conscious states of all conscious beings from their own point of view. She calls that property omnisubjectivity. God not only knows that you are in pain, for instance, but is present in your pain, grasping your pain the way you grasp it. The same point applies to every feeling, every belief, every thought, every desire you have. It also applies to the conscious states of animals.Zagzebski begins with an account of what subjectivity is and why it differs from anything in the objective world, then argues that omnisubjectivity is entailed by divine omniscience and omnipresence, divine love and justice, and practices of prayer. She offers three models of how omnisubjectivity is possible: the empathy model, the perceptual model, and panentheism. She answers objections that it is incompatible with other attributes such as timelessness, immutability, impassibility, divine goodness, divine holiness, and infinity. She extends the account of omnisubjectivity to the divine grasp of possible but non-actual subjective states, arguing that God grasps all possible subjective states of all possible conscious beings in his imagination. She then applies the conclusions of the book to the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Many arguments in the book apply to all the monotheistic religions and some arguments apply to monotheistic Hinduism. The book concludes with the claim that subjectivity is primary in the universe. God is intrinsically subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Objectivity is being from the outside viewpoint, and it exists only relative to the created world.

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski here explains and defends the idea that the God of the monotheistic religions does not only know all objective facts, but he also perfectly grasps the conscious states of all conscious beings from their own point of view. She calls that property omnisubjectivity. God not only knows that you are in pain, for instance, but is present in your pain, grasping your pain the way you grasp it. The same point applies to every feeling, every belief, every thought, every desire you have. It also applies to the conscious states of animals.Zagzebski begins with an account of what subjectivity is and why it differs from anything in the objective world, then argues that omnisubjectivity is entailed by divine omniscience and omnipresence, divine love and justice, and practices of prayer. She offers three models of how omnisubjectivity is possible: the empathy model, the perceptual model, and panentheism. She answers objections that it is incompatible with other attributes such as timelessness, immutability, impassibility, divine goodness, divine holiness, and infinity. She extends the account of omnisubjectivity to the divine grasp of possible but non-actual subjective states, arguing that God grasps all possible subjective states of all possible conscious beings in his imagination. She then applies the conclusions of the book to the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Many arguments in the book apply to all the monotheistic religions and some arguments apply to monotheistic Hinduism. The book concludes with the claim that subjectivity is primary in the universe. God is intrinsically subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Objectivity is being from the outside viewpoint, and it exists only relative to the created world.

Fatalism -- the thesis that something in the past necessitates the entire future -- is often argued for in three ways. One argument is that the truth of propositions about future events makes those events necessary. Another is that infallible divine foreknowledge necessitates all future human acts. The third is that the past history of the world in conjunction with universal causal laws necessitates the entire future. Each of these arguments depends on a premise of the necessity of the past. In Fatalism and the Logic of Time, Linda Zagzebski examines two interpretations of this necessity. One interpretation is the modal necessity of the past, and the other interpretation is the cause of closure of the past. She argues that the combination of the necessity of the past with the transfer of necessity principle is inconsistent with the truth of any proposition about the past that entails a proposition about the future. As such, the problem is much broader than fatalism. It is a problem in the logic of time. All arrows of time, as well as the arrows of physics, arise from the human experience of before and after -- but that experience does not itself require an arrow.

Fatalism -- the thesis that something in the past necessitates the entire future -- is often argued for in three ways. One argument is that the truth of propositions about future events makes those events necessary. Another is that infallible divine foreknowledge necessitates all future human acts. The third is that the past history of the world in conjunction with universal causal laws necessitates the entire future. Each of these arguments depends on a premise of the necessity of the past. In Fatalism and the Logic of Time, Linda Zagzebski examines two interpretations of this necessity. One interpretation is the modal necessity of the past, and the other interpretation is the cause of closure of the past. She argues that the combination of the necessity of the past with the transfer of necessity principle is inconsistent with the truth of any proposition about the past that entails a proposition about the future. As such, the problem is much broader than fatalism. It is a problem in the logic of time. All arrows of time, as well as the arrows of physics, arise from the human experience of before and after -- but that experience does not itself require an arrow.

Fatalism -- the thesis that something in the past necessitates the entire future -- is often argued for in three ways. One argument is that the truth of propositions about future events makes those events necessary. Another is that infallible divine foreknowledge necessitates all future human acts. The third is that the past history of the world in conjunction with universal causal laws necessitates the entire future. Each of these arguments depends on a premise of the necessity of the past. In Fatalism and the Logic of Time, Linda Zagzebski examines two interpretations of this necessity. One interpretation is the modal necessity of the past, and the other interpretation is the cause of closure of the past. She argues that the combination of the necessity of the past with the transfer of necessity principle is inconsistent with the truth of any proposition about the past that entails a proposition about the future. As such, the problem is much broader than fatalism. It is a problem in the logic of time. All arrows of time, as well as the arrows of physics, arise from the human experience of before and after -- but that experience does not itself require an arrow.

In this book Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains.Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques.Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques.

In this book Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains.Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community''s justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community''s perspective, its justifying claims are insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski''s argument shows, an individual''s acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques.

Widely regarded as one of the foremost figures in contemporary philosophy of religion, this book by Linda Zagzebski is a major contribution to ethical theory and theological ethics. At the core of the book lies a form of virtue theory based on the emotions. Quite distinct from deontological, consequentialist and teleological virtue theories, this one has a particular theological, indeed Christian, foundation. The theory helps to resolve philosophical problems and puzzles of various kinds: the dispute between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in moral psychology, the claims and counterclaims of realism and anti-realism in the metaphysics of value, and paradoxes of perfect goodness in natural theology, including the problem of evil. As with Zagzebski's previous Cambridge book Virtues of the Mind, this book will be sought out eagerly by a broad swathe of professionals and graduate students in philosophy and religious studies.

Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in epistemology, including the concept of knowledge. This highly original work of philosophy for professionals will also provide students with an excellent introduction to epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology.

Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in epistemology, including the concept of knowledge. This highly original work of philosophy for professionals will also provide students with an excellent introduction to epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology.

Widely regarded as one of the foremost figures in contemporary philosophy of religion, this book by Linda Zagzebski is a major contribution to ethical theory and theological ethics. At the core of the book lies a form of virtue theory based on the emotions. Quite distinct from deontological, consequentialist and teleological virtue theories, this one has a particular theological, indeed Christian, foundation. The theory helps to resolve philosophical problems and puzzles of various kinds: the dispute between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in moral psychology, the claims and counterclaims of realism and anti-realism in the metaphysics of value, and paradoxes of perfect goodness in natural theology, including the problem of evil. As with Zagzebski's previous Cambridge book Virtues of the Mind, this book will be sought out eagerly by a broad swathe of professionals and graduate students in philosophy and religious studies.

Two simple yet tremendously powerful ideas that shaped virtually every aspect of civilizationThis book is a breathtaking examination of the two greatest ideas in human history. The first is the idea that the human mind can grasp the universe. The second is the idea that the human mind can grasp itself. Acclaimed philosopher Linda Zagzebski shows how the first unleashed a cultural awakening that swept across the world in the first millennium BCE, giving birth to philosophy, mathematics, science, and virtually all the major world religions. It dominated until the Renaissance, when the discovery of subjectivity profoundly transformed the arts and sciences. This second great idea governed our perception of reality up until the dawn of the twenty-first century.Zagzebski explores how the interplay of the two ideas led to conflicts that have left us ambivalent about the relationship between the mind and the universe, and have given rise to a host of moral and political rifts over the deepest questions human beings face. Should we organize civil society around the ideal of living in harmony with the world or that of individual autonomy? Zagzebski explains how the two greatest ideas continue to divide us today over issues such as abortion, the environment, free speech, and racial and gender identity.This panoramic book reveals what is missing in our conception of ourselves and the world, and imagines a not-too-distant future when a third great idea, the idea that human minds can grasp each other, will help us gain an idea of the whole of reality.

Two simple yet tremendously powerful ideas that shaped virtually every aspect of civilizationThis book is a breathtaking examination of the two greatest ideas in human history. The first is the idea that the human mind can grasp the universe. The second is the idea that the human mind can grasp itself. Acclaimed philosopher Linda Zagzebski shows how the first unleashed a cultural awakening that swept across the world in the first millennium BCE, giving birth to philosophy, mathematics, science, and virtually all the major world religions. It dominated until the Renaissance, when the discovery of subjectivity profoundly transformed the arts and sciences. This second great idea governed our perception of reality up until the dawn of the twenty-first century.Zagzebski explores how the interplay of the two ideas led to conflicts that have left us ambivalent about the relationship between the mind and the universe, and have given rise to a host of moral and political rifts over the deepest questions human beings face. Should we organize civil society around the ideal of living in harmony with the world or that of individual autonomy? Zagzebski explains how the two greatest ideas continue to divide us today over issues such as abortion, the environment, free speech, and racial and gender identity.This panoramic book reveals what is missing in our conception of ourselves and the world, and imagines a not-too-distant future when a third great idea, the idea that human minds can grasp each other, will help us gain an idea of the whole of reality.

Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in epistemology, including the concept of knowledge. This highly original work of philosophy for professionals will also provide students with an excellent introduction to epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology.

Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in epistemology, including the concept of knowledge. This highly original work of philosophy for professionals will also provide students with an excellent introduction to epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology.